Decisions

E.D. Cal. September 1, 2026 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Mexico

The district judge adopted the findings in part and granted the petition. The court assumed the more demanding Zadvydas standard applied, because the record did not make clear whether the re-detention rested only on changed circumstances or also on violations of the order of supervision. On that assumption the petitioner had shown no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future: the government produced no evidence that Mexico had formally accepted him, and removal to Mexico under the informal arrangement depends on the person’s consent, which he had refused on five occasions. Immediate release was ordered, and re-detention under 8 C.F.R. 241.13(i)(2) was enjoined unless there are material changed circumstances and a neutral decisionmaker finds a significant likelihood of removal.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Due process Pre-deprivation hearing

Caution The injunction against third-country removal that the magistrate judge had recommended was refused as premature, the court finding nothing in the record to suggest removal to any country other than Mexico was contemplated. A footnote preserves the government’s ability to re-detain for a further six months under 8 C.F.R. 241.13(i)(1) if the conditions of release are violated. The court noted concerns about the petitioner’s criminal history but held that Ninth Circuit authority directed release on conditions. Unpublished; no reporter citation established. The order cites the findings and recommendations as Document 32 where the docket shows Document 13.

E.D. Cal. August 28, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 2547035 Third country: Mexico

The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, finding nothing in the record to show that ICE gave the required informal interview on revoking the order of supervision, and that the government failed to carry its burden of changed circumstances because removal to Mexico under the standing arrangement depends on consent, which he refused at every service. She recommended release, a hearing before any re-detention, and an injunction barring third-country removal without fourteen days’ notice and an immigration judge hearing.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Notice Due process Pre-deprivation hearing

Caution This is a findings and recommendation, not a decision of the court, and as of 7 September 2026 no order adopting or rejecting it had issued. It should not be cited as a final holding. Unpublished slip copy. It issued before the petitioner’s reply deadline had run and on an untimely government response, and the court expressly declined to reach his other claims. The petitioner is self-represented. His criminal history was acknowledged and held not to justify continued detention, a point a reviewing judge could weigh differently.

E.D. Cal. August 27, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 2532065 Third country: Mexico

The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, finding that ICE revoked the order of supervision without the informal interview the regulations require, and failed to show changed circumstances making removal reasonably foreseeable, because removal to Mexico under the standing arrangement depends on the person’s consent, which he had repeatedly refused. She recommended release, a hearing before any re-detention, and an injunction barring third-country removal without fourteen days’ notice and an immigration judge hearing.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Notice Due process Reasonable fear Pre-deprivation hearing

Caution This is a findings and recommendation by a magistrate judge, not a decision of the court. It was adopted in part by the district judge on 1 September 2026, who granted the petition and ordered immediate release, but refused as premature the recommended injunction against third-country removal. That order is the court’s final position and has its own entry in this register. Unpublished slip copy. The third-country analysis is largely a block quotation of A.A.M. v. Andrews, so the language about a full and fair hearing before a neutral adjudicator is A.A.M.’s, not this court’s.

C.D. Cal. August 24, 2026 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190133

The subsequent-history line records that the writ of habeas corpus was granted, an injunction was granted, and judgment was entered.

Redetention Notice Withholding of removal

Caution Not read directly and not supplied; recorded only in the subsequent-history line of the printout of the February 26, 2026 order in the same case. No docket, judge, or terms are given for it.

C.D. Cal. August 24, 2026

Accepting the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge after de novo review of the portions to which the government objected, the court granted the petition. It ordered that Respondents are “ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) unless his re-detention is ordered at a custody hearing before a neutral arbiter in which the government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community.” Judgment was entered the same day in favour of the petitioner.

Order of supervision Revocation Redetention Custody hearing Burden of proof

Caution An unreported district court order. The reasoning is in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, which the Coalition has not obtained; this order adopts it without restating it. Note also that the injunction is framed in terms of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), whereas the February 2026 preliminary injunction in the same case turned on 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i); the file does not explain the shift.

W.D.N.Y. August 24, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The government stated only that ICE was “presently seeking to remove [Al Nassar] to a country other than Iraq.”

The petitioner came to the United States as a refugee in 2010, at fifteen, and became a lawful permanent resident two years later. After a 2017 conviction in New York State court, an immigration judge revoked that status and ordered him removed to Iraq, but granted deferral of removal to Iraq under the Convention Against Torture. ICE held him for three months from 20 December 2018 and released him on an order of supervision on 20 March 2019 because it was unable to “deport him to Iraq.” On 9 January 2026, at a “routine check-in,” ICE revoked his order of supervision and sent him to the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, where he remained. A post-order custody review panel recommended on 9 July 2026 that he stay detained. The government’s answer stated that “[d]ue to the grant of deferral of removal to Iraq, ICE is presently seeking to remove [Al Nassar] to a country other than Iraq.” The court held that he had met his initial burden: the government conceded that it released him in 2019 because it could not remove him, and it “does not offer any evidence showing that its ability to deport him has changed whatsoever in the intervening period.” In rebuttal the government relied on a five-month-old declaration and “includes no details about any efforts that it is making to remove Al Nassar to a third country, much less the status of those efforts,” and the custody review recommendation was “just as conclusory.” Rejecting the government’s call for deference, the court wrote: “the Government does not ask the Court to defer to its foreign policy judgment here: It asks the Court to defer to its say-so. Zadvydas does not demand such deference; it counsels its opposite.” It also held that “the Government cannot use Al Nassar’s criminal past to justify detaining him indefinitely when his removal is not reasonably foreseeable.” His continued detention was “neither statutorily nor constitutionally permissible,” and the court ordered his release within 24 hours.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Third-country removal Burden of proof Changed circumstances

Caution Release was ordered on the detention claim alone. The court did not resolve the parties’ dispute over whether ICE gave sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard before revoking supervision; those claims were dismissed without prejudice as moot. No third country was named in the record. The docket text filed with the decision describes the petition as granted; the decision itself grants it in part. The court’s earlier decision denying the government’s motion to dismiss was not read.

S.D. Fla. August 21, 2026 Third country: Mexico

The revocation notice cited an unchanged file, an unchanged interview, and bedspace availability, and the claimed interview came more than four months late, so the re-detention violated the regulation; release ordered.

Redetention Notice Informal interview Prolonged detention (Zadvydas)

Caution The Zadvydas claim was held premature at 120 days because this court does not aggregate detentions, and the brief sets out the split on aggregation. The account of the March 9, 2026 bus trip toward the Mexican border is the petitioner's, credited as the record before the court on an unopposed point, not a judicial finding. No reporter or unofficial citation is printed in the brief.

C.D. Cal. August 19, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 2434858 Third country: Mexico; a screening notice of 1 June 2026 recorded a finding that he had established it is more likely than not he would be persecuted in Mexico

The court held the petitioner was not subject to mandatory detention, his theft charge having been dismissed on completion of diversion, and that re-detaining him and revoking his order of supervision without a pre-deprivation hearing violated procedural due process. It ordered immediate release and entered a limited permanent injunction requiring seven days’ notice and a bond hearing before any re-detention, written notice and reopened proceedings before any third-country removal, and barring removal to Mexico outright.

