Decisions

S.D. Fla. August 21, 2026 Third country: Mexico

The revocation notice cited an unchanged file, an unchanged interview, and bedspace availability, and the claimed interview came more than four months late, so the re-detention violated the regulation; release ordered.

Redetention Notice Informal interview Prolonged detention (Zadvydas)

Caution The Zadvydas claim was held premature at 120 days because this court does not aggregate detentions, and the brief sets out the split on aggregation. The account of the March 9, 2026 bus trip toward the Mexican border is the petitioner's, credited as the record before the court on an unopposed point, not a judicial finding. No reporter or unofficial citation is printed in the brief.

W.D. Mich. June 4, 2026 Third country: Palau, under a Third Country Removal agreement between the United States and Palau signed on 24 December 2025. ICE planned to remove her on a charter flight on 4 May 2026.

An immigration judge ordered the petitioner removed on 7 October 2025 but granted withholding of removal after finding it “more likely than not that [Petitioner’s] life or freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground if she were removed to Vietnam.” After nearly six months of post-order detention, the District of Arizona granted her first habeas petition on 17 March 2026, when the government conceded that it could not establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. She was released on 20 March 2026 on an order of supervision. On 27 April 2026 she attended a routine check-in at the Detroit ICE Field Office and was re-detained for removal to a third country. A declaration by an Acting Deputy Assistant Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations stated that she had been “accepted to be removed to Palau pursuant to a Third Country Removal agreement between the United States and Palau that was signed on December 24, 2025,” and that “The Petitioner’s acceptance by Palau and placement on the manifest for this charter serves as the travel document in the Petitioner’s removal.” The court granted a temporary restraining order on 1 May 2026 and she was released on 6 May 2026, so she was not on the 4 May 2026 flight. The government argued that Palau’s acceptance was a change of circumstances making removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court found that the respondents “do not provide any more details as to when the ‘next scheduled charter to Palau’ is scheduled to occur or whether Respondents have currently valid travel documents to allow Respondents to effect Petitioner’s removal,” and that “There is nothing in the record before the Court to indicate that Respondents have taken any further action since May 4, 2026, including securing currently valid travel documents, to effect the deportation of Petitioner.” The court held that “at this time, the Court is unable to conclude that Respondents have provided sufficient facts to show that removal is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.” It granted the petition, did not address the petitioner’s other claims, and kept all named respondents in the case so that its order would bind one with authority to act if she were transferred.

Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Informal interview Third-country removal Withholding of removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Changed circumstances Travel documents Habeas jurisdiction

Caution The finding is tied to the record before the court “at this time”; the court did not rule on removal to Palau as such and did not reach the petitioner’s other claims. In one section the opinion describes the grant as conditional; its conclusion states that a judgment granting the petition will be entered. That separate judgment was not read. The description of acceptance and manifest placement as the travel document is the government’s statement in a declaration, not a finding of the court.

C.D. Cal. May 26, 2026 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115713; 2026 WL 1471864

The court adjudged the revocation of the order of supervision and the re-detention unlawful and permanently enjoined re-detention without an individualized pre-detention hearing before a neutral arbiter and third-country removal without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral

Caution Entered over objections after de novo review of a magistrate judge's report that is not in the supplied file, so the reasoning behind the 'neutral arbiter' requirement has not been read; the brief notes these requirements go further than any other order in the collection.

D. Nev. April 24, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order.

Mr. Hassan was admitted to the United States in 2006 as a Sudanese refugee “fleeing genocide.” He was ordered removed on 8 February 2021 because of criminal convictions, but the immigration judge deferred his removal to Sudan under the Convention Against Torture “because it is likely that he will be tortured if returned to that country.” He was held for about 90 days and released because the government could not carry out his removal. On 15 January 2026 he was arrested in Weber, Utah, for riding a train without a ticket; four days later ICE took him into custody and moved him to the Nevada Southern Detention Center. The court counted his 2021 detention together with his 2026 detention, holding that “the government cannot simply restart the six-month clock whenever it chooses to re-detain him.” It found the government’s response “woefully insufficient to show that there is a significant likelihood of Hassan’s removal at all, let alone in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and granted the petition on that ground. It also held that ICE had given him neither notice of the reasons for revoking his release nor an informal interview: “It’s undisputed that those regulations were not followed here.” On third-country removal, the court described an ICE policy under which no notice or opportunity to be heard is given where “the United States has received diplomatic assurances from the country of removal that [noncitizens] removed from the United States will not be persecuted or tortured” and the Department of State deems them credible, and which otherwise allows removal on as little as six hours’ notice without asking whether the person fears removal. It held that where assurances are relied on, “Notice, let alone an opportunity to be heard, is not available to a noncitizen in that situation,” and that the notice route “does not comport with the fundamental requirements of due process.” Because removal to Sudan is deferred, the court found that any removal “will likely be effectuated under its unconstitutional third-country-removal policy.” It barred removal to any country not listed on his removal order unless the government first meets the requirements the order sets out: notice, asking whether he fears persecution or harm in the designated country and recording the answer in writing, telling him that he may seek protection by a motion to reopen, and adequate time to prepare and file it.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Informal interview Compliance with regulations Third-country removal Notice Diplomatic assurances Due process CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(g) Changed circumstances

Caution The ruling on the third-country policy concerns the policy as described in the record (ECF No. 8-5); no particular third country had been designated for him. The court did not reach his separate constitutional challenge to prolonged detention or his claim under the Administrative Procedure Act. The government filed its response late, and the court accepted it. After the order, the docket shows a motion to enforce filed on 27 April 2026 and a minute order on it on 1 May 2026, which have not been reviewed.

