Decisions

W.D.N.Y. August 24, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The government stated only that ICE was “presently seeking to remove [Al Nassar] to a country other than Iraq.”

The petitioner came to the United States as a refugee in 2010, at fifteen, and became a lawful permanent resident two years later. After a 2017 conviction in New York State court, an immigration judge revoked that status and ordered him removed to Iraq, but granted deferral of removal to Iraq under the Convention Against Torture. ICE held him for three months from 20 December 2018 and released him on an order of supervision on 20 March 2019 because it was unable to “deport him to Iraq.” On 9 January 2026, at a “routine check-in,” ICE revoked his order of supervision and sent him to the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, where he remained. A post-order custody review panel recommended on 9 July 2026 that he stay detained. The government’s answer stated that “[d]ue to the grant of deferral of removal to Iraq, ICE is presently seeking to remove [Al Nassar] to a country other than Iraq.” The court held that he had met his initial burden: the government conceded that it released him in 2019 because it could not remove him, and it “does not offer any evidence showing that its ability to deport him has changed whatsoever in the intervening period.” In rebuttal the government relied on a five-month-old declaration and “includes no details about any efforts that it is making to remove Al Nassar to a third country, much less the status of those efforts,” and the custody review recommendation was “just as conclusory.” Rejecting the government’s call for deference, the court wrote: “the Government does not ask the Court to defer to its foreign policy judgment here: It asks the Court to defer to its say-so. Zadvydas does not demand such deference; it counsels its opposite.” It also held that “the Government cannot use Al Nassar’s criminal past to justify detaining him indefinitely when his removal is not reasonably foreseeable.” His continued detention was “neither statutorily nor constitutionally permissible,” and the court ordered his release within 24 hours.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Third-country removal Burden of proof Changed circumstances

Caution Release was ordered on the detention claim alone. The court did not resolve the parties’ dispute over whether ICE gave sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard before revoking supervision; those claims were dismissed without prejudice as moot. No third country was named in the record. The docket text filed with the decision describes the petition as granted; the decision itself grants it in part. The court’s earlier decision denying the government’s motion to dismiss was not read.

D. Md. August 21, 2026 Third country: Guatemala (removal on 10 July 2026; Guatemalan officials refused him and handed him to Mexican officials to be returned to Mexico). He was later removed to Mexico itself, the country of protection, on 1 August 2026.

An immigration judge granted Doe deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture in July 2024, finding that he was more likely than not to be tortured by the government, or with its acquiescence, if returned to Mexico. The finding rested on his substantial assistance to the Department of Justice and his testimony against defendants affiliated with Mexican drug cartels. Released on an order of supervision in November 2024, he lived in Maryland until he was taken into custody at a routine ICE check-in in January 2026. The court recorded that “Without any notice,” on 10 July 2026 the government removed him to Guatemala; Guatemalan officials refused him and handed him to Mexican officials to be returned to Mexico, but a Mexican consular official, on learning of his protection, had him returned to the United States the same day. On about 15 or 16 July 2026 he was removed a second time, allegedly directly to Mexico, and again returned. On 21 July 2026 the government purportedly served a Notice of Termination of Deferral of Removal, stating that the Department of State had received diplomatic assurances from the Mexican government that he would not be tortured and that the Acting ICE Director and the Secretary of State had found them reliable. The notice “gave no other information or details about the diplomatic assurances,” and bore no Spanish translation although Doe does not speak or read English. The parties agreed that this form of termination “is extremely rare.” On 1 August 2026 he was deported to Mexico, where he has been in hiding. The court held that it had jurisdiction despite 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) and § 1252(g), because Doe challenged the process used to end his protection, not his removal order, and the route the government chose left no record for a court of appeals to review: “This Court cannot accept the nonsensical result that Doe is unable to obtain judicial review of these executive actions by virtue of the path to termination chosen by the Executive itself.” Adopting the due process analysis of Khouzam v. Attorney General (3d Cir. 2008), which the parties agreed is the only case to have addressed termination on diplomatic assurances, the court found that Doe “was afforded no notice and no hearing whatsoever,” and concluded that “the manner in which Defendants revoked Doe’s CAT Deferral likely violated his procedural due process rights, exceeding the Defendants’ lawful authority.” It took judicial notice of statements by United States officials, and of State Department travel warnings, that “seemingly contradict any diplomatic assurances that the Mexican government can control cartels’ unlawful actions and protect Doe from torture.” Finding the remaining factors met, the court stressed that “There is an immense public interest in ensuring that persons who risk their personal safety to assist the government in prosecuting wrongdoing are not placed in harm’s way by the very entity they assisted,” and, following Noem v. Abrego Garcia, ordered the government to facilitate his return.

