The petitioner, a citizen of Vietnam admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 1990, was ordered removed to Vietnam in April 2006 and placed on an order of supervision in January 2008 because ICE could not obtain travel documents from Vietnam. There was no indication that he failed to comply with his conditions, but his supervision was revoked and he was arrested on 5 August 2025. The court recorded that he “was apparently swept back into custody during an ICE surge in immigrant re-detentions.” He had been detained for just over four months, within the six-month period treated as presumptively reasonable, but the court held the presumption rebuttable and found his removal not reasonably foreseeable. It found “no indication that respondents made an individualized determination that Mr. Wana, as opposed to a generic Vietnamese immigrant, was likely to be removed in a reasonable period of time,” and that he “is of mixed parentage, has no documentation verifying his Vietnamese identity, has two criminal convictions, and has no family, connections, or resources to assist his return to Vietnam.” The government’s declaration was held inadmissible because it was not subscribed under penalty of perjury and because the deportation officer showed no personal knowledge of agreements between the two countries. On the re-detention, ICE had given notice and an informal interview, which “seems to be all that is required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).” Following E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, the court held that “Those meager procedures do not, however, provide the process due under the Fifth Amendment.” The government argued the third-country claims were not ripe because ICE was seeking travel documents to Vietnam. The court held that ICE’s internal memorandum of 9 July 2025 on third-country removals, the likelihood that he would not be issued travel documents to Vietnam, and “the recent third-country deportations of hundreds of immigrants, including pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants,” gave rise to “an imminent threat that Mr. Wana will face third-country removal.” Applying Aden v. Nielsen, it required reopened removal proceedings before any third-country removal. Adopting the reasoning of Nguyen v. Scott, the court found “that the government is intentionally removing noncitizens to countries with which they have no connection, often in contravention of the governing statute and regulations, and knowing that they will be subject to imprisonment or other punishment.” It prohibited removal “to any country where he is likely to face imprisonment or other punishment upon arrival.”
Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The punitive finding was made by adopting the reasoning of Nguyen v. Scott, not on evidence about a destination specific to this petitioner, and no third country had been named. The court held that the petitioner had not proven a violation of the re-detention regulations themselves; relief on re-detention rests on due process. In a footnote the court said it disagreed with cases holding that the six-month period runs from the final removal order whether or not the person is in custody.
Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Compliance with regulations Informal interview Due process Pre-deprivation hearing Travel documents Ripeness Third-country removal ICE policy of 9 July 2025 Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing
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