M.D. Fla. March 20, 2026 2026 WL 787639 Third country: Mexico

Because ICE gave written notice and an informal interview, the petitioner received what the Fifth Amendment requires, and his Zadvydas claim was premature at four months; the petition was denied.

Redetention Notice Informal interview Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9)

Caution Denied without prejudice to refiling after six months. This is a different petitioner from Chavez Barrios v. Ripa and the brief warns that the two Barrios cases must be kept separate in every list.

W.D. Wash. December 15, 2025 Third country: None identified in the order. The government was seeking a travel document from Vietnam.

The petitioner, a citizen of Vietnam admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 1990, was ordered removed to Vietnam in April 2006 and placed on an order of supervision in January 2008 because ICE could not obtain travel documents from Vietnam. There was no indication that he failed to comply with his conditions, but his supervision was revoked and he was arrested on 5 August 2025. The court recorded that he “was apparently swept back into custody during an ICE surge in immigrant re-detentions.” He had been detained for just over four months, within the six-month period treated as presumptively reasonable, but the court held the presumption rebuttable and found his removal not reasonably foreseeable. It found “no indication that respondents made an individualized determination that Mr. Wana, as opposed to a generic Vietnamese immigrant, was likely to be removed in a reasonable period of time,” and that he “is of mixed parentage, has no documentation verifying his Vietnamese identity, has two criminal convictions, and has no family, connections, or resources to assist his return to Vietnam.” The government’s declaration was held inadmissible because it was not subscribed under penalty of perjury and because the deportation officer showed no personal knowledge of agreements between the two countries. On the re-detention, ICE had given notice and an informal interview, which “seems to be all that is required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).” Following E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, the court held that “Those meager procedures do not, however, provide the process due under the Fifth Amendment.” The government argued the third-country claims were not ripe because ICE was seeking travel documents to Vietnam. The court held that ICE’s internal memorandum of 9 July 2025 on third-country removals, the likelihood that he would not be issued travel documents to Vietnam, and “the recent third-country deportations of hundreds of immigrants, including pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants,” gave rise to “an imminent threat that Mr. Wana will face third-country removal.” Applying Aden v. Nielsen, it required reopened removal proceedings before any third-country removal. Adopting the reasoning of Nguyen v. Scott, the court found “that the government is intentionally removing noncitizens to countries with which they have no connection, often in contravention of the governing statute and regulations, and knowing that they will be subject to imprisonment or other punishment.” It prohibited removal “to any country where he is likely to face imprisonment or other punishment upon arrival.”

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Compliance with regulations Informal interview Due process Pre-deprivation hearing Travel documents Ripeness Third-country removal ICE policy of 9 July 2025 Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The punitive finding was made by adopting the reasoning of Nguyen v. Scott, not on evidence about a destination specific to this petitioner, and no third country had been named. The court held that the petitioner had not proven a violation of the re-detention regulations themselves; relief on re-detention rests on due process. In a footnote the court said it disagreed with cases holding that the six-month period runs from the final removal order whether or not the person is in custody.

D.N.M. December 4, 2025 Third country: In 2025 the government asked El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Peru to accept him; Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Peru declined. It also contacted ICE’s Middle East/East Africa Removal Division. Several countries, not named, declined in 2016 and 2017. The court recorded that at least five countries declined to accept him between 2016 and 2025.

The petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed to Mexico on 26 May 2016 and at the same time granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, “based on testimony and evidence that his life would be in danger if he returned to Mexico.” The government held him while it sought a third country and, after several countries declined, released him on an order of supervision on 9 March 2017. He missed an ICE appointment on 1 March 2023. On 14 February 2025 he was arrested at a Border Patrol checkpoint in New Mexico and detained at the Otero County Processing Center while the government again sought a third country. In June 2025 his former counsel asked to drop the deferral so he could be removed to Mexico; an immigration judge granted reopening and termination on 17 September 2025 without addressing his later motion to withdraw that request, and his appeal is pending. The court recorded that “the parties agreed that Petitioner’s CAT deferral remains legally operative during the pendency of the BIA appeal.” The court rejected the government’s argument that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) and (b)(9) barred review: “The government’s detention of Petitioner lacks the direct link to his removal proceedings or to the execution of his removal order to fall under the ambit of § 1252(g) or § 1252(b)(9).” It counted the four months he spent in detention in 2016 and 2017 toward the six-month period under Zadvydas v. Davis, stating that it “is disinclined to allow such gamesmanship by the government.” On the prospect of removal, the court found: “The government has also not been able to identify a third country to accept Petitioner.” It added that “between 2016 and 2025, at least five countries have declined to accept him,” and that even if a country agreed, “Petitioner may be entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek protection from removal, further prolonging his detention should he be allowed to remain in custody.” It held: “Because Petitioner has been detained more than six months and his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, his ongoing detention violates the INA.” It excused the failure to seek administrative review under 8 C.F.R. 241.13. The court did not decide whether the revocation of his supervision was lawful, but noted: “The government has provided no information about who made the decision to revoke Petitioner’s Order of Supervision, and whether it complied with § 241.4(l)(2) such that no notice or hearing was required.”