Redetention Pre-deprivation hearing Due process Third-country designation Notice Withholding of removal Credible fear

Caution Unpublished slip copy. A final decision on the parties’ consent to a magistrate judge, not a recommendation, so no district-judge adoption was required. No subsequent history appears as of 7 September 2026. The court resolved the case on procedural due process and did not adjudicate the grounds concerning flight risk or conditions of detention, did not apply the substantive due process standards it set out, and did not reach an indefinite-detention analysis. The printed text contains an apparent drafting error describing removal to a country other than Cuba, which is language from a cited case and not this petitioner, and an inconsistent docket reference to the screening notice.

C.D. Cal. August 17, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 2395216 Third country: Mexico

The court granted the petition, holding that re-detaining a person who had complied with an order of supervision since 2018, at a scheduled check-in and without notice or a hearing, violated procedural due process, and ordered her immediate release. It entered a limited permanent injunction requiring at least seven days’ notice and a hearing before an immigration judge before any re-detention, and written notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond in reopened proceedings before any attempt to remove her to a country other than Guatemala.

Redetention Due process Notice Third-country designation Withholding of removal CAT

Caution Unpublished slip copy. Decided by a magistrate judge on the parties’ full consent, so unlike the recommendations in this collection it is a final and appealable judgment. As of 7 September 2026 no subsequent history appeared, but the decision is recent enough that the appeal window and any post-judgment motions may still be open. The printed text carries several original typographical errors.

E.D. Cal. July 10, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 1999108 Third country: None identified; the third-country analysis is general and no destination was named

The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, finding detention had passed the presumptively reasonable six months with no significant likelihood of removal, and that ICE revoked release without the notice and prompt informal interview the regulations require. He recommended release, an injunction against re-detention absent strict compliance, and an injunction against third-country removal without at least ten days’ notice and a meaningful opportunity to raise a fear-based claim before an immigration judge.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Due process Third-country designation Notice CAT

Caution This is a findings and recommendation, not a decision of the court, issued with a shortened seven-day objection period. It was ADOPTED IN PART AND REJECTED IN PART by the district judge on 21 July 2026, so parts of what is recommended here do not stand; the 21 July order must be read before this is relied on. Unpublished slip copy. The magistrate judge expressly declined to reach the claim that the detention hearing was constitutionally inadequate.

W.D. Mich. June 4, 2026 Third country: Palau, under a Third Country Removal agreement between the United States and Palau signed on 24 December 2025. ICE planned to remove her on a charter flight on 4 May 2026.

An immigration judge ordered the petitioner removed on 7 October 2025 but granted withholding of removal after finding it “more likely than not that [Petitioner’s] life or freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground if she were removed to Vietnam.” After nearly six months of post-order detention, the District of Arizona granted her first habeas petition on 17 March 2026, when the government conceded that it could not establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. She was released on 20 March 2026 on an order of supervision. On 27 April 2026 she attended a routine check-in at the Detroit ICE Field Office and was re-detained for removal to a third country. A declaration by an Acting Deputy Assistant Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations stated that she had been “accepted to be removed to Palau pursuant to a Third Country Removal agreement between the United States and Palau that was signed on December 24, 2025,” and that “The Petitioner’s acceptance by Palau and placement on the manifest for this charter serves as the travel document in the Petitioner’s removal.” The court granted a temporary restraining order on 1 May 2026 and she was released on 6 May 2026, so she was not on the 4 May 2026 flight. The government argued that Palau’s acceptance was a change of circumstances making removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court found that the respondents “do not provide any more details as to when the ‘next scheduled charter to Palau’ is scheduled to occur or whether Respondents have currently valid travel documents to allow Respondents to effect Petitioner’s removal,” and that “There is nothing in the record before the Court to indicate that Respondents have taken any further action since May 4, 2026, including securing currently valid travel documents, to effect the deportation of Petitioner.” The court held that “at this time, the Court is unable to conclude that Respondents have provided sufficient facts to show that removal is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.” It granted the petition, did not address the petitioner’s other claims, and kept all named respondents in the case so that its order would bind one with authority to act if she were transferred.

Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Informal interview Third-country removal Withholding of removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Changed circumstances Travel documents Habeas jurisdiction

Caution The finding is tied to the record before the court “at this time”; the court did not rule on removal to Palau as such and did not reach the petitioner’s other claims. In one section the opinion describes the grant as conditional; its conclusion states that a judgment granting the petition will be entered. That separate judgment was not read. The description of acceptance and manifest placement as the travel document is the government’s statement in a declaration, not a finding of the court.

C.D. Cal. May 26, 2026 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115713; 2026 WL 1471864

The court adjudged the revocation of the order of supervision and the re-detention unlawful and permanently enjoined re-detention without an individualized pre-detention hearing before a neutral arbiter and third-country removal without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral

Caution Entered over objections after de novo review of a magistrate judge's report that is not in the supplied file, so the reasoning behind the 'neutral arbiter' requirement has not been read; the brief notes these requirements go further than any other order in the collection.

N.D. Ind. May 22, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The government identified Iran as the only country under consideration.

The petitioner, an Iranian citizen who entered the United States in 1999, was ordered removed on 13 November 2002 after criminal convictions in Illinois. ICE released him on an order of supervision on 22 October 2012, and he remained on release for nearly thirteen years until ICE detained him on 17 September 2025. He was held at the Miami Correctional Facility, a facility of the Indiana Department of Correction, and filed the petition without a lawyer. The court held, by reference to its earlier decision in Liang v. English, that “jurisdiction is secure insofar as this opinion goes,” despite the government’s reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and § 1252(b)(9). The government identified Iran as the only country under consideration. An ICE official attested on 13 April 2026 that “the airspace over Iran is closed which has paused removals to Iran” and that “[r]emovals will resume once the airspace reopens.” The court found that the petitioner had shown good reason to believe removal was not foreseeable, noting the recent military conflict “between the United States and Iran and the present uncertainty of a resolution, which reasonably impedes any removal to Iran for the foreseeable future.” The court held that the government had not rebutted that showing. It found that “the precise relationship between the efforts to remove Mr. Khodabakhsh and the closure of Iran’s airspace is unclear,” that “it is less clear how closed airspace would hinder efforts to obtain travel documents,” and that the government did not explain why travel documents had not been obtained “after eight months of detention, five of which predate the current conflict with Iran,” or suggest that a formal request had been submitted. The court said it “has no insight into if or when an agreement allowing removals to continue might be reached. More important, the government has presented no such insight, so has not met its burden today.” It ordered his release on the same conditions as his last release, adding that efforts to remove him “may continue while he returns to supervision.”

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Order of supervision Travel documents Jurisdiction 1252(g) Self-represented petitioner

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The order concerns detention only: removal to Iran remains the government’s stated aim, and the court said efforts to remove him may continue. No third country and no protection from removal appear in the order. The court’s assessment of the conflict with Iran and the closure of Iranian airspace is as of 22 May 2026.

N.D. Cal. May 14, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 1915726 Third country: Saint Kitts and Nevis

The court granted a preliminary injunction barring removal to Saint Kitts and Nevis, or any other country not designated on the removal order, unless the petitioner is first given notice and an opportunity to pursue fear-based protection, and barring re-detention without notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. It held that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions did not apply because he challenges the manner of his detention and removal rather than the removal order, and declined to treat the March 2025 policy memorandum or the State Department’s credibility finding on Saint Kitts’ diplomatic assurances as displacing binding circuit precedent on due process.

