Decisions

E.D. Va. August 18, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The respondents stated that they expected to remove him to Honduras.

The petition, filed by the petitioner without a lawyer, contained “very little background information,” so the court relied on the respondents’ account. He had been removed to Honduras in 2011 and 2022 without claiming fear. On 23 May 2026 immigration officers took him into custody near Salisbury, Maryland, and reinstated the 2011 removal order; “Petitioner claimed fear of removal to Honduras.” He was referred for a reasonable fear interview on 15 July 2026. On 11 August 2026 an immigration judge took testimony and “concurred with the Department of Homeland Security’s determination that Petitioner’s fear of returning to his home country was not credible.” The court recorded that “Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(1), no administrative appeal is available.” On custody, the court held that “because Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1231 and a reinstated order of removal, he is not entitled to a bond hearing,” and that he “is not entitled to ‘any neutral custody determination’ as he suggests.” It treated the reinstated order as starting a new removal period: “Petitioner has only been detained on the reinstated order of removal since May 23, 2026, which is less than three months, and far less than the presumptively reasonable six-month period.” It stated that it “will not consider Petitioner’s assertions concerning the foreseeability of removal until after the six-month removal period has elapsed.” The petitioner relied on decisions concerning people re-detained for removal to a third country, including one in which removal to Mexico was enjoined. The court held that those decisions “are factually distinguishable from the instant case and are therefore inapposite.” The respondents told the court that “upon the conclusion of this habeas proceeding or the vacatur of the no movement order, Respondents should be able to promptly effectuate Petitioner’s final order of removal to his native Honduras.”

Bond hearing Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Reinstated removal orders Reasonable fear Self-represented petitioner Transfer out of district

Caution Not a third-country removal case. The facts are the respondents’ account, adopted because the petition gave little background. The negative reasonable fear determination was made by the immigration judge after the petition was filed and was not under review in this case. The court declined to consider whether removal is reasonably foreseeable until the six-month period has run, so the denial does not decide that question. With the no-transfer order vacated, the respondents said they expected to remove him promptly to Honduras. The copy is a scanned image with a machine-read text layer; quotations were checked against the page images.

S.D. Fla. April 28, 2026

Exhaustion was excused as futile and the detention is governed by section 1226(a), so the government must hold a bond hearing within five days at which it bears the burden by clear and convincing evidence, or release him.

Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing

Caution The brief treats this and Euceda v. Noem as a different question from third-country removal; no reporter or unofficial citation is printed and the brief does not name the judge (the docket suffix is BLOOM).

E.D. Cal. February 25, 2026 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: No third country was ever identified by the government. The injunction runs against removal to any of them without a fear hearing first.

Sam Sarfarzi-Esfahari had a final order of removal to Iran dating from 8 October 2004, deferral of removal under the Convention against Torture, and had been living under an Order of Supervision. He was re-detained. The court held that re-detaining him under the written policy he challenged violated due process, granted the petition, and ordered a bond hearing within fourteen days at which the government would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was a flight risk or a danger, failing which he was to be released. It separately barred the government from removing him to any third country without first giving him an individualised opportunity to say that he feared that country. On the question whether a challenge to a written policy is ripe before any particular third country has been named, the court held that it is, quoting the Ninth Circuit: where the harm alleged is directly traceable to a written policy there is an implicit likelihood of its repetition in the immediate future.

Third-country removal CAT deferral CAT Order of supervision Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Notice Due process Standing Ripeness Bond hearing Burden of proof Compliance with regulations ICE policy of 9 July 2025

Caution A district court decision. It binds the parties to it and nobody else. The relief has two halves and they are not the same: the detention half was granted in a narrower form than the magistrate judge had recommended, because the district judge ordered a hearing rather than immediate release. Note also the date. A document of 26 January 2026 in this case is findings and recommendations by a magistrate judge, which is a proposal and not an order. The operative decision is the order of 25 February 2026 adopting it in part. Citing the January date as the grant of relief would be wrong.