CAT deferral Diplomatic assurances Termination without notice Due process Third-country removal Chain refoulement Jurisdiction Jurisdiction 1252(g) Judicial review Access to counsel Remedy

Caution Interim relief only: a temporary restraining order. Much of the account of the removals comes from the complaint and declarations, and the second removal is described as “allegedly” directly to Mexico. The court said an evidentiary hearing would be needed to find the facts about the process provided. It ruled on the process used, not on whether the assurances were reliable or the termination valid. The opinion’s record citations refer to the sealed original case, and the court said an amended version would issue once the pseudonymous refiling was complete. A later memorandum opinion of 14 September 2026 (Document 49) denied the government’s motion for reconsideration, converted the order into a preliminary injunction, recorded that Doe had been returned to the United States, and recorded the government’s new account that the termination notice was served on 1 August 2026, the day of his removal, rather than on 21 July 2026.

C.D. Cal. May 26, 2026 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115713; 2026 WL 1471864

The court adjudged the revocation of the order of supervision and the re-detention unlawful and permanently enjoined re-detention without an individualized pre-detention hearing before a neutral arbiter and third-country removal without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral

Caution Entered over objections after de novo review of a magistrate judge's report that is not in the supplied file, so the reasoning behind the 'neutral arbiter' requirement has not been read; the brief notes these requirements go further than any other order in the collection.

D. Nev. April 24, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order.

Mr. Hassan was admitted to the United States in 2006 as a Sudanese refugee “fleeing genocide.” He was ordered removed on 8 February 2021 because of criminal convictions, but the immigration judge deferred his removal to Sudan under the Convention Against Torture “because it is likely that he will be tortured if returned to that country.” He was held for about 90 days and released because the government could not carry out his removal. On 15 January 2026 he was arrested in Weber, Utah, for riding a train without a ticket; four days later ICE took him into custody and moved him to the Nevada Southern Detention Center. The court counted his 2021 detention together with his 2026 detention, holding that “the government cannot simply restart the six-month clock whenever it chooses to re-detain him.” It found the government’s response “woefully insufficient to show that there is a significant likelihood of Hassan’s removal at all, let alone in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and granted the petition on that ground. It also held that ICE had given him neither notice of the reasons for revoking his release nor an informal interview: “It’s undisputed that those regulations were not followed here.” On third-country removal, the court described an ICE policy under which no notice or opportunity to be heard is given where “the United States has received diplomatic assurances from the country of removal that [noncitizens] removed from the United States will not be persecuted or tortured” and the Department of State deems them credible, and which otherwise allows removal on as little as six hours’ notice without asking whether the person fears removal. It held that where assurances are relied on, “Notice, let alone an opportunity to be heard, is not available to a noncitizen in that situation,” and that the notice route “does not comport with the fundamental requirements of due process.” Because removal to Sudan is deferred, the court found that any removal “will likely be effectuated under its unconstitutional third-country-removal policy.” It barred removal to any country not listed on his removal order unless the government first meets the requirements the order sets out: notice, asking whether he fears persecution or harm in the designated country and recording the answer in writing, telling him that he may seek protection by a motion to reopen, and adequate time to prepare and file it.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Informal interview Compliance with regulations Third-country removal Notice Diplomatic assurances Due process CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(g) Changed circumstances

Caution The ruling on the third-country policy concerns the policy as described in the record (ECF No. 8-5); no particular third country had been designated for him. The court did not reach his separate constitutional challenge to prolonged detention or his claim under the Administrative Procedure Act. The government filed its response late, and the court accepted it. After the order, the docket shows a motion to enforce filed on 27 April 2026 and a minute order on it on 1 May 2026, which have not been reviewed.

W.D. Wash. April 15, 2026 Third country: Canada, Mexico or the United Kingdom. The government said ICE was determining whether any of the three would accept him; it also said the petitioner had asked to be removed to Canada or Mexico.

The petitioner entered the United States in December 2005 at the age of eleven. Earlier in his removal case an immigration judge found him not competent to represent himself and a qualified representative was assigned. On 11 September 2025 an immigration judge ordered him removed to Iran and granted him deferral of removal to Iran under Article III of the Convention Against Torture. He was detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma. According to the government, immediately after the removal order ICE began “efforts to identify a third country for Petitioner’s removal,” and was “currently determining whether Canada, Mexico, or the United Kingdom, will accept Petitioner.” The government also said he had refused to cooperate with removal efforts and had received multiple failure to depart warnings. The government acknowledged that the presumptively reasonable six-month period had lapsed. The court held that the government’s statements about a third country “alone do not automatically render Petitioner’s removal” reasonably foreseeable, and that the government did not provide “any specific evidence or other information on what steps they have taken, or imminently intend to take, to effectuate Petitioner’s removal and ensure that he is not indefinitely detained.” On cooperation, it found that the government did “fail to identify how Petitioner has purportedly refused to cooperate with ICE, let alone how such a refusal has contributed to the delay.” The court ordered release within 72 hours, declining to prohibit GPS monitoring. It barred re-detention “unless and until he is provided with adequate notice and a hearing before an immigration court to determine whether re-detention is appropriate,” and barred removal to a third country “unless and until he is provided with adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, in accordance with all applicable laws.” Because it granted relief on prolonged detention, it did not reach the arguments on procedural due process, fear of removal and “punitive third-country banishment.”

