Decisions

D. Colo. June 10, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 1678205 Third country: Cameroon; ICE had earlier sought acceptance from Libya, Tanzania and Lebanon, and had arranged a flight toward Equatorial Guinea

The court refused immediate release and a bond hearing, holding that the petitioner’s own refusal to board his flight made him the impediment to removal. It granted relief in part, ordering that notwithstanding Cameroon’s diplomatic assurances he receive written notice in a language he understands, and at least ten days and a hearing before an immigration judge to raise a fear-based claim, before removal to Cameroon or any other third country.

Third-country designation Notice Due process Diplomatic assurances Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction Class action

Caution Unpublished slip copy. The petitioner was self-represented and the application was liberally construed. The order rests on Pacheco v. Baltazar and on A.A.M. v. Andrews, and presumes familiarity with an earlier related habeas case. Respondents were ordered to file a status report within five days of the hearing, so the operative outcome post-dates this order.

E.D. Cal. March 26, 2026 833 F. Supp. 3d 1092; 2026 WL 849861. Findings and recommendations 10 March 2026, order adopting them 26 March 2026. Third country: None identified. The injunction is prospective.

A man ordered removed to Vietnam in 1998, released by a federal court in 2000 because there was no reasonable likelihood of removal, and living under an order of supervision since then, was taken into immigration custody in July 2025 on the day he was due to be paroled from a state sentence. He filed a habeas petition himself, without a lawyer, after his request for appointed counsel was refused. He won on every ground he raised. The magistrate judge recommended, and the district judge adopted, an order releasing him immediately on his previous conditions, requiring the government to hand back his identification, passport, work permit and social security card at release, and permanently barring the government from revoking his supervision again without following 8 C.F.R. 241.13(i) and due process. The order also set out, in numbers, what the government must do before it may remove him to any third country: a meaningful opportunity and at least ten days to raise a fear-based claim; if he shows a reasonable fear, the government must move to reopen his removal proceedings; and if he does not, a meaningful opportunity and at least fifteen days to seek reopening himself. On the punitive question the court found that, to the extent the policy deliberately seeks to remove people to countries where they will be imprisoned on arrival, it is punitive and violates due process, following Baltodano v. Bondi. It reached that finding on the petitioner's uncontested allegations, and explained why they were uncontested: the government did not address them, and under Rule 8(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure an allegation that is not denied is admitted. The same silence appears in Nguyen v. Scott, Abubaka v. Bondi and Baltodano v. Bondi, where courts recorded that the government argued only that the question was foreclosed and never answered it on the merits. The findings also record the state of D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security as at 10 March 2026: the District of Massachusetts had set the third-country removal policy aside as unlawful on 25 February 2026 and held that class members have a right to meaningful notice before removal to any third country and a meaningful opportunity to raise a country-specific claim against it; that judgment was stayed until 12 March 2026 or until the First Circuit ruled on a stay motion; and an appeal was pending.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Revocation of supervision Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Rule 8(b)(6) admission Self-represented petitioner D.V.D. class action

Caution The punitive finding rests on allegations the government never answered, treated as admitted under Rule 8(b)(6). That is a rule of pleading, not a finding on evidence, and the decision says so. It is a description of what happens when the government declines to contest a claim, and it would carry less weight against a government that had. This is a district court decision and binds only the parties. The petitioner had serious convictions, including a sentence of twenty-five years to life, and still obtained the injunction, because the protection does not depend on the record of the person invoking it. The account of D.V.D. above is the state of that case as the court recorded it on 10 March 2026, not as at today. Anyone relying on it should check where the appeal now stands.

W.D. Wash. February 11, 2026 826 F. Supp. 3d 1282; 2026 WL 381163 Third country: Uganda, by notice of intent September 2025. Requests later sent to Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with no reply.