CAT deferral Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Jurisdiction 1252(g) Notice Informal interview

Caution Release rests on prolonged detention under Zadvydas alone. The court expressly did not decide whether the arrest and the revocation of supervision without notice or an interview were lawful, and it did not grant the requested order requiring notice and an opportunity to seek protection before any removal to a third country. The deferral was the subject of a pending appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals; the government argued that he would already have been removed to Mexico if not for that appeal. The court’s docket text records that the main document was replaced on 5 December 2025 at chambers’ request; the copy read is the court’s copy of Doc. 30, filed 4 December 2025, as published on govinfo.gov, and it matches the web printout on the site in substance.

S.D. Tex. September 26, 2025 2025 WL 2774610

ICE re-detained the petitioner without a shown lawful revocation, notice of reasons, or the required informal interview, and his removal is not reasonably foreseeable; release was ordered with notice required once a third country is identified.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution The third-country notice claim was held premature even as summary judgment on it was denied, and no fixed notice period was set; final judgment was to be entered separately and is not in the file; the government produced no copy of any order revoking supervision; the court noted a split on whether the six-month period resets on re-detention.

S.D. Fla. September 9, 2025 824 F. Supp. 3d 1243

The revocation itself was authorized under section 241.4(l)(2)(iii), but the check-in desk conversation was not the required informal interview after return to custody, so seventy-five days of detention without a meaningful opportunity to be heard violated due process.

Redetention Informal interview Notice CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution Section 241.4 applied rather than section 241.13 because the petitioner never obtained a section 241.13 determination; the court flagged its disagreement with Chavez Barrios v. Ripa, a decision of the same district, on whether section 241.4(l)(1) process attaches to an (l)(2) revocation; the court retained jurisdiction to enforce.

C.D. Cal. September 3, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809; 2025 WL 4666804

The revocation notice was not individualized and stated no reasons, and ICE's belief that removal was now possible was no changed circumstance; release was ordered and re-detention or removal barred without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Redetention Notice Informal interview CAT deferral Third-country designation

Caution Temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on a preliminary record; the Form I-294 account reaches the court through a declaration by the petitioner's brother relaying a telephone call and is the record before the court, not a judicial finding; the brief warns that the 'border on the Kafkaesque' quotation in this order follows an ambiguous 'Id.' and is now traced to Roble v. Bondi at 772.

S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2025 798 F. Supp. 3d 400

The government gave no notice of revocation and no interview before re-detaining a man released in 2018, violating its own regulations and due process; release was ordered, and transfer after filing did not defeat jurisdiction.

Redetention Notice Informal interview Jurisdiction 1252(g) Transfer out of district

Caution Granted in part. The court's description of Westley v. Harper as reaching the merits of the section 241.4(l) claim is in tension with the project's earlier note that Westley was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and the brief directs that neither characterisation be published until the Westley opinion itself is read.

E.D. Cal. August 20, 2025 2025 WL 2791778

The re-detention was unlawful because ICE gave no informal interview and showed no changed circumstances making removal to China reasonably foreseeable; release was ordered and re-detention barred without notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution Temporary restraining order granted in part on a preliminary record, with a preliminary-injunction schedule to follow; the request to enjoin third-country removal was denied without prejudice as not ripe; the order introduces 'five claims' and then lists six, and several regulatory citations are printed irregularly.

S.D. Fla. August 8, 2025 2025 WL 2280485; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153228 Third country: Guatemala

The emergency motion was denied: section 241.4(l)(2) required no notice or interview and both were in fact given, the Zadvydas claim was premature, and the regulatory stay barred removal to Mexico only.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g) Transfer out of district Bond hearing

Caution The brief records that this decision resolves the project's ledger claim 10 against the version previously carried: the motion was denied, and no appellate stay is supported, only the district court's interim order of June 12, 2025 staying transfer and removal. The decision splits from Grigorian, Zhu, Ceesay and Torres on whether section 241.4(l)(1) process attaches to an (l)(2) revocation, and from Gonzalez v. Noem and Zhu on jurisdiction to restrain a transfer.