CAT deferral Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Pre-deprivation hearing Notice Travel documents

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The court decided the petition on prolonged detention alone and expressly did not reach the claims on procedural due process, fear of removal or punitive third-country removal. The third-country protection it ordered is adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond; unlike several other orders from this district in the register, it does not specify reopened proceedings before an immigration judge. The statements about the petitioner’s refusal to cooperate are the government’s, and the court found them unsupported. The copy has no electronic filing stamp; the date given is the date the judge signed the order. The court’s docket heading on the copy reads “Babakhanlou v. Bondi et al”, but the caption of the order names Todd Blanche as first respondent.

D. Mass. February 25, 2026 2026 WL 521557

Granting the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Counts I and IV, dissolving the April 18, 2025 preliminary injunction, and dismissing Counts II, III, V and VI, the court declared the third-country removal policy unlawful and set it aside. The policy is identified as DHS’s memorandum of 30 March 2025, “Guidance Regarding Third Country Removals,” and ICE’s memorandum of 9 July 2025 issued after the Supreme Court’s stay. The court also declared that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(d) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) require the government to seek removal to a class member’s designated country, alternative country, or country of citizenship before effecting removal to a third country, and that class members have the right to meaningful notice before removal to any third country and to a meaningful opportunity to raise a country-specific claim before it. The opinion opens: “This case is about whether the Government may, without notice, deport a person to the wrong country, or a country where he is likely to be persecuted, or tortured, thereby depriving that person of the opportunity to seek protections to which he would be undisputedly entitled.” On the assurances the policy relies on: “nobody really knows anything about these purported ‘assurances.’ Whom do they cover? What do they cover? Why has the Government deemed them credible? How can anyone even know for certain that they exist?”

Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Class relief Diplomatic assurances Statutory sequence

Caution The judgment was stayed by its own terms “until fifteen days from date of issuance or until the First Circuit rules on any motion for an administrative stay or stay pending appeal, whichever occurs first.” The First Circuit granted the government a stay pending appeal on 16 March 2026, over the dissent of Judge Montecalvo; that order is registered separately. The class is defined in the judgment as those with a final removal order under INA sections 240, 241(a)(5) or 238(b), including withholding-only proceedings, whom DHS has deported or will deport on or after 18 February 2025 to a country not previously designated and not identified in writing in the prior proceedings. The First Circuit largely affirmed the judgment on 18 September 2026 (No. 26-1212) and dissolved its stay pending appeal on 23 September 2026. On 29 September 2026 the Supreme Court stayed the order and judgment and granted certiorari (No. 26-426), with argument set for December 2026; Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson would have denied the stay. That order is registered separately.

E.D. Cal. February 25, 2026 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: No third country was ever identified by the government. The injunction runs against removal to any of them without a fear hearing first.

Sam Sarfarzi-Esfahari had a final order of removal to Iran dating from 8 October 2004, deferral of removal under the Convention against Torture, and had been living under an Order of Supervision. He was re-detained. The court held that re-detaining him under the written policy he challenged violated due process, granted the petition, and ordered a bond hearing within fourteen days at which the government would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was a flight risk or a danger, failing which he was to be released. It separately barred the government from removing him to any third country without first giving him an individualised opportunity to say that he feared that country. On the question whether a challenge to a written policy is ripe before any particular third country has been named, the court held that it is, quoting the Ninth Circuit: where the harm alleged is directly traceable to a written policy there is an implicit likelihood of its repetition in the immediate future.

Third-country removal CAT deferral CAT Order of supervision Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Notice Due process Standing Ripeness Bond hearing Burden of proof Compliance with regulations ICE policy of 9 July 2025

Caution A district court decision. It binds the parties to it and nobody else. The relief has two halves and they are not the same: the detention half was granted in a narrower form than the magistrate judge had recommended, because the district judge ordered a hearing rather than immediate release. Note also the date. A document of 26 January 2026 in this case is findings and recommendations by a magistrate judge, which is a proposal and not an order. The operative decision is the order of 25 February 2026 adopting it in part. Citing the January date as the grant of relief would be wrong.