W.D. Tex. November 17, 2025 817 F. Supp. 3d 406

Mandatory detention reaches only a person currently seeking admission, so the petitioner, who holds Special Immigrant Juvenile status, must receive a bond hearing within fourteen days or be released.

Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing Attorney fees

Caution Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act were denied under Fifth Circuit authority holding the Act does not authorize fees for successful section 2241 motions, in contrast to the fee award in Aden v. Nielsen; no docket number is printed in the brief.

N.D. Cal. September 19, 2025 2025 WL 2689266

Due process bars re-detaining a noncitizen released after an individualized risk determination, even where detention is mandatory, without notice and a hearing on whether a material change of circumstances justifies re-detention.

Redetention Notice Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary injunction on the 'serious questions' standard, not a final judgment; the printed title reads 'Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order' although the body grants a preliminary injunction; the decretal paragraph states no forum, deadline, or burden of proof, although the body states a clear and convincing standard.

E.D. Cal. September 18, 2025 2025 WL 2675760 Third country: Kenya, Eritrea, Somalia, or Benin (mentioned to the petitioner; none secured)

The court enjoined third-country removal without written notice, a minimum of ten days to raise a Convention Against Torture claim, and reopening or fifteen days to seek reopening, but declined to order release under Zadvydas.

Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Withholding of removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Bond hearing Jurisdiction 1252(g) Diplomatic assurances

Caution Preliminary injunction converted from a temporary restraining order with merits briefing to follow, although the decretal paragraph says 'permanently enjoined'; the bond hearing within 30 days, which the government requested, appears in the analysis but not in the numbered decretal paragraphs; the judge is not named anywhere in the printout; the assurances material comes from the court's quotation of ICE's July 9, 2025 policy, not from any assurance in this case.

N.D. Cal. September 15, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: None identified in the orders read.

Aroldo Alberto Rodriguez Diaz had been released from immigration custody. When the government moved to re-detain him, the court held that he had raised serious questions on his claim that he holds a protected liberty interest in remaining at liberty, that due process therefore entitles him to notice and a hearing before he is taken back into custody, and that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in his favour. A restraining order issued the same day the application was made. A preliminary injunction followed in September.

Redetention Due process Notice Custody hearing Bond hearing Appeal pending

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only, and the only decision in this register currently known to be on appeal. The government has taken it to the Ninth Circuit, No. 25-7196. If that court rules, this entry will be behind the law until it is updated. The orders read do not mention the Convention against Torture, third-country removal, or an Order of Supervision; a secondary research memorandum described this case as involving all three, and it does not.

N.D. Cal. September 12, 2025 2025 WL 2637503

An asylum seeker released on her own recognizance is detained under section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), and due process entitles her to a pre-deprivation bond hearing before any re-arrest.

Redetention Notice Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary injunction, not a final judgment; substantive due process claims were expressly not reached; the country of origin is printed throughout as 'Columbia'; the decretal language, unlike the earlier temporary restraining order, does not repeat the word 'notice'.

W.D. La. August 27, 2025 2025 WL 2472136

A noncitizen present since 2005 and taken into custody as she left her immigration hearing is likely detained under section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2)(A), and must receive an individualized bond hearing or be released.

Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary posture, with the habeas petition still pending; the separate motion for release was denied and release was ordered only if the bond hearing was not held by September 5, 2025, and the outcome of that hearing is not in the file; the order does not separately label the relief as a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.

N.D. Cal. August 22, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. A full-text search of the decision returns no occurrence of the phrase.

Carolina Ortiz Calderon had applied for asylum, for withholding of removal and for protection under the Convention against Torture, and had been released on her own recognisance. On her re-detention the court held, in its own words, that the government "may not re-detain Ortiz Calderon during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court without providing her with a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge", and that detention requires clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger together with a showing that no lesser conditions would suffice.

