Decisions

E.D. Cal. June 27, 2026 Third country: Equatorial Guinea

An immigration judge had ordered the petitioner removed to Egypt but granted him withholding of removal to Egypt in 2018. In 2026 the government sought to remove him instead to Equatorial Guinea, and placed him on a charter manifest for 28 April 2026. The court recorded that he “had no knowledge of respondents’ intent to remove him to Equatorial Guinea at the time he filed his habeas petition.” The court granted the petition and enjoined the respondent from removing him “to a third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in reopened removal proceedings with a hearing before an Immigration Judge.” The record contains the government’s own account of how a removal of this kind is documented. A declaration filed by the Department of Homeland Security states: “His acceptance by Equatorial Guinea and placement on the manifest for this charter serves as the travel document in Petitioner’s removal.” The government relied on a Third Country Removal Agreement signed by the Department of State with the Government of Equatorial Guinea on 23 October 2025, said to contain assurances that people removed there “will not be subjected to persecution or torture,” which the State Department had determined credible. The court recorded that the respondents did not produce a copy of that agreement. The court declined to treat country-level assurances as a substitute for an individual decision, quoting Mbaba v. Perez: reliance on “blanket assurances is no substitute for an individualized determination through a proceeding that is appropriately calibrated to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Uncontested expert evidence before the court described more than two dozen third-country nationals removed by the United States to Equatorial Guinea since November 2025 who had subsequently been sent on to their countries of origin.

Third-country removal Notice Diplomatic assurances Travel documents Convention Against Torture Withholding of removal Chain refoulement Habeas corpus

Caution The agreement on which the removal rested was never produced to the court that was deciding whether the removal was lawful. The assurances are described in the record as the government’s representations and were not the subject of any judicial finding. The record is internally inconsistent on documentation. An earlier order in the same case, summarising a deportation officer’s declaration, states that travel documents for removal to Equatorial Guinea were received on 2 April 2026. That does not sit with the declaration that the manifest serves as the travel document. Nothing published resolves the two accounts, and the Coalition records both. The date above is that of the order adopting the findings and recommendations. The findings and recommendations themselves are dated 5 June 2026.

6th Cir. December 20, 2018 912 F.3d 869 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

Reversing, the court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) deprived the District Court of jurisdiction over the removal-based claims and that § 1252(f)(1) barred the class-wide injunction on the detention-based claims. It vacated both preliminary injunctions and remanded with directions to dismiss the removal-based claims. Judge White dissented, and would have held that the District Court had jurisdiction. The panel described the case as arising from “the government’s efforts to execute long-standing final removal orders of Iraqi nationals that the United States had, for many years, been unable to execute.”

Jurisdiction stripping Section 1252(g) Section 1252(f)(1) Class-wide injunctive relief Suspension Clause Habeas Preliminary injunction vacated Contrary authority

Caution Contrary authority, and controlling in the Sixth Circuit. It vacated the 24 July 2017 injunction recorded separately in this collection. The panel ruled on jurisdiction and on the form of relief; the lawfulness of the removals themselves, and the process due before an order of supervision is revoked, were not before it. The opinion was first filed unpublished on 20 December 2018 and designated for full-text publication the following day, which is why some sources date it 21 December.

W.D. Mo. March 22, 2018 Unreported; order at ECF No. 20 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court denied the government’s motion to dismiss and granted the habeas petition, ordering immediate release and directing that “Petitioner’s conditions of his order of supervision which were in effect before his detention are reinstated immediately.” The court held it had no authority to examine ICE’s decision to issue or to execute the removal order, but did have jurisdiction over the request for release from detention pending removal. Applying Zadvydas v. Davis to a case where removal was reasonably foreseeable, it weighed the statutory factors and found detention not reasonably necessary to secure removal: “Most notable, is the fact that Petitioner was released on an Order of Supervision in 2012 and has for the past 6 years adhered regularly to the conditions placed upon him.” It added that he had no criminal history and strong family and community ties.

Detention pending removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Section 1231(a)(6) Order of supervision Redetention Reinstatement of supervision conditions Habeas jurisdiction

Caution It is an unreported district court order, not binding on any other court. The petitioner held no withholding of removal and no protection under the Convention Against Torture, and no third country was involved; removal was to his country of citizenship. The legal basis is Zadvydas and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), not the post-order custody review regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13. What the order records is a court treating years of compliance with an order of supervision as a reason against redetention, and restoring the supervision conditions that redetention had displaced. A docket number of 5:18-cv-06099 sometimes attached to this case in secondary sources is wrong; that number belongs to an unrelated case.