W.D. Wash. December 4, 2025 Final order 4 Dec 2025: 815 F. Supp. 3d 1191; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250760; 2025 WL 3484769. Preliminary injunction 7 Nov 2025: 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220311; 2025 WL 3123991. Earlier order 23 Oct 2025: 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209241; 2025 WL 2987766. Third country: Any third country where imprisonment was likely

Decided in two stages by Judge Lasnik. On 7 November 2025 the court granted a preliminary injunction on the notice and procedure claim, but refused the punitive claim, holding that the record before it lacked the specificity and examples regarding third-country imprisonment that were present in Nguyen v. Scott. On 4 December 2025, on a fuller record, the court granted the habeas petition, ordered release on conditions, and held that the practice of third-country removal paired with imprisonment is intended to be punitive and violates due process under Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236-38 (1896) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001). Wong Wing struck down a provision of the Chinese Exclusion Act imposing imprisonment at hard labour before removal, holding that Congress may expel but may not add infamous punishment without a trial by jury, and distinguishing detention while awaiting deportation from punishment. Adopting the formulation used four days earlier in Hambarsonpour v. Bondi, the court ordered the government not to remove the petitioner to any third country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm. The petitioner held deferral of removal to Nicaragua under the Convention against Torture, had been detained about twenty-four months, and the government had not requested travel documents from any third country. Two further passages matter. The court set out at length the account given in D.A. v. Noem, in which Judge Chutkan of the District of Columbia described five people who held withholding or deferral of removal being woken in the middle of the night at an ICE facility, shackled, put aboard a United States military cargo plane and flown to Ghana, a country none had any connection to, and taken to Dema Camp, described as a remote open-air detention facility surrounded by armed military guards. Judge Chutkan wrote that the case was "not an outlier" but part of what appeared to be "a pattern and widespread effort to evade the government's legal obligations by doing indirectly what it cannot do directly." Judge Lasnik called that account deeply concerning. Second, the court declined to go further. It recorded the petitioner's concern that the government is using third states as bridge countries to send people onward to the very country a United States immigration court has barred removal to, said it shared that concern, but found no sufficiently clear evidence of punitive intent on that record. It noted that the argument could be made in the reopened removal proceedings its own order required.

Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Infamous punishment Third-country removal Fifth Amendment due process Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT CAT deferral Notice Reopened removal proceedings

Caution The government appealed on 30 January 2026 and then withdrew the appeal. On 7 April 2026 the Ninth Circuit granted the appellant's own motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and ordered that the dismissal order serve as the mandate. No. 26-10166, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10166. The judgment was never reviewed on its merits and was never reversed. The injunction stands, and the government chose not to test it on appeal. The punitive holding in this line of cases traces back to Nguyen v. Scott, decided on 21 August 2025. This opinion records that Nguyen was voluntarily dismissed by its petitioner the following month after an agreement between the parties, and so never reached a merits decision. The findings that Abubaka, Hambarsonpour and this case all rest on were therefore made at the preliminary injunction stage of a case that was then settled. That does not make them wrong, and three courts have since adopted them on their own records, but anyone relying on this line should know where it begins. Note also the sequence within this case: the same judge refused the punitive claim in November for want of specific evidence about imprisonment in destination countries, and granted it in December once that evidence was supplied. The petitioner had twenty-four convictions and still obtained the injunction, because the protection does not depend on the record of the person invoking it. The court's refusal to find punitive intent in the use of bridge countries is a limit on the decision and is recorded above rather than left out.

D.N.M. December 4, 2025 Third country: In 2025 the government asked El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Peru to accept him; Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Peru declined. It also contacted ICE’s Middle East/East Africa Removal Division. Several countries, not named, declined in 2016 and 2017. The court recorded that at least five countries declined to accept him between 2016 and 2025.

The petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed to Mexico on 26 May 2016 and at the same time granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, “based on testimony and evidence that his life would be in danger if he returned to Mexico.” The government held him while it sought a third country and, after several countries declined, released him on an order of supervision on 9 March 2017. He missed an ICE appointment on 1 March 2023. On 14 February 2025 he was arrested at a Border Patrol checkpoint in New Mexico and detained at the Otero County Processing Center while the government again sought a third country. In June 2025 his former counsel asked to drop the deferral so he could be removed to Mexico; an immigration judge granted reopening and termination on 17 September 2025 without addressing his later motion to withdraw that request, and his appeal is pending. The court recorded that “the parties agreed that Petitioner’s CAT deferral remains legally operative during the pendency of the BIA appeal.” The court rejected the government’s argument that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) and (b)(9) barred review: “The government’s detention of Petitioner lacks the direct link to his removal proceedings or to the execution of his removal order to fall under the ambit of § 1252(g) or § 1252(b)(9).” It counted the four months he spent in detention in 2016 and 2017 toward the six-month period under Zadvydas v. Davis, stating that it “is disinclined to allow such gamesmanship by the government.” On the prospect of removal, the court found: “The government has also not been able to identify a third country to accept Petitioner.” It added that “between 2016 and 2025, at least five countries have declined to accept him,” and that even if a country agreed, “Petitioner may be entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek protection from removal, further prolonging his detention should he be allowed to remain in custody.” It held: “Because Petitioner has been detained more than six months and his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, his ongoing detention violates the INA.” It excused the failure to seek administrative review under 8 C.F.R. 241.13. The court did not decide whether the revocation of his supervision was lawful, but noted: “The government has provided no information about who made the decision to revoke Petitioner’s Order of Supervision, and whether it complied with § 241.4(l)(2) such that no notice or hearing was required.”