Third-country designation Notice Withholding of removal CAT Redetention Due process Jurisdiction Diplomatic assurances

Caution A preliminary injunction, resting on likelihood of success and not a final merits ruling; the habeas petition remains pending and the order runs until further order of the court. Unpublished slip copy. An APPEAL WAS FILED IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT ON 14 JULY 2026, so its status should be checked before reliance. The court expressly declined to weigh the evidence about conditions faced by third-country deportees, and did not reach the substantive due process claim.

E.D. Cal. April 27, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 1133268 Third country: None identified; the government said it was pursuing removal to China, but the court reached the third-country claim because ICE was operating under its third-country removal policy

The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition on the claims that re-detention breached the changed-circumstances requirement and amounted to unconstitutionally indefinite detention, China having repeatedly declined to issue travel documents, and that an earlier preliminary injunction be made permanent. Reaching the third-country claim, she recommended barring any third-country removal without twenty-one days’ written notice in a language the petitioner understands, at least ten days to raise a fear-based claim, a government motion to reopen if reasonable fear is shown, and at least fifteen days to seek reopening if it is not.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Due process Third-country designation Notice Reasonable fear CAT Jurisdiction

Caution This is a findings and recommendation, not a decision of the court, with a seven-day objection period. As of 7 September 2026 no order adopting it appeared, so the docket should be checked before it is treated as operative. Unpublished slip copy. The detention holdings are not independent analysis: the magistrate judge rests on the district judge’s earlier preliminary injunction reasoning because the evidentiary record had not changed. Three of the claims were not reached. The printed text repeatedly miscites the governing regulation.

D. Nev. April 24, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order.

Mr. Hassan was admitted to the United States in 2006 as a Sudanese refugee “fleeing genocide.” He was ordered removed on 8 February 2021 because of criminal convictions, but the immigration judge deferred his removal to Sudan under the Convention Against Torture “because it is likely that he will be tortured if returned to that country.” He was held for about 90 days and released because the government could not carry out his removal. On 15 January 2026 he was arrested in Weber, Utah, for riding a train without a ticket; four days later ICE took him into custody and moved him to the Nevada Southern Detention Center. The court counted his 2021 detention together with his 2026 detention, holding that “the government cannot simply restart the six-month clock whenever it chooses to re-detain him.” It found the government’s response “woefully insufficient to show that there is a significant likelihood of Hassan’s removal at all, let alone in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and granted the petition on that ground. It also held that ICE had given him neither notice of the reasons for revoking his release nor an informal interview: “It’s undisputed that those regulations were not followed here.” On third-country removal, the court described an ICE policy under which no notice or opportunity to be heard is given where “the United States has received diplomatic assurances from the country of removal that [noncitizens] removed from the United States will not be persecuted or tortured” and the Department of State deems them credible, and which otherwise allows removal on as little as six hours’ notice without asking whether the person fears removal. It held that where assurances are relied on, “Notice, let alone an opportunity to be heard, is not available to a noncitizen in that situation,” and that the notice route “does not comport with the fundamental requirements of due process.” Because removal to Sudan is deferred, the court found that any removal “will likely be effectuated under its unconstitutional third-country-removal policy.” It barred removal to any country not listed on his removal order unless the government first meets the requirements the order sets out: notice, asking whether he fears persecution or harm in the designated country and recording the answer in writing, telling him that he may seek protection by a motion to reopen, and adequate time to prepare and file it.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Informal interview Compliance with regulations Third-country removal Notice Diplomatic assurances Due process CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(g) Changed circumstances

Caution The ruling on the third-country policy concerns the policy as described in the record (ECF No. 8-5); no particular third country had been designated for him. The court did not reach his separate constitutional challenge to prolonged detention or his claim under the Administrative Procedure Act. The government filed its response late, and the court accepted it. After the order, the docket shows a motion to enforce filed on 27 April 2026 and a minute order on it on 1 May 2026, which have not been reviewed.

W.D. Wash. April 15, 2026 Third country: Canada, Mexico or the United Kingdom. The government said ICE was determining whether any of the three would accept him; it also said the petitioner had asked to be removed to Canada or Mexico.

The petitioner entered the United States in December 2005 at the age of eleven. Earlier in his removal case an immigration judge found him not competent to represent himself and a qualified representative was assigned. On 11 September 2025 an immigration judge ordered him removed to Iran and granted him deferral of removal to Iran under Article III of the Convention Against Torture. He was detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma. According to the government, immediately after the removal order ICE began “efforts to identify a third country for Petitioner’s removal,” and was “currently determining whether Canada, Mexico, or the United Kingdom, will accept Petitioner.” The government also said he had refused to cooperate with removal efforts and had received multiple failure to depart warnings. The government acknowledged that the presumptively reasonable six-month period had lapsed. The court held that the government’s statements about a third country “alone do not automatically render Petitioner’s removal” reasonably foreseeable, and that the government did not provide “any specific evidence or other information on what steps they have taken, or imminently intend to take, to effectuate Petitioner’s removal and ensure that he is not indefinitely detained.” On cooperation, it found that the government did “fail to identify how Petitioner has purportedly refused to cooperate with ICE, let alone how such a refusal has contributed to the delay.” The court ordered release within 72 hours, declining to prohibit GPS monitoring. It barred re-detention “unless and until he is provided with adequate notice and a hearing before an immigration court to determine whether re-detention is appropriate,” and barred removal to a third country “unless and until he is provided with adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, in accordance with all applicable laws.” Because it granted relief on prolonged detention, it did not reach the arguments on procedural due process, fear of removal and “punitive third-country banishment.”

CAT deferral Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Pre-deprivation hearing Notice Travel documents

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The court decided the petition on prolonged detention alone and expressly did not reach the claims on procedural due process, fear of removal or punitive third-country removal. The third-country protection it ordered is adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond; unlike several other orders from this district in the register, it does not specify reopened proceedings before an immigration judge. The statements about the petitioner’s refusal to cooperate are the government’s, and the court found them unsupported. The copy has no electronic filing stamp; the date given is the date the judge signed the order. The court’s docket heading on the copy reads “Babakhanlou v. Bondi et al”, but the caption of the order names Todd Blanche as first respondent.

D. Md. April 7, 2026 Third country: Mexico (notices of revocation of release and of removal served 15 February 2026).

Ms. Mendoza Palacios was ordered removed on 2 August 2019 but granted withholding of removal as to El Salvador under the Convention Against Torture, because she had shown that she would more likely than not be tortured there. She was released on an order of supervision, has no criminal convictions, and was not alleged to have breached her supervision. ICE detained her without prior notice on 14 February 2026 and the next day served notices of its intent to remove her to Mexico; at the informal interview she said “she doesn’t have any family member in Mexico.” After the court entered a temporary restraining order, an asylum officer gave her a telephone “third country screening” on 10 March 2026. By her account she described being kidnapped in Mexico in about October 2012 by “gang members acting in concert with a uniformed police officer” and held for about two weeks. The officer found that she “did not establish that it is more likely than not that [she] will be persecuted or tortured in Mexico.” The government filed no opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that she “has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that until and unless an immigration judge concurs with the asylum officer’s determination that she lacks a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico, due process precludes her removal to Mexico.” It found that “a single review by an asylum officer creates an unacceptably high risk of erroneous deprivation,” and that the government had given no reason why that risk is any lower for a third-country removal proposed years after the original proceedings. The court declined to defer the case because of the D.V.D. class action or the pending appeal in Bojorquez v. Baker, because “Permitting removal without adjudicating her claim of entitlement to IJ review would effectively constitute ruling for Respondents on the merits.” On detention, it held that the government’s refusal to provide immigration judge review was “the source of delay,” entitling her to an order that the government “either (a) refer her case for immigration judge review, or (b) release her from detention.” It described the threatened harm as “persecution, torture, or death.”

