Decisions

3d Cir. December 5, 2008 549 F.3d 235 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

Precedential. The court held that the District Court lacked habeas jurisdiction and vacated its order, but that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the petition for review, that the rule of non-inquiry did not bar review, and that the government had denied Khouzam due process. It rejected the argument that assurances from Egypt are categorically insufficient, leaving the question to individualized determination. On the merits: “It is obvious that Khouzam was not afforded notice and a full and fair hearing prior to his imminent removal on the basis of diplomatic assurances. In fact, Khouzam was afforded no notice and no hearing whatsoever.” The government had given him nothing but “a cursory three-line letter dated three months after the termination decision had been made,” and beyond its bare assertions the court found “no record supporting the reliability of the diplomatic assurances.” Because the termination order was invalid and he had been taken into custody on the strength of it, he had to be restored to his earlier terms of release. Remanding to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the court set out what due process requires before removal on assurances: notice, an opportunity to present evidence and argument challenging the reliability of the assurances and the government’s compliance with the regulations before a neutral and impartial decisionmaker, and an individualized determination on a record disclosed to the person.

Diplomatic assurances CAT deferral Termination without notice Fifth Amendment due process Rule of non-inquiry Habeas jurisdiction REAL ID Act section 1252(a)(4) Petition for review Order of supervision Remand to the BIA

Caution The court did not hold that Egypt’s assurances were unreliable. It held that Khouzam was entitled to a hearing at which to test them, and remanded for that hearing. It rejected the argument that assurances from a state with an egregious record of torture are categorically insufficient. Removal here was to the petitioner’s own country, not to a third country.

7th Cir. January 5, 1998 132 F.3d 405 Third country: Russia

At the outset of a one-day hearing, at the request of the government, the immigration judge designated Russia as Mrs. Kossov’s country of deportation and Latvia as Mr. Kossov’s. The hearing and the asylum application concerned Latvia. The judge granted voluntary departure and, in the alternative, ordered them both deported to Russia. The Court of Appeals vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and remanded, concluding that the immigration judge had committed errors that severely prejudiced the couple’s ability to present their claim for asylum. The error was the absence of notice: “The IJ never informed the Kossovs, who at the time were without counsel, that they had the right to seek asylum here and introduce evidence specifically directed against deportability to Russia.” The court cited the regulation then in force, 8 C.F.R. 242.17(c)(2), as “providing that immigration judge must advise alien of right to apply for asylum or withholding of deportation with respect to any country specified as a possible deportation site, provided alien ‘expresses fear of persecution or harm upon return to’ such country”. It rejected the argument that designating the country at the start of the hearing was notice enough. That argument “fails miserably”, because the couple appeared without counsel and “It is too much to expect that they should have the expertise to adapt instantaneously to such an unexpected turn of events”. The couple had not raised the point before the Board of Immigration Appeals, which ordinarily forfeits it. The court held that it could reach the issue anyway: “What this Court is in effect asked to review is an order deporting the Kossovs to Russia in the absence of a fair hearing concerning that deportation. The BIA should have recognized sua sponte such a fundamental failure of due process during its consideration of the Kossovs’ challenge to the deportation order.”

Notice Third-country designation Due process Self-represented petitioner Jurisdiction Remand to the BIA

Caution A deportation case decided under the rules in force before the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, so its statutory and regulatory references are to provisions that have since been renumbered. The regulation it relied on, 8 C.F.R. 242.17(c)(2), has a successor at 8 C.F.R. 1240.11(c)(1), and the trigger phrase the court placed inside its own quotation marks, “expresses fear of persecution or harm upon return to”, appears in the rule in force today word for word. The Coalition has compared the court’s quotation with the current rule; it has not obtained the 1997 printing of the older one. The reported text is taken from a scanned reporter volume and carries line-break hyphens inside words. The reported decision also includes a separate concurring opinion, which the Coalition has not read.