CAT deferral Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Jurisdiction 1252(g) Notice Informal interview

Caution Release rests on prolonged detention under Zadvydas alone. The court expressly did not decide whether the arrest and the revocation of supervision without notice or an interview were lawful, and it did not grant the requested order requiring notice and an opportunity to seek protection before any removal to a third country. The deferral was the subject of a pending appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals; the government argued that he would already have been removed to Mexico if not for that appeal. The court’s docket text records that the main document was replaced on 5 December 2025 at chambers’ request; the copy read is the court’s copy of Doc. 30, filed 4 December 2025, as published on govinfo.gov, and it matches the web printout on the site in substance.

N.D. Cal. October 10, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201666; 2025 WL 2899220 Third country: Jordan

Serious questions exist that the petitioner may not be detained without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, or removed to a third country without notice and an opportunity to apply for fear-based relief.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9)

Caution Preliminary injunction on a 'serious questions' showing, not a final merits ruling; issued by a magistrate judge, and the file does not state whether the parties consented; the supplied file is named for the July 26, 2025 temporary restraining order but contains the October 10, 2025 order.

E.D. Cal. September 18, 2025 2025 WL 2675760 Third country: Kenya, Eritrea, Somalia, or Benin (mentioned to the petitioner; none secured)

The court enjoined third-country removal without written notice, a minimum of ten days to raise a Convention Against Torture claim, and reopening or fifteen days to seek reopening, but declined to order release under Zadvydas.

Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Withholding of removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Bond hearing Jurisdiction 1252(g) Diplomatic assurances

Caution Preliminary injunction converted from a temporary restraining order with merits briefing to follow, although the decretal paragraph says 'permanently enjoined'; the bond hearing within 30 days, which the government requested, appears in the analysis but not in the numbered decretal paragraphs; the judge is not named anywhere in the printout; the assurances material comes from the court's quotation of ICE's July 9, 2025 policy, not from any assurance in this case.

S.D. Fla. September 9, 2025 824 F. Supp. 3d 1243

The revocation itself was authorized under section 241.4(l)(2)(iii), but the check-in desk conversation was not the required informal interview after return to custody, so seventy-five days of detention without a meaningful opportunity to be heard violated due process.

Redetention Informal interview Notice CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution Section 241.4 applied rather than section 241.13 because the petitioner never obtained a section 241.13 determination; the court flagged its disagreement with Chavez Barrios v. Ripa, a decision of the same district, on whether section 241.4(l)(1) process attaches to an (l)(2) revocation; the court retained jurisdiction to enforce.

C.D. Cal. September 3, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809; 2025 WL 4666804

The revocation notice was not individualized and stated no reasons, and ICE's belief that removal was now possible was no changed circumstance; release was ordered and re-detention or removal barred without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Redetention Notice Informal interview CAT deferral Third-country designation

Caution Temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on a preliminary record; the Form I-294 account reaches the court through a declaration by the petitioner's brother relaying a telephone call and is the record before the court, not a judicial finding; the brief warns that the 'border on the Kafkaesque' quotation in this order follows an ambiguous 'Id.' and is now traced to Roble v. Bondi at 772.

D. Mass. August 28, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established.

Granting the plaintiffs' motion under Rule 62.1, the court stated that it would dissolve its April 18, 2025 preliminary injunction if the First Circuit remanded the appeal for that purpose.

Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Class relief

Caution An interlocutory indicative ruling that does not itself dissolve the injunction; whether the First Circuit remanded, and whether the injunction was later dissolved, is not stated in the file; the disposition fits none of the listed categories, so 'Other' is used.

D. Minn. August 25, 2025 803 F. Supp. 3d 766

ICE's notice merely parroted the regulation and gave no individualized reasons for re-detention, and the government bore and failed to carry the burden of showing changed circumstances; release ordered.

Redetention Notice CAT deferral Third-country designation

Caution The court declined a forward-looking injunction against future re-detention and declined class-wide relief because the petitioner had not sued as a class. The brief establishes that the 'border on the Kafkaesque' quotation belongs to this decision at 772 and not to Nouri v. Herrera or Gonzalez v. Noem.