Third-country removal Withholding of removal CAT Reasonable fear Due process Country-specific nature of withholding Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) D.V.D. class action Habeas jurisdiction

Caution Interim relief only. The operative terms are in a separate preliminary injunction order of the same day (ECF No. 24), which is not in the file. The court did not decide the government’s motion to dismiss. The kidnapping account is the petitioner’s description of what she told the asylum officer, not a finding of the court. The docket shows a final joint status report on 14 April 2026 and an order of 21 April 2026 dismissing the petition as moot without prejudice; the reason for mootness is not stated in the docket text reviewed.

E.D. Cal. March 27, 2026 832 F. Supp. 3d 1071; 2026 WL 849579 Third country: Mexico

The court granted a temporary restraining order in full, finding the petitioner likely to succeed both on her claim that ICE revoked her release without the changed-circumstances determination required by 8 C.F.R. section 241.13(i)(2), there being no evidence that travel documents had been sought or that Mexico had agreed to accept her, and on her due process claim that she could not be removed to Mexico without notice and an opportunity to present a fear-based claim to a neutral adjudicator.

Redetention Third-country designation Notice Due process CAT Withholding of removal

Caution Interim relief on a likelihood-of-success standard, not a final ruling; the matter was referred onward to the assigned magistrate judge. The court expressly rejected part of the petitioner’s regulatory argument, finding she had not shown a failure to comply with the notice and informal-interview requirements; relief rested on section 241.13(i)(2) alone. The opinion contains two apparent typographical date errors.

M.D. Fla. March 20, 2026 2026 WL 787639 Third country: Mexico

Because ICE gave written notice and an informal interview, the petitioner received what the Fifth Amendment requires, and his Zadvydas claim was premature at four months; the petition was denied.

Redetention Notice Informal interview Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9)

Caution Denied without prejudice to refiling after six months. This is a different petitioner from Chavez Barrios v. Ripa and the brief warns that the two Barrios cases must be kept separate in every list.

W.D. Wash. March 12, 2026 829 F. Supp. 3d 907; 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51428; 2026 WL 698786 Third country: None identified. No country had agreed to accept him.

A twenty-two year old Egyptian man was ordered released after roughly seventeen months in immigration detention, eight of them after his removal order became final. An immigration judge had ordered him removed but granted withholding of removal to Egypt, which the court described, following the Ninth Circuit, as a powerful indication of the improbability of his foreseeable removal by any objective measure. He held no other citizenship and no country had agreed to take him. The court recorded what brought him to the United States. His father was arrested, detained, tortured and deprived of medical care after a dispute with a member of the Egyptian parliament over corruption in their village, and died. He then campaigned for an opposition candidate and continued that activity at his university, where he was a law student, and was himself arrested, detained and tortured as a political prisoner. The court ordered immediate release, required the government to confirm the release within forty-eight hours, prohibited re-detention without first complying with 8 C.F.R. 241.13(i) and 8 U.S.C. 1231, and prohibited removal to any third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. It set out what compliant notice requires: written notice of the country designated, the statutory basis for the designation, and an affirmative question to the person about whether they fear persecution or harm there, with the answer recorded in writing. It said the government's own policy does not inspire confidence that it can be relied on to provide that process without a court order. The punitive claim was refused, and the reason matters. The court held it did not have a sufficient basis to find the third-country removal programme unconstitutional as a whole, or punitive as applied to this man. The declaration he relied on came from Nguyen v. Scott and concerned pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants and the resulting removals to South Sudan and Eswatini. He is Egyptian, and offered nothing about a removal practice specific to him or to people like him. The findings in the other cases, the court held, were specific to a particular population and particular destination countries and do not extend to these circumstances. The court also refused two further requests: a hearing before an immigration judge at which the government would have to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence before any re-detention, and a set of four conditions the petitioner asked to be imposed before re-detention, neither of which it found any authority for.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal CAT Redetention Revocation of supervision Third-country removal Notice Meaningful opportunity Diplomatic assurances Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Evidence of destination conditions

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The petitioner won release and the procedural protections, and lost on punishment. That loss is the reason this entry is here. Read alongside Nguyen v. Scott, Abubaka v. Bondi, Hambarsonpour v. Bondi, Baltodano v. Bondi and Pham v. Warden, it shows that the punitive argument has so far turned on evidence about the destination rather than on the doctrine. Where a court has been shown what happens to people on arrival in a named country, it has found the practice punitive. Where it has not, it has declined, and has said the earlier findings were tied to a particular population and particular destinations. Judge Lasnik refused the same claim in Baltodano in November 2025 for want of that evidence and granted it in December once the evidence was supplied. The commercial reporter carried a positive signal on this decision as of September 2026.

C.D. Cal. February 26, 2026 2026 WL 855153

The boilerplate notice of changed circumstances did not justify revoking supervision; the court ordered immediate release and enjoined removal to Mexico or any third country and transfer out of the district.

Redetention Notice Withholding of removal Transfer out of district

Caution Temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on a preliminary record; the government stated it had no opposition argument to present; a final judgment in the same case is recorded for August 24, 2026 and was not supplied.

C.D. Cal. February 26, 2026

Granting a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to a petitioner who filed pro se, the court ordered Respondents “to immediately release Petitioner from custody and restore him to the status quo prior to his detention by reinstating his supervision,” and enjoined them “from removing Petitioner to Mexico or any third country or transferring him from the Central District of California pending adjudication of his Petition.” The court applied 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), under which ICE may re-detain a person released on an order of supervision only “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and § 241.13(i)(3), which requires that the person “be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release” and be given an initial informal interview promptly after return to custody. The notice given here said only that “there are changed circumstances in your case.” The court found that the petitioner could not be expected to “respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification” when the notice stated no reasons. Respondents did not contest the allegations, stating: “At this time, Respondents do not have an opposition argument to present.” The bond requirement was waived.

Order of supervision Revocation Redetention Third-country designation Notice

Caution An unreported district court order. The petitioner is a Mexican national who had been on an order of supervision; the order records prior arrests and convictions, which are not summarised here. The court cited Roble v. Bondi, Chavez Barrios v. Ripa, Nguyen v. Hyde, Tran v. Baker, Zadori v. Noem and Diaz v. Kaiser; the first two are registered separately in this collection and the remainder are not, because they have not been read directly.

E.D. Cal. February 25, 2026 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: No third country was ever identified by the government. The injunction runs against removal to any of them without a fear hearing first.