Redetention Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Asylum Withholding of removal CAT

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. Her protection claims are recorded in the order as background. What was decided is the detention question alone. There is no holding here about removal to a third country and the phrase does not appear in the decision.

N.D. Cal. August 21, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Guatemala was the country in dispute, by a determination that he could be removed there.

Juan Edelmar Alva Alva was released on an Order of Supervision on 3 December 2018 and lived under it for nearly seven years. He did not challenge his final order of removal. What was in dispute was a determination that he could be removed to Guatemala. He was re-detained, and a restraining order of 7 August 2025 secured his release. The court then held that a person who has been at liberty on an Order of Supervision for that length of time has a liberty interest in remaining at liberty, and that the government may not re-detain him during the proceedings without first giving him a hearing before an immigration judge to decide whether detention is warranted on grounds of flight risk or danger to the community.

Redetention Order of supervision Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Third-country designation Notice

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. The order decides the detention question and does not decide whether he may lawfully be removed to Guatemala. It does not address protection under the Convention against Torture.

S.D. Fla. August 8, 2025 2025 WL 2280485; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153228 Third country: Guatemala

The emergency motion was denied: section 241.4(l)(2) required no notice or interview and both were in fact given, the Zadvydas claim was premature, and the regulatory stay barred removal to Mexico only.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g) Transfer out of district Bond hearing

Caution The brief records that this decision resolves the project's ledger claim 10 against the version previously carried: the motion was denied, and no appellate stay is supported, only the district court's interim order of June 12, 2025 staying transfer and removal. The decision splits from Grigorian, Zhu, Ceesay and Torres on whether section 241.4(l)(1) process attaches to an (l)(2) revocation, and from Gonzalez v. Noem and Zhu on jurisdiction to restrain a transfer.

N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. No third country appears in this decision.

Frescia Garro Pinchi had been released on bond. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested her again, without a warrant, at a courthouse. The court held that a person previously released on bond holds a protected liberty interest, that she was therefore likely to succeed on her claim that due process entitles her to a hearing before a neutral immigration judge before any re-arrest, and that the government may not re-detain her absent clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger to the community.

Redetention Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Arrest at a courthouse

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. It is about warrantless re-arrest and the right to a hearing before re-detention. It does not concern a final order of removal, protection under the Convention against Torture, or removal to a third country. The case is now docketed as Garro Pinchi v. Mullin after a change of respondent; the surname is Garro Pinchi, not Pinchi.

N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. No third country appears in this decision.

The petitioner holds a final administrative order of removal and has proceedings on withholding of removal and protection under the Convention against Torture on foot. What the court decided was narrower than that background suggests. It enjoined and restrained the government from re-detaining him without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, held before he is taken into custody, to evaluate whether re-detention is warranted on grounds of flight risk or danger to the community.

Redetention Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Withholding of removal CAT

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. The petitioner’s protection claims form the background to the case and are not what was decided. There is no holding here about removal to a third country. The case appears on the public docket under the petitioner’s full name, Reyes v. Kaiser; the anonymised form used here is the one the court uses in the caption of its own order.

W.D. Wash. April 24, 2025 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239

A noncitizen who entered without inspection and was arrested while living in the United States is likely detained under section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), and must receive a bond hearing within fourteen days.

Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary injunction on the named plaintiff's individual statutory claim; the order does not certify a class and is not a final ruling on the section 1225(b)(2) versus section 1226(a) question, and the court said the government would have a full opportunity to brief that question later; immediate release was declined in favour of a bond hearing; the plaintiff's country of citizenship is not stated; the decision was later distinguished in Martinez v. Scott (W.D. Wash., 27 August 2025).

U.S. June 13, 2022 596 U.S. 543 (2022) Third country: None. The question was detention authority and the scope of relief, not destination.