S.D. Fla. August 8, 2025 2025 WL 2280485; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153228 Third country: Guatemala

The emergency motion was denied: section 241.4(l)(2) required no notice or interview and both were in fact given, the Zadvydas claim was premature, and the regulatory stay barred removal to Mexico only.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g) Transfer out of district Bond hearing

Caution The brief records that this decision resolves the project's ledger claim 10 against the version previously carried: the motion was denied, and no appellate stay is supported, only the district court's interim order of June 12, 2025 staying transfer and removal. The decision splits from Grigorian, Zhu, Ceesay and Torres on whether section 241.4(l)(1) process attaches to an (l)(2) revocation, and from Gonzalez v. Noem and Zhu on jurisdiction to restrain a transfer.

N.D. Cal. August 6, 2025 2025 WL 2243616

Serious questions exist that due process bars detention or removal to any third country without notice and an opportunity to present a fear-based claim; sections 1252(g), (a)(5), (b)(9) and FARRA do not bar review.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9)

Caution Preliminary injunction on the 'serious questions' standard, converted from a temporary restraining order by consent; every merits finding is framed as a serious question and none is final; no third country is identified anywhere in the file, and the court did not identify the governing detention statute by number.

U.S. July 3, 2025 606 U.S. ___ (2025); 145 S. Ct. 2627

After the Supreme Court stayed the April 18, 2025 preliminary injunction, the district court held that its May 21, 2025 remedial order, which directed procedures for six class members already removed in violation of the injunction, remained in full force. On the government's motion the Supreme Court held otherwise: “The motion for clarification is granted. Our June 23 order stayed the April 18 preliminary injunction in full. The May 21 remedial order cannot now be used to enforce an injunction that our stay rendered unenforceable.”

Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Class relief Remedy

Caution Justice Kagan concurred, having voted against the stay: “I voted to deny the Government's previous stay application in this case, and I continue to believe that this Court should not have stayed the District Court's April 18 order enjoining the Government from deporting non-citizens to third countries without notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. But a majority of this Court saw things differently, and I do not see how a district court can compel compliance with an order that this Court has stayed.” Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice Jackson. This order resolves what an earlier register entry recorded as an unregistered further opinion at 145 S. Ct. 2627.

U.S. June 26, 2025 606 U.S. 259 (2025) Third country: None identified in the opinion. The final administrative removal order of 26 January 2021 directed removal to Jamaica.

Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, was processed for removal under the streamlined procedure for people convicted of aggravated felonies. On 26 January 2021 the Department of Homeland Security issued a final administrative removal order directing his removal to Jamaica. He did not contest removal from the United States but sought protection under the Convention Against Torture, telling an immigration officer that a Jamaican drug kingpin who had killed two of his cousins would likely kill him if he was returned. An immigration judge found him credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica. The Board of Immigration Appeals vacated that grant on 31 May 2022, and he filed a petition for review three days later. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition as filed too late, treating the 30-day deadline as running from the 2021 order and as jurisdictional. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment. On the first question it held “that a BIA order in a withholding-only proceeding is not a ‘final order of removal,’ and therefore the 30-day filing deadline cannot be satisfied by filing a petition for review within 30 days of the BIA’s withholding-only order.” Relying on Nasrallah v. Barr and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, it stated: “An order denying relief under the CAT is not a final order of removal and does not affect the validity of a previously issued order of removal or render that order non-final.” On the second question it held “that the 30-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional.” Because the government did not press the deadline, the Court wrote, “it does not preclude this case from proceeding on remand.” Answering the government’s concern that people might lose review of a later denial of protection, the Court said that “the Government can inform aliens of the need to file a petition within 30 days after the issuance of a FARO, and it can alert the court of appeals to the pendency of a withholding-only proceeding so that review there can wait until that issue is decided.” Justice Thomas, concurring, wrote that “the Fourth Circuit may nevertheless lack jurisdiction over this suit for a different reason,” because Riley sought review only of the order on his claim under the Convention and not of a final order of removal. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting in part for four Justices, wrote: “One should not be required to appeal an order before it exists.” In Part IV, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, she added that “the Government is obligated by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to provide noncitizens with adequate notice about the need for an immediate appeal to preserve the right to judicial review of CAT claims.”

CAT deferral Withholding-only proceedings Petition for review Judicial review Jurisdiction Notice

Caution The Court did not decide whether Riley is entitled to protection under the Convention. It decided only which order starts the 30-day period for a petition for review and that the period is not jurisdictional, and it returned the case to the Fourth Circuit, where Justice Thomas flagged a separate jurisdictional question. The holding on finality (Part II-A) was joined by five Justices and opposed by four; the holding that the deadline is not jurisdictional (Part II-B) was joined by all nine. Riley faced removal to his country of nationality, not to a third country. The text read is the preliminary print of volume 606, which the Reporter of Decisions states is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. The statement on notice in Part IV of the partial dissent is not part of the opinion of the Court.