Sam Sarfarzi-Esfahari had a final order of removal to Iran dating from 8 October 2004, deferral of removal under the Convention against Torture, and had been living under an Order of Supervision. He was re-detained. The court held that re-detaining him under the written policy he challenged violated due process, granted the petition, and ordered a bond hearing within fourteen days at which the government would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was a flight risk or a danger, failing which he was to be released. It separately barred the government from removing him to any third country without first giving him an individualised opportunity to say that he feared that country. On the question whether a challenge to a written policy is ripe before any particular third country has been named, the court held that it is, quoting the Ninth Circuit: where the harm alleged is directly traceable to a written policy there is an implicit likelihood of its repetition in the immediate future.

Third-country removal CAT deferral CAT Order of supervision Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Notice Due process Standing Ripeness Bond hearing Burden of proof Compliance with regulations ICE policy of 9 July 2025

Caution A district court decision. It binds the parties to it and nobody else. The relief has two halves and they are not the same: the detention half was granted in a narrower form than the magistrate judge had recommended, because the district judge ordered a hearing rather than immediate release. Note also the date. A document of 26 January 2026 in this case is findings and recommendations by a magistrate judge, which is a proposal and not an order. The operative decision is the order of 25 February 2026 adopting it in part. Citing the January date as the grant of relief would be wrong.

W.D. Wash. February 24, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order.

The petitioner was born in Vietnam in 1970 to a United States citizen father and came to the United States in May 1990 as a lawful permanent resident under the Amerasian Homecoming Act. An immigration judge ordered him removed to Vietnam on 11 June 2009, and he was released on an order of supervision in August 2009 “because he could not be removed.” He was detained at his yearly check-in on 22 August 2025. The court recorded that the record “does not reflect whether or when any travel document request was submitted to Vietnam.” It was undisputed that he had been held longer than six months. The government relied on Vietnam’s agreement in February 2025 to accelerate travel document issuance and on media reports of hundreds of removals to Vietnam, but offered no information on removals of people who arrived before 1995 except to acknowledge “additional hurdles.” The court held that “The assertion that some Vietnamese nationals have been removed to Vietnam offers no evidence that Petitioner, or others in similar circumstances, is likely to be removed in the foreseeable future,” and that the government “has not obtained travel documents for Petitioner, does not know when such documents might issue, and does not know if they will issue at all.” The court denied without prejudice his request for an order against third-country removal because “He does not claim that he is likely to be subject to such removal.” It did not reach his claims that the re-detention violated procedural due process and ICE regulations, and it ruled before his reply was due, finding habeas relief warranted on the government’s return.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Travel documents Third-country removal Ripeness

Caution A district court decision by a magistrate judge sitting with the parties’ consent, binding only on the parties. The petitioner obtained release only: the request for protection against third-country removal was denied without prejudice, so the order gives no protection against removal to a third country. Not to be confused with Nguyen v. Bondi (C25-2674-SKV, slug van-nguyen-v-bondi), already in the register, which concerns a different petitioner.

W.D. Wash. February 3, 2026 818 F. Supp. 3d 1235; 2026 WL 408098 Third country: None identified. The government was seeking removal to Vietnam.

A lawful permanent resident admitted in March 1995, ordered removed to Vietnam in March 2008 and released on an order of supervision in April 2009 because the government could not obtain travel documents, was re-detained in June 2025. The court ordered his immediate release. It recorded that the government had failed to remove him in almost eighteen years, that seven months after re-detaining him it had still not sent a travel document request to Vietnam, and that its declaration described how the process works in general but said nothing about how it would work in his case. On the reasons given for re-detaining him the court was blunt. The government said he was a threat to public safety. His most recent conviction was six years earlier, and the court called it incomprehensible that immigration authorities would decide six years later that his re-detention was warranted on that basis. The government also said he could be removed quickly. Seven months without a travel document request made that justification implausible. On the process used, the court found no document supporting the claim that notice was given at re-detention, no mention of the required informal interview at that time, and a corrected revocation letter served more than two months later, which could in no way be deemed timely. The court then went further than the regulations. Even assuming full compliance with them, it held, those limited procedures do not provide the process due under the Fifth Amendment, following E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316. It ordered that the government may not re-detain him without first giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard before an immigration judge. The government argued the third-country claims were not ripe because it was trying to remove him to Vietnam. The court rejected that. Little in the government's own materials suggested Vietnam was likely to issue travel documents, and that, taken with the policy itself and what the court described as the recent third-country removals of hundreds of immigrants, gave rise to an imminent threat. On the merits the court found no basis to deviate from Baltodano, Abubaka and Nguyen v. Scott, and ordered that he not be removed to any country other than Vietnam without notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond in reopened removal proceedings before an immigration judge, or to any country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm. The government offered no substantive response at all to the claim that the programme is punitive.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Ripeness Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Government silence on the merits

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties, and decided by a magistrate judge. Two features are worth holding onto. First, the government again offered no substantive answer to the punitive claim. That silence now appears in Nguyen v. Scott, Abubaka v. Bondi, Baltodano v. Bondi, Pham v. Warden and this case. In Pham a court treated the equivalent silence as an admission under Rule 8(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, courts in this district do not agree about re-detention. This court ordered that there be no re-detention without a hearing before an immigration judge. Five weeks later, in Saadhom v. Bondi, another judge of the same court refused that exact request, holding she could not conclude that due process requires a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge in every case. Both decisions stand. The punitive analysis this decision follows originates in Nguyen v. Scott, decided at the preliminary injunction stage on 21 August 2025 and voluntarily dismissed by its petitioner the following month after an agreement between the parties, so it never reached a merits decision. That does not make the findings wrong, and five courts have now adopted them, but anyone relying on this line should know where it begins. The court also recorded, in a footnote, that the government's third-country removal policy was never provided to it in this case. It worked from the text set out in Nguyen v. Scott.

E.D. Cal. February 3, 2026 2026 WL 145631 (for the original order of 20 January 2026). The number itself sits behind a paid service and could not be confirmed from a public source. Third country: None identified. The removal in prospect was to China.

Xiao Luo Huang was re-detained after Immigration and Customs Enforcement revoked his supervised release. The court held that the government had failed to show changed circumstances establishing a significant likelihood of his removal to China, and went further on what follows from that failure. In its words: "And where an immigration regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal statute and ICE fails to adhere to it, the challenged action is invalid." And: "Here, DHS’s failure to follow its own procedural regulations constitutes a due process violation." The agency’s own rules, in other words, are not internal housekeeping that it may set aside at will. Breaking them is itself the constitutional wrong. He was ordered released.

Redetention Order of supervision Compliance with regulations Due process Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Changed circumstances Burden of proof

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. Take care with which order is being cited. The order of 20 January 2026 was superseded by an amended order of 3 February 2026 carrying the same two sentences, and the petition was then granted outright on 25 February 2026. A current citation should run to the amended order rather than the first one.

W.D. Wash. January 14, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The government said ICE may pursue removal to a third country if Iran does not issue a travel document, without naming one.