A Russian man who arrived at a port of entry and was detained in May 2024 sought asylum on the ground that he feared persecution in Russia for opposing corruption. An immigration judge found he had a well-founded fear of future persecution by the Russian government and granted withholding of removal, recording that but for the presumption of ineligibility required by the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule she would have granted asylum outright. The government appealed, never filed a brief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal in June 2025. The government then kept him in detention while it looked for a third country. The court ordered his release within one day. Removal to Russia was barred by the immigration judge's order, and the government did not address the point in its brief at all. Its own declaration showed it had served him with a notice of intent to remove him to Uganda in September 2025, had then asked him to complete forms for the countries he had named, had not sent those requests to Denmark, Norway and Sweden until January 2026, and had received no reply from any of them. The court permanently barred removal to any third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in reopened removal proceedings with a hearing before an immigration judge. It set out the 9 July 2025 ICE memorandum in its own words, including the provision that where the Department of State believes diplomatic assurances credible, a person "may be removed without the need for further procedures." It recorded that the government itself accepts that courts in the district have found due process requires more than that policy, and it quoted the observation from Nguyen v. Scott that it would be impossible to comply both with Ninth Circuit precedent and the policy. It also held that the Supreme Court's stay in the D.V.D. class action does not bar an individual habeas petition, since it is not clear whether the stay rested on jurisdiction or on the merits, and one of the government's main arguments there concerned the power to grant class-wide relief, which has no bearing on individual cases. The punitive claim was refused, without prejudice. The court accepted that there is extensive evidence across multiple cases that the government is carrying out some third-country removals that are unconstitutionally punitive. But the law of permanent injunctions did not let it infer from those cases that everyone facing third-country removal is likely to suffer the same harm. It gave its reasons on these facts: this petitioner has no criminal record, and the countries the government had actually approached were Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Political persecution Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Diplomatic assurances Unconstitutional punishment D.V.D. class action Effect of the Supreme Court stay

Caution The petitioner won release and the notice protections, and lost on punishment. That loss is the reason this entry is here. Read with Saadhom v. Bondi and with the two-stage sequence in Baltodano v. Bondi, it shows what the punitive finding has so far depended on. It is not a doctrinal dispute. Every court to consider it has accepted that some of these removals are punitive. What divides the outcomes is whether the person before the court was shown to be at risk of that particular fate, which has turned on who they are and where the government was actually trying to send them. Here the court pointed to a petitioner with no criminal record and to proposed destinations in northern Europe. The refusal was without prejudice, so it decides nothing for the future if the destination changes. The Uganda notice recorded in this decision is a court record of a proposed destination, not a finding about conditions there. A district court decision, binding only on the parties.

W.D. Wash. December 23, 2025 817 F. Supp. 3d 1102; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265398 Third country: Mauritania and then Uganda, by successive statements of intent. Neither was ever pursued to the point of a travel document.

An Egyptian man was ordered released after two hundred and twenty-five days in immigration detention. An immigration judge had denied his asylum claim and ordered him removed to Egypt, but granted withholding of removal under the Convention against Torture, which meant a finding that if returned he would more likely than not be tortured. Both sides waived appeal. He has no citizenship or significant ties to any other country, no travel document had been obtained for anywhere, and no country had been identified as willing to take him. On detention the government offered no response at all. It conceded the six month period had passed, then ignored the burden that shifts to it. The court traced what the government had actually done. In May 2025 an officer told him of an intent to attempt removal to Mauritania. A consular request in June was unsuccessful. By September that plan had apparently been abandoned, because on 2 September, in the final days of the ninety day removal period, he was served with a notice of intent to remove him to Uganda. There was no evidence that any step was ever taken towards Uganda: no travel document sought, no interest shown by Uganda, no communication with Uganda about him at all, and Uganda was not among the consulates contacted. Then on 15 December, thirteen days after this petition was filed, he was handed a Mauritanian travel document application. The court said the government cannot overcome a pending petition by handing over an application and making a request to headquarters it could have made months earlier. The court rejected the argument that he lacked standing to challenge third-country removal. Standing was obvious, because the government conceded it was pursuing his removal to third countries. It added that the government's own assertion that he "has not independently raised fear in response to a notice of removal to Uganda" showed he had already been injured, because due process requires that a person be asked whether they fear the destination rather than left to volunteer it. It also rejected the argument that his membership of the D.V.D. class barred individual relief. The order sets out the 9 July 2025 ICE memorandum in detail, and it is the fullest account of that policy in this register. Where the United States has received diplomatic assurances the Department of State believes credible, a person "may be removed without the need for further procedures." Where it has not, an officer serves a notice of removal naming the country, but the policy states that ICE "will not affirmatively ask whether the [noncitizen] is afraid of being removed to the country of removal." ICE will generally wait at least twenty-four hours before removing, and in exigent circumstances only six. If the person does not affirmatively state a fear within twenty-four hours, they are removed. The court held these procedures fall far short of what due process requires, and found that the government had misrepresented what protections the policy actually gives. The punitive claim was refused without prejudice. The court recorded the petitioner's allegation, drawn from reporting in The New Yorker, that the government had attempted and completed an end run around the Convention against Torture by deporting a group of people to Ghana, which then sent them on to their countries of citizenship despite their fears of persecution. It noted that he did not substantiate the allegations, that the government did not deny them, and that courts in this district and across the country have recognised that the government is intentionally removing individuals to countries where they will be imprisoned. Even so, on these pleadings it had no sufficient basis to find the programme unconstitutional as a whole or punitive as applied to him, because the cases so finding were specific to a particular population and particular destination countries.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT Withholding of removal Standing Ripeness Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Diplomatic assurances ICE policy of 9 July 2025 Unconstitutional punishment D.V.D. class action