U.S. June 23, 2025 606 U.S. ___ (2025); 145 S. Ct. 2153

On the government's application, the Supreme Court stayed the district court's classwide preliminary injunction pending appeal, removing the protection the class had been granted below. The order gives no reasons: “The application for stay presented to JUSTICE JACKSON and by her referred to the Court is granted. The April 18, 2025, preliminary injunction of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, case No. 25-cv-10676, is stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.”

Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Class relief

Caution Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice Kagan and Justice Jackson. The stay terminates automatically if certiorari is denied, and on the sending down of the judgment if it is granted. A further order of 3 July 2025 on the government's motion for clarification is registered separately.

D. Mass. April 18, 2025 778 F. Supp. 3d 355; 2025 WL 1142968

The court certified a class and preliminarily enjoined the government from removing class members to third countries without notice and a meaningful opportunity to seek relief under the Convention Against Torture.

Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Class relief

Caution Not read directly; described in later opinions. The injunction was stayed by the Supreme Court on June 23, 2025, and on August 28, 2025 the issuing court stated it would dissolve it if the First Circuit remanded. The briefs do not name the judge for this order and do not print the class definition in full.

W.D. Wash. December 6, 2019 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210865; 2019 WL 6683512 Third country: Somalia

The government's position was not substantially justified, and the court awarded $36,720 in fees and $2,170 in expenses at $450 per hour under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Attorney fees Notice Third-country designation

Caution Fees were denied for the unsuccessful motion-to-enforce phase. The brief notes that a Fifth Circuit decision cited elsewhere in the collection holds the Act does not authorize fees for successful section 2241 motions, so fee recovery depends on the circuit.

W.D. Wash. June 20, 2019 409 F. Supp. 3d 998; 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103569; 2019 WL 2548137 Third country: Somalia

DHS may designate a removal country outside removal proceedings, but designating Somalia without notice or an opportunity to be heard violated due process, so proceedings must be reopened before any removal there.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation Withholding of removal CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Bond hearing Prolonged detention (Zadvydas)

Caution The four-step notice procedure often attributed to this case comes from subsection D of the magistrate judge's report, which the district judge did not adopt; the court's statement that failing to advise of the right to apply for asylum or withholding is itself a due process violation is hedged as what Ninth Circuit case law 'suggests'; the court held detention was not indefinite under Zadvydas and granted only a bond hearing on that score. Any account presenting the case as forbidding administrative designation misstates it.

D.D.C. December 7, 2009 672 F. Supp. 2d 49; 2009 WL 4572732

Three Rwandan nationals, ethnic Hutus, had been held for two years by the Rwandan Patriotic Army at Kami camp, which they described as “an unofficial detention center to which only the RPA had access,” where they say they were subjected to “brutal physical and psychological torture.” Each confessed. Extradited to the United States in 2003 to stand trial, they succeeded in having those confessions suppressed as coerced and as products of torture, United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 85-86 (D.D.C. 2006), and the indictment was dismissed in February 2007. In the removal proceedings that followed, “[t]he immigration court ordered that the plaintiffs be removed to Rwanda, but granted their applications for deferral of removal under the CAT.” Then, as the court records: “On August 25, 2009, ICE notified the plaintiffs that it was considering terminating their deferrals of removal based on diplomatic assurances the Department of State had received from Rwanda’s Chief Prosecutor and the Rwandan Minister of Justice that none of the plaintiffs would be tortured if removed to Rwanda.” A footnote adds that Rwanda also assured the Department of State that any prosecution would comply with Rwandan and international law “and that none of the plaintiffs’ previously coerced confessions would be used against them.” ICE gave them until 6 November 2009 to submit written evidence why the assurances should not be credited. They argued that the process denied due process because there was no hearing before a neutral and impartial decision-maker and no guarantee that they would receive the full record or be notified of a final decision. The court denied a preliminary injunction on ripeness grounds, no final agency decision having been made.

CAT deferral Termination of deferral Diplomatic assurances Due process Neutral decisionmaker Ripeness

Caution The court decided nothing about the reliability of Rwanda’s assurances or the lawfulness of terminating a CAT deferral. It held only that the claim was not yet ripe. Its closing footnote states: “The court appreciates the very real danger the plaintiffs may face if they are returned to Rwanda, and reiterates that this decision was made on ripeness grounds alone.” The government stipulated it would not remove the plaintiffs before 8 December 2009 and said it would not remove them sooner than thirty days after a final decision. Whether the deferrals were ultimately terminated, and whether these three men were removed, the Coalition is still investigating.