The petitioner came to the United States as a refugee from Iran in 2001 and later became a lawful permanent resident. After criminal convictions in Oregon he was ordered removed to Iran on 11 September 2014, and was released on an order of supervision in December 2014 because “ICE was unable to obtain travel documents to Iran or a third country.” He remained on release, reporting regularly to ICE, until 9 July 2025, when he was taken into custody at an in-person check-in at the Portland ICE facility. He said he was told he was arrested because the United States had recently bombed Iran. The ICE declaration said removal had become significantly likely; the court recorded that the officer “offers no explanation as to how this determination was made or the basis for it.” ICE had sent a travel document request to Iran in July 2025 and followed it up in November 2025, with no response to either. The petitioner produced an ICE document from November 2024 listing Iran as an “uncooperative” country. The court held that the government did not explain how “these two apparently unsuccessful attempts to communicate with Iranian authorities” showed any likelihood of removal, and that “The vague suggestion that ICE might pursue removal to an unspecified third country at some future time does nothing to demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” The court rejected the government’s argument that it should decline the third-country claims because the petitioner was likely a member of the class in D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, adopting the analysis in Nguyen v. Scott as Baltodano v. Bondi and Abubaka v. Bondi had done. The government offered no substantive argument on the merits. Following those decisions and Aden v. Nielsen, the court held him entitled to an order that he not be removed to a third country “without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in reopened removal proceedings.” It recorded that the government’s current policy “has not been provided to the Court in this action.” On the claim that third-country removal is punitive, the court recorded that the government had “not provided any substantive response to this claim.” Relying on Nguyen v. Scott, Baltodano, Abubaka and Hambarsonpour v. Bondi, it concluded that “Respondents’ current practice of third country removals paired with imprisonment violates due process,” and enjoined removal “to any third country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm.”

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Travel documents Third-country removal D.V.D. class action Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing

Caution A district court decision by a magistrate judge, binding only on the parties. The court did not reach the claims that the re-detention itself violated procedural and substantive due process. The finding on the punitive nature of third-country removal was adopted from Nguyen v. Scott, Baltodano v. Bondi and Abubaka v. Bondi; it was not made on evidence about a destination specific to this petitioner, no third country had been named, and the government’s policy was not before the court.

C.D. Cal. December 30, 2025 Slip Copy; 2025 WL 4061564 Third country: None identified

The court granted a temporary restraining order, finding the petitioner likely to succeed on his claim that ICE revoked a twenty-year order of supervision without the changed circumstances the regulations require and without the informal interview they require, and ordered his immediate release and reinstatement of the prior order of supervision. It rejected his indefinite-detention claim, holding he had offered no affirmative evidence that removal to Vietnam was not reasonably foreseeable.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Due process Notice

Caution NOT A THIRD-COUNTRY REMOVAL CASE. No third country was designated; the removal at issue was to Vietnam, the country named in the removal order, and no fear-based third-country claim is discussed. It is included because it supplies the changed-circumstances and informal-interview standards that the third-country re-detention cases in this collection rely on. Beyond that: a temporary restraining order only, on a likelihood-of-success standard; the second application drew no opposition, and two earlier applications had been denied. The same order set a show-cause hearing on a preliminary injunction, whose outcome is not in this document. The petitioner lost on his indefinite-detention claim.

W.D. Wash. December 15, 2025 Third country: None identified in the order. The government was seeking a travel document from Vietnam.

The petitioner, a citizen of Vietnam admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 1990, was ordered removed to Vietnam in April 2006 and placed on an order of supervision in January 2008 because ICE could not obtain travel documents from Vietnam. There was no indication that he failed to comply with his conditions, but his supervision was revoked and he was arrested on 5 August 2025. The court recorded that he “was apparently swept back into custody during an ICE surge in immigrant re-detentions.” He had been detained for just over four months, within the six-month period treated as presumptively reasonable, but the court held the presumption rebuttable and found his removal not reasonably foreseeable. It found “no indication that respondents made an individualized determination that Mr. Wana, as opposed to a generic Vietnamese immigrant, was likely to be removed in a reasonable period of time,” and that he “is of mixed parentage, has no documentation verifying his Vietnamese identity, has two criminal convictions, and has no family, connections, or resources to assist his return to Vietnam.” The government’s declaration was held inadmissible because it was not subscribed under penalty of perjury and because the deportation officer showed no personal knowledge of agreements between the two countries. On the re-detention, ICE had given notice and an informal interview, which “seems to be all that is required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).” Following E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, the court held that “Those meager procedures do not, however, provide the process due under the Fifth Amendment.” The government argued the third-country claims were not ripe because ICE was seeking travel documents to Vietnam. The court held that ICE’s internal memorandum of 9 July 2025 on third-country removals, the likelihood that he would not be issued travel documents to Vietnam, and “the recent third-country deportations of hundreds of immigrants, including pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants,” gave rise to “an imminent threat that Mr. Wana will face third-country removal.” Applying Aden v. Nielsen, it required reopened removal proceedings before any third-country removal. Adopting the reasoning of Nguyen v. Scott, the court found “that the government is intentionally removing noncitizens to countries with which they have no connection, often in contravention of the governing statute and regulations, and knowing that they will be subject to imprisonment or other punishment.” It prohibited removal “to any country where he is likely to face imprisonment or other punishment upon arrival.”

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Compliance with regulations Informal interview Due process Pre-deprivation hearing Travel documents Ripeness Third-country removal ICE policy of 9 July 2025 Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The punitive finding was made by adopting the reasoning of Nguyen v. Scott, not on evidence about a destination specific to this petitioner, and no third country had been named. The court held that the petitioner had not proven a violation of the re-detention regulations themselves; relief on re-detention rests on due process. In a footnote the court said it disagreed with cases holding that the six-month period runs from the final removal order whether or not the person is in custody.

D.N.M. December 4, 2025 Third country: In 2025 the government asked El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Peru to accept him; Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Peru declined. It also contacted ICE’s Middle East/East Africa Removal Division. Several countries, not named, declined in 2016 and 2017. The court recorded that at least five countries declined to accept him between 2016 and 2025.

The petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed to Mexico on 26 May 2016 and at the same time granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, “based on testimony and evidence that his life would be in danger if he returned to Mexico.” The government held him while it sought a third country and, after several countries declined, released him on an order of supervision on 9 March 2017. He missed an ICE appointment on 1 March 2023. On 14 February 2025 he was arrested at a Border Patrol checkpoint in New Mexico and detained at the Otero County Processing Center while the government again sought a third country. In June 2025 his former counsel asked to drop the deferral so he could be removed to Mexico; an immigration judge granted reopening and termination on 17 September 2025 without addressing his later motion to withdraw that request, and his appeal is pending. The court recorded that “the parties agreed that Petitioner’s CAT deferral remains legally operative during the pendency of the BIA appeal.” The court rejected the government’s argument that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) and (b)(9) barred review: “The government’s detention of Petitioner lacks the direct link to his removal proceedings or to the execution of his removal order to fall under the ambit of § 1252(g) or § 1252(b)(9).” It counted the four months he spent in detention in 2016 and 2017 toward the six-month period under Zadvydas v. Davis, stating that it “is disinclined to allow such gamesmanship by the government.” On the prospect of removal, the court found: “The government has also not been able to identify a third country to accept Petitioner.” It added that “between 2016 and 2025, at least five countries have declined to accept him,” and that even if a country agreed, “Petitioner may be entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek protection from removal, further prolonging his detention should he be allowed to remain in custody.” It held: “Because Petitioner has been detained more than six months and his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, his ongoing detention violates the INA.” It excused the failure to seek administrative review under 8 C.F.R. 241.13. The court did not decide whether the revocation of his supervision was lawful, but noted: “The government has provided no information about who made the decision to revoke Petitioner’s Order of Supervision, and whether it complied with § 241.4(l)(2) such that no notice or hearing was required.”