The respondents had been detained under section 1231(a)(6) while they sought withholding of removal after their earlier removal orders were reinstated. In two class actions, district courts in California and Washington ordered bond hearings for the class members after six months of detention; the Northern District of California “enjoined [the Government] from detaining [respondents] and the class members pursuant to section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a bond hearing.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed both. The Supreme Court reversed on a threshold question. It held that section 1252(f)(1) “generally prohibits lower courts from entering injunctions that order federal officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out the specified statutory provisions,” with one exception: lower courts retain authority to “enjoin or restrain the operation of” those provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” The Court concluded: “It is sufficient to hold that the classwide injunctive relief awarded in these cases was unlawful.” The opinion refers to the companion case decided the same day, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, for the detention authority under section 1231(a)(6).

Section 1252(f)(1) Class relief Bond hearing Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding-only proceedings Reinstated removal orders Detention pending removal

Caution The Court decided only the availability of class-wide injunctive relief. It did not decide whether people detained under section 1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings, and it left individual relief untouched by its own terms. The Court also said it had no occasion to decide whether section 1252(f)(1) reaches declaratory relief. The text read is the slip opinion, which is subject to formal revision.

U.S. June 29, 2021 594 U.S. 523; 141 S. Ct. 2271 Third country: None (the question was detention authority, not destination)

Reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court held that the detention of a person whose earlier removal order has been reinstated after unlawful reentry is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, not § 1226, so such people are not entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge while their withholding-only proceedings are pending. On the effect of a withholding grant, the Court said the removal order “remains in full force, and DHS retains the authority to remove the alien to any other country authorized by the statute,” a list the Court sets out that ends with “any country willing to accept the alien.” And: “In short, withholding-only relief is country-specific. It relates to where an alien may be removed. It says nothing, however, about the antecedent question whether an alien is to be removed from the United States.” 594 U.S. 536. Justice Breyer, dissenting for three, would have held that § 1226 governs and that a bond hearing is required.

Detention authority Reinstated removal orders Withholding-only proceedings Bond hearing Section 1226 and section 1231 Country-specific nature of withholding Contrary authority

Caution Contrary authority, included because it cuts against the argument rather than for it, and anyone relying on the cases in this collection should read it first. The question presented was which of two detention statutes applies during withholding-only proceedings. Revocation of an order of supervision, notice of a third-country designation, and the reliability of diplomatic assurances were not before the Court and are not addressed in the opinion.

W.D. Wash. December 6, 2019 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210865; 2019 WL 6683512 Third country: Somalia

The government's position was not substantially justified, and the court awarded $36,720 in fees and $2,170 in expenses at $450 per hour under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Attorney fees Notice Third-country designation

Caution Fees were denied for the unsuccessful motion-to-enforce phase. The brief notes that a Fifth Circuit decision cited elsewhere in the collection holds the Act does not authorize fees for successful section 2241 motions, so fee recovery depends on the circuit.

W.D. Wash. November 7, 2019 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194142; 2019 WL 5802013 Third country: Somalia

The court had habeas jurisdiction to review an immigration judge's no-bond determination for legal error and the petitioner stated a colorable due process claim, but prudential exhaustion applied and was not excused.

Bond hearing

Caution This is the unfavourable decision in the same case; fees were later denied for this phase as unsuccessful.

W.D. Wash. June 20, 2019 409 F. Supp. 3d 998; 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103569; 2019 WL 2548137 Third country: Somalia

DHS may designate a removal country outside removal proceedings, but designating Somalia without notice or an opportunity to be heard violated due process, so proceedings must be reopened before any removal there.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation Withholding of removal CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Bond hearing Prolonged detention (Zadvydas)

Caution The four-step notice procedure often attributed to this case comes from subsection D of the magistrate judge's report, which the district judge did not adopt; the court's statement that failing to advise of the right to apply for asylum or withholding is itself a due process violation is hedged as what Ninth Circuit case law 'suggests'; the court held detention was not indefinite under Zadvydas and granted only a bond hearing on that score. Any account presenting the case as forbidding administrative designation misstates it.