E.D. Mich. July 24, 2017 261 F. Supp. 3d 820 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court granted a class-wide preliminary injunction halting removals to Iraq until class members could seek relief in the immigration courts. Its account of what had happened: “Without warning, over 1,400 Iraqi nationals discovered that their removal orders — many of which had lain dormant for several years — were now to be immediately enforced, following an agreement reached between the United States and Iraq to facilitate removal.” One named petitioner had been living in her community under a final order of removal since 1986. The court found that the resulting search for counsel had been “significantly impeded by the Government’s successive transfers of many detainees across the country, separating them from their lawyers and the families and communities who can assist in those legal efforts,” and that people who had lived peaceably for years under limited supervision had had little reason to incur the cost of a motion to reopen before the policy changed. Rejecting the government’s position that only the immigration courts could act, it held that “a federal district court is armed with jurisdiction to act as a first responder to protect the writ of habeas corpus and the allied right to due process,” so that people facing grave harm are not removed before having their day in court.

Mass redetention Long-dormant removal orders Bilateral repatriation agreement Habeas jurisdiction Suspension Clause Due process Motions to reopen Transfer of detainees Class action Preliminary injunction

Caution Vacated. The Sixth Circuit held on 20 December 2018 that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter either injunction and remanded with directions to dismiss the removal-based claims. The Sixth Circuit did not disturb the findings of fact recorded here, which is why they are kept in this collection. Removal was to the class members’ country of origin, not to a third country.

3d Cir. December 5, 2008 549 F.3d 235 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

Precedential. The court held that the District Court lacked habeas jurisdiction and vacated its order, but that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the petition for review, that the rule of non-inquiry did not bar review, and that the government had denied Khouzam due process. It rejected the argument that assurances from Egypt are categorically insufficient, leaving the question to individualized determination. On the merits: “It is obvious that Khouzam was not afforded notice and a full and fair hearing prior to his imminent removal on the basis of diplomatic assurances. In fact, Khouzam was afforded no notice and no hearing whatsoever.” The government had given him nothing but “a cursory three-line letter dated three months after the termination decision had been made,” and beyond its bare assertions the court found “no record supporting the reliability of the diplomatic assurances.” Because the termination order was invalid and he had been taken into custody on the strength of it, he had to be restored to his earlier terms of release. Remanding to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the court set out what due process requires before removal on assurances: notice, an opportunity to present evidence and argument challenging the reliability of the assurances and the government’s compliance with the regulations before a neutral and impartial decisionmaker, and an individualized determination on a record disclosed to the person.

Diplomatic assurances CAT deferral Termination without notice Fifth Amendment due process Rule of non-inquiry Habeas jurisdiction REAL ID Act section 1252(a)(4) Petition for review Order of supervision Remand to the BIA

Caution The court did not hold that Egypt’s assurances were unreliable. It held that Khouzam was entitled to a hearing at which to test them, and remanded for that hearing. It rejected the argument that assurances from a state with an egregious record of torture are categorically insufficient. Removal here was to the petitioner’s own country, not to a third country.

M.D. Pa. June 15, 2007 497 F. Supp. 2d 615; 2007 WL 1746367 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court refused to dismiss the habeas petition and stayed removal pending the outcome of the proceeding. Khouzam had been released in February 2006 under an order of supervision, after eight years in custody, on a finding that there was no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. When he reported to the ICE facility in York, Pennsylvania on 29 May 2007 as that order required, he was retaken into custody and handed a three-line letter from the Assistant Secretary for ICE stating that the Secretary of Homeland Security had terminated his deferral of removal to Egypt, effective four months earlier, on diplomatic assurances the government would not show him. Rejecting the government’s arguments that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction and that the petition raised non-justiciable political questions, the court held that Khouzam had presented justiciable issues falling within its habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a stay should continue: granting one “to assure proper observance of the applicable law serves the public interest.”

Diplomatic assurances CAT deferral Termination without notice Redetention at a reporting appointment Order of supervision Habeas jurisdiction Political question Stay of removal

Caution Interim relief only. This was a ruling on a motion to dismiss and a stay application, not a final judgment. This is the first of two opinions in the same case; the merits were decided on 10 January 2008. Removal here was to the petitioner’s own country, Egypt, not to a third country. The Third Circuit later held that the District Court had no habeas jurisdiction over these claims and vacated the January 2008 order on that ground, while granting the same relief on the petition for review.