CAT deferral Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Jurisdiction 1252(g) Notice Informal interview

Caution Release rests on prolonged detention under Zadvydas alone. The court expressly did not decide whether the arrest and the revocation of supervision without notice or an interview were lawful, and it did not grant the requested order requiring notice and an opportunity to seek protection before any removal to a third country. The deferral was the subject of a pending appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals; the government argued that he would already have been removed to Mexico if not for that appeal. The court’s docket text records that the main document was replaced on 5 December 2025 at chambers’ request; the copy read is the court’s copy of Doc. 30, filed 4 December 2025, as published on govinfo.gov, and it matches the web printout on the site in substance.

E.D. Cal. November 7, 2025 2025 WL 3123793 Third country: None identified in the order.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement revoked the petitioner’s supervised release and re-detained her without showing changed circumstances or a significant likelihood that she would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, and without following its own regulations on the review of release decisions. The court granted an injunction and ordered her released. The passage of the decision that later courts cite gathers the earlier cases on where the burden lies, and it is that discussion, rather than the outcome, that has carried into the cases that followed.

Redetention Order of supervision Compliance with regulations Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Changed circumstances Burden of proof Due process

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. The court anonymised the petitioner to initials in the caption, so the case is filed on the public docket under a different name, Xie v. Lyons. Both names refer to the same case, and the anonymised form is the one the court itself uses in the decision.

D. Md. October 24, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: United Kingdom

Because the government produced no evidence of any step taken to effectuate removal to the United Kingdom or anywhere else, there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and the writ issues.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Third-country designation

Caution The earlier September 19, 2025 opinion in the same case, which held the court had jurisdiction and denied relief at that time, is not in the file; this order does not bar removal and does not address what process is due before a third-country removal; no reporter or unofficial citation is printed for this document; the supplied file name carries the date 20251025 although the document is dated October 24, 2025.

S.D. Tex. October 16, 2025 2025 WL 2937692 Third country: None identified in the order.

Iyad Muhammad Abuelhawa was living under an Order of Supervision when Immigration and Customs Enforcement revoked it and re-detained him. The regulation that allows revocation requires changed circumstances making removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court held that the burden of showing this rests on the government and on nobody else: upon revocation of release, the government bears the burden to show a significant likelihood that the person may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, and the required showing, by its terms, can only be made by the government. Here it had identified no changed circumstances at all. He was ordered released back to his previous conditions.

Redetention Order of supervision Compliance with regulations Burden of proof Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Changed circumstances Due process

Caution A district court decision in the Southern District of Texas, binding on the parties only and persuasive at most anywhere else. It is recorded here because the burden question it decides recurs across this whole line of cases, and because later decisions in California cite it. A secondary research memorandum placed this case among decisions of the Northern District of California. It is not one.

N.D. Cal. October 10, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201666; 2025 WL 2899220 Third country: Jordan

Serious questions exist that the petitioner may not be detained without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, or removed to a third country without notice and an opportunity to apply for fear-based relief.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9)

Caution Preliminary injunction on a 'serious questions' showing, not a final merits ruling; issued by a magistrate judge, and the file does not state whether the parties consented; the supplied file is named for the July 26, 2025 temporary restraining order but contains the October 10, 2025 order.

S.D. Tex. September 26, 2025 2025 WL 2774610

ICE re-detained the petitioner without a shown lawful revocation, notice of reasons, or the required informal interview, and his removal is not reasonably foreseeable; release was ordered with notice required once a third country is identified.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution The third-country notice claim was held premature even as summary judgment on it was denied, and no fixed notice period was set; final judgment was to be entered separately and is not in the file; the government produced no copy of any order revoking supervision; the court noted a split on whether the six-month period resets on re-detention.

N.D. Cal. September 19, 2025 2025 WL 2689266

Due process bars re-detaining a noncitizen released after an individualized risk determination, even where detention is mandatory, without notice and a hearing on whether a material change of circumstances justifies re-detention.

Redetention Notice Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary injunction on the 'serious questions' standard, not a final judgment; the printed title reads 'Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order' although the body grants a preliminary injunction; the decretal paragraph states no forum, deadline, or burden of proof, although the body states a clear and convincing standard.

D. Md. September 19, 2025 2025 WL 2687354 Third country: United Kingdom

The court held that it had jurisdiction, that the petitioner had not yet carried his burden to show a Zadvydas violation, and ordered the government to produce information about efforts to effectuate his removal.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Third-country designation

Caution Not read directly; known only as summarised in the October 24, 2025 opinion in the same case, which later granted the writ. The brief does not separately name the judge for this order, describing it as 'this Court's' prior opinion.

N.D. Cal. September 18, 2025 2025 WL 2689853

Five noncitizens released under section 1226(a) and arrested at immigration court must be released immediately and may not be re-detained without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice Mandatory detention 1225(b)

Caution Ex parte temporary restraining order issued the same day as the arrests, with the government not heard; the court did not definitively decide whether section 1225(b) or section 1226(a) governs, saying only that it found section 1225(b)(2)(A) 'particularly doubtful'; it expired October 2, 2025 and the file contains no later order.

N.D. Cal. September 15, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: None identified in the orders read.

Aroldo Alberto Rodriguez Diaz had been released from immigration custody. When the government moved to re-detain him, the court held that he had raised serious questions on his claim that he holds a protected liberty interest in remaining at liberty, that due process therefore entitles him to notice and a hearing before he is taken back into custody, and that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in his favour. A restraining order issued the same day the application was made. A preliminary injunction followed in September.

Redetention Due process Notice Custody hearing Bond hearing Appeal pending

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only, and the only decision in this register currently known to be on appeal. The government has taken it to the Ninth Circuit, No. 25-7196. If that court rules, this entry will be behind the law until it is updated. The orders read do not mention the Convention against Torture, third-country removal, or an Order of Supervision; a secondary research memorandum described this case as involving all three, and it does not.

N.D. Cal. September 12, 2025 2025 WL 2637503

An asylum seeker released on her own recognizance is detained under section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), and due process entitles her to a pre-deprivation bond hearing before any re-arrest.

Redetention Notice Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary injunction, not a final judgment; substantive due process claims were expressly not reached; the country of origin is printed throughout as 'Columbia'; the decretal language, unlike the earlier temporary restraining order, does not repeat the word 'notice'.

W.D. Wash. September 11, 2025 2025 WL 2637750

Total detention exceeding six months is not presumptively reasonable, and the petitioner is likely to show no significant likelihood of removal to Vietnam because he facially fails the memorandum of understanding's eligibility conditions; release ordered.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas)

Caution Preliminary injunction on likelihood of success, entered while the habeas petition and the government's motion to dismiss remained pending; the request for an order barring future arrest was denied; the two supplied files are duplicates of the same order and are merged into this one entry; the statelessness finding rests on a 1983 document and the petitioner's testimony, and the court decided the point only on likelihood of success.

N.D. Cal. September 9, 2025 2025 WL 2615063

Two petitioners released years earlier under a class bail process are likely to succeed on a due process claim that they may not be re-detained without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice

Caution Ex parte temporary restraining order on a preliminary record, with the government not yet heard; it expired September 23, 2025 and the file contains no later order; the order contains no third-country discussion, no protection grant, and no country of proposed removal, and the court did not identify the governing detention statute.