3d Cir. December 5, 2008 549 F.3d 235 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

Precedential. The court held that the District Court lacked habeas jurisdiction and vacated its order, but that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the petition for review, that the rule of non-inquiry did not bar review, and that the government had denied Khouzam due process. It rejected the argument that assurances from Egypt are categorically insufficient, leaving the question to individualized determination. On the merits: “It is obvious that Khouzam was not afforded notice and a full and fair hearing prior to his imminent removal on the basis of diplomatic assurances. In fact, Khouzam was afforded no notice and no hearing whatsoever.” The government had given him nothing but “a cursory three-line letter dated three months after the termination decision had been made,” and beyond its bare assertions the court found “no record supporting the reliability of the diplomatic assurances.” Because the termination order was invalid and he had been taken into custody on the strength of it, he had to be restored to his earlier terms of release. Remanding to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the court set out what due process requires before removal on assurances: notice, an opportunity to present evidence and argument challenging the reliability of the assurances and the government’s compliance with the regulations before a neutral and impartial decisionmaker, and an individualized determination on a record disclosed to the person.

Diplomatic assurances CAT deferral Termination without notice Fifth Amendment due process Rule of non-inquiry Habeas jurisdiction REAL ID Act section 1252(a)(4) Petition for review Order of supervision Remand to the BIA

Caution The court did not hold that Egypt’s assurances were unreliable. It held that Khouzam was entitled to a hearing at which to test them, and remanded for that hearing. It rejected the argument that assurances from a state with an egregious record of torture are categorically insufficient. Removal here was to the petitioner’s own country, not to a third country.

M.D. Pa. January 10, 2008 529 F. Supp. 2d 543; 2008 WL 98545 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The writ was granted, the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to terminate the court-ordered deferral of removal was vacated, and Khouzam was ordered released forthwith on the conditions of supervision that had been in place before his redetention. The court reached three conclusions. First, diplomatic assurances from states regarded as routinely engaging in torture, such as Egypt, do not per se violate the Convention Against Torture or the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act. Second, there was a substantial question of fact whether the government had complied with its own regulations governing removal on a diplomatic assurance. Third, and decisively, the government’s refusal to expose the Egyptian assurance to review by any impartial adjudicator denied due process: “At the core of due process are the requirements of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard,” and neither was supplied. The court rejected the government’s position that the requisite opportunity to be heard was furnished by the habeas proceeding itself.

Diplomatic assurances CAT deferral Termination without notice Due process Notice and hearing Impartial adjudicator Compliance with regulations Release from custody Order of supervision

Caution Vacated on jurisdictional grounds. The Third Circuit held on 5 December 2008 that the District Court had no habeas jurisdiction over these claims and vacated this order, while reaching the same result on the merits by granting the petition for review. Cite the Third Circuit decision for the holding; this opinion remains the fuller statement of the reasoning and of the record. Removal here was to the petitioner’s own country, Egypt, not to a third country. The signed order carries a typographical error in its date line, reading “JANUARY, 2007” for 2008.

M.D. Pa. June 15, 2007 497 F. Supp. 2d 615; 2007 WL 1746367 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court refused to dismiss the habeas petition and stayed removal pending the outcome of the proceeding. Khouzam had been released in February 2006 under an order of supervision, after eight years in custody, on a finding that there was no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. When he reported to the ICE facility in York, Pennsylvania on 29 May 2007 as that order required, he was retaken into custody and handed a three-line letter from the Assistant Secretary for ICE stating that the Secretary of Homeland Security had terminated his deferral of removal to Egypt, effective four months earlier, on diplomatic assurances the government would not show him. Rejecting the government’s arguments that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction and that the petition raised non-justiciable political questions, the court held that Khouzam had presented justiciable issues falling within its habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a stay should continue: granting one “to assure proper observance of the applicable law serves the public interest.”

Diplomatic assurances CAT deferral Termination without notice Redetention at a reporting appointment Order of supervision Habeas jurisdiction Political question Stay of removal

Caution Interim relief only. This was a ruling on a motion to dismiss and a stay application, not a final judgment. This is the first of two opinions in the same case; the merits were decided on 10 January 2008. Removal here was to the petitioner’s own country, Egypt, not to a third country. The Third Circuit later held that the District Court had no habeas jurisdiction over these claims and vacated the January 2008 order on that ground, while granting the same relief on the petition for review.

E.D. Va. August 28, 2006 446 F. Supp. 2d 604

The petition was premature because the six-month post-removal period had not run, and ICE's active steps to secure a third country defeated the claim that removal was not significantly likely.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Third-country designation

Caution Adverse authority, and the brief carries it as such. Pre-removal custody does not count toward the six months. The petitioner was cooperating with ICE's efforts and consented to removal to a third country, so nothing in the case addresses removal over objection, without notice, or to a state where the person fears harm. The brief describes the grant only as 'CAT relief' without specifying withholding or deferral, and it does not print the decretal disposition.