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The petitioner won release and the notice protections, and lost on punishment, without prejudice. The refusal follows the same line as Saadhom v. Bondi and Vashchuk v. Bondi. The court did not doubt that some of these removals are punishment. It said the findings to that effect were tied to particular populations and particular destinations, and that this petitioner had not connected himself to them. The Uganda and Mauritania notices recorded here are court records of what the government said it intended, not findings about conditions in either country. The court's point about Uganda was that nothing was ever done about it, which raises its own question about why the notice was served at all in the last days of the removal period. The account of the Ghana removals is the petitioner's allegation as the court recorded it, sourced to a magazine article. It is not a finding. The findings on Ghana are in D.A. v. Noem, recorded separately in this register.

E.D. Cal. December 4, 2025 815 F. Supp. 3d 1124; 2025 WL 3485219 Third country: Cameroon

The court held it retained habeas jurisdiction despite section 1252(g) and the pending D.V.D. class action, and that the petitioner was likely to succeed on his due process claim because the Third Country Removal Policy gave him no way to have a negative fear determination by a USCIS officer reviewed by an immigration judge. It enjoined removal to Cameroon or any other third country until he has a meaningful opportunity to present his fear claim before an immigration judge, holding that a discretionary motion to reopen is not an adequate substitute.

Third-country designation Notice Reasonable fear Withholding of removal CAT Due process Jurisdiction Class action

Caution Interim relief only: a temporary restraining order granted in part on a likelihood-of-success standard, not a final judgment. Two of the three requests were treated as moot after the government gave notice and conducted a screening interview during briefing. The motion to dismiss and a separate Zadvydas motion were left unresolved. A further order in the same case dated 19 December 2025 is not part of the document read.

E.D. Mich. July 24, 2017 261 F. Supp. 3d 820 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court granted a class-wide preliminary injunction halting removals to Iraq until class members could seek relief in the immigration courts. Its account of what had happened: “Without warning, over 1,400 Iraqi nationals discovered that their removal orders — many of which had lain dormant for several years — were now to be immediately enforced, following an agreement reached between the United States and Iraq to facilitate removal.” One named petitioner had been living in her community under a final order of removal since 1986. The court found that the resulting search for counsel had been “significantly impeded by the Government’s successive transfers of many detainees across the country, separating them from their lawyers and the families and communities who can assist in those legal efforts,” and that people who had lived peaceably for years under limited supervision had had little reason to incur the cost of a motion to reopen before the policy changed. Rejecting the government’s position that only the immigration courts could act, it held that “a federal district court is armed with jurisdiction to act as a first responder to protect the writ of habeas corpus and the allied right to due process,” so that people facing grave harm are not removed before having their day in court.

Mass redetention Long-dormant removal orders Bilateral repatriation agreement Habeas jurisdiction Suspension Clause Due process Motions to reopen Transfer of detainees Class action Preliminary injunction

Caution Vacated. The Sixth Circuit held on 20 December 2018 that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter either injunction and remanded with directions to dismiss the removal-based claims. The Sixth Circuit did not disturb the findings of fact recorded here, which is why they are kept in this collection. Removal was to the class members’ country of origin, not to a third country.