S.D. Fla. September 9, 2025 824 F. Supp. 3d 1243

The revocation itself was authorized under section 241.4(l)(2)(iii), but the check-in desk conversation was not the required informal interview after return to custody, so seventy-five days of detention without a meaningful opportunity to be heard violated due process.

Redetention Informal interview Notice CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution Section 241.4 applied rather than section 241.13 because the petitioner never obtained a section 241.13 determination; the court flagged its disagreement with Chavez Barrios v. Ripa, a decision of the same district, on whether section 241.4(l)(1) process attaches to an (l)(2) revocation; the court retained jurisdiction to enforce.

D. Md. September 8, 2025 2025 WL 2592543 Third country: Australia and Romania

Detention is not authorized by section 1231(a)(6) because, with withholding granted as to Iran and no response from Australia or Romania, there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Third-country designation Notice Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution The six-month Zadvydas presumption was assumed without deciding to apply; the third-country notice claim was stayed because the petitioner is a D.V.D. class member, so the court did not rule on what process is due before a third-country removal; the separate order carrying the decretal terms of release is not in the file.

N.D. Cal. September 6, 2025 2025 WL 2578275

A lawful permanent resident released in 2020 and arrested at his home must be released immediately and may not be re-detained without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice

Caution Ex parte temporary restraining order entered the same day as the arrest, without a government response; it expired September 20, 2025; the order identifies no detention statute, no removal order, and no country of removal, and does not state the petitioner's citizenship, which the September 19, 2025 order in the same case gives as Cambodia.

C.D. Cal. September 3, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809; 2025 WL 4666804

The revocation notice was not individualized and stated no reasons, and ICE's belief that removal was now possible was no changed circumstance; release was ordered and re-detention or removal barred without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Redetention Notice Informal interview CAT deferral Third-country designation

Caution Temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on a preliminary record; the Form I-294 account reaches the court through a declaration by the petitioner's brother relaying a telephone call and is the record before the court, not a judicial finding; the brief warns that the 'border on the Kafkaesque' quotation in this order follows an ambiguous 'Id.' and is now traced to Roble v. Bondi at 772.

C.D. Cal. August 28, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168233; 2025 LX 356195

The court set a briefing schedule and enjoined the government from removing the petitioner to Iran or to any third country.

Redetention Third-country designation Notice

Caution The brief describes this order only through its identification of the three decisions in the case and the Form I-294 account it records; it names Walter, D.J. and Bristow, M.J. for the case without attributing this order to either, so the judge field is left empty.

S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2025 798 F. Supp. 3d 400

The government gave no notice of revocation and no interview before re-detaining a man released in 2018, violating its own regulations and due process; release was ordered, and transfer after filing did not defeat jurisdiction.

Redetention Notice Informal interview Jurisdiction 1252(g) Transfer out of district

Caution Granted in part. The court's description of Westley v. Harper as reaching the merits of the section 241.4(l) claim is in tension with the project's earlier note that Westley was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and the brief directs that neither characterisation be published until the Westley opinion itself is read.

D. Minn. August 25, 2025 803 F. Supp. 3d 766

ICE's notice merely parroted the regulation and gave no individualized reasons for re-detention, and the government bore and failed to carry the burden of showing changed circumstances; release ordered.

Redetention Notice CAT deferral Third-country designation

Caution The court declined a forward-looking injunction against future re-detention and declined class-wide relief because the petitioner had not sued as a class. The brief establishes that the 'border on the Kafkaesque' quotation belongs to this decision at 772 and not to Nouri v. Herrera or Gonzalez v. Noem.

N.D. Cal. August 22, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. A full-text search of the decision returns no occurrence of the phrase.

Carolina Ortiz Calderon had applied for asylum, for withholding of removal and for protection under the Convention against Torture, and had been released on her own recognisance. On her re-detention the court held, in its own words, that the government "may not re-detain Ortiz Calderon during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court without providing her with a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge", and that detention requires clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger together with a showing that no lesser conditions would suffice.

Redetention Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Asylum Withholding of removal CAT

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. Her protection claims are recorded in the order as background. What was decided is the detention question alone. There is no holding here about removal to a third country and the phrase does not appear in the decision.

W.D. Wash. August 21, 2025 2025 WL 2419288

The court found the petitioner likely to succeed on his Zadvydas claim and ordered his release, rejected the argument that detention must be consecutive, and found ICE's third-country removal policy likely inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Notice

Caution Not read directly; described and quoted in the printouts of Tang v. Bondi, Villanueva v. Tate, and Y.T.D. v. Andrews, and in the D.V.D. indicative ruling. Tang distinguished it. Evidence recited in Tang indicates Vietnam issued a travel document for this petitioner on September 3, 2025, after the order.

N.D. Cal. August 21, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Guatemala was the country in dispute, by a determination that he could be removed there.

Juan Edelmar Alva Alva was released on an Order of Supervision on 3 December 2018 and lived under it for nearly seven years. He did not challenge his final order of removal. What was in dispute was a determination that he could be removed to Guatemala. He was re-detained, and a restraining order of 7 August 2025 secured his release. The court then held that a person who has been at liberty on an Order of Supervision for that length of time has a liberty interest in remaining at liberty, and that the government may not re-detain him during the proceedings without first giving him a hearing before an immigration judge to decide whether detention is warranted on grounds of flight risk or danger to the community.

Redetention Order of supervision Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Third-country designation Notice

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. The order decides the detention question and does not decide whether he may lawfully be removed to Guatemala. It does not address protection under the Convention against Torture.

N.D. Cal. August 21, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. A full-text search of the decision returns no occurrence of the phrase.

The government placed Paula Sofia Ramirez Clavijo in full removal proceedings and released her on her own recognisance. It then sought to move her into expedited removal, a track with far fewer protections. The court held that having put her in full proceedings and released her, the government had given her a protected liberty interest and could not retroactively switch her to the expedited track. It enjoined the government from re-detaining her without notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and from transferring or removing her while the case runs.

Redetention Due process Expedited removal Liberty interest Custody hearing Transfer

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. It is about which removal track a person may be placed in and about re-detention. It is not about removal to a third country, and the phrase does not appear in the decision.

E.D. Cal. August 20, 2025 2025 WL 2791778

The re-detention was unlawful because ICE gave no informal interview and showed no changed circumstances making removal to China reasonably foreseeable; release was ordered and re-detention barred without notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution Temporary restraining order granted in part on a preliminary record, with a preliminary-injunction schedule to follow; the request to enjoin third-country removal was denied without prejudice as not ripe; the order introduces 'five claims' and then lists six, and several regulatory citations are printed irregularly.

N.D. Cal. August 16, 2025 2025 WL 2453968

The court ordered the government to release the petitioner, to refrain from re-detaining her without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and to refrain from removing her from the United States.

Redetention Notice

Caution Not read directly; known only from the September 12, 2025 preliminary-injunction order's recital of its terms and from an editorial history note, which lists it under the name 'Aceros v. Kaiser'. Extensions of this order on August 25 and September 4, 2025 are noted in that opinion and are not registered here.

S.D. Fla. August 8, 2025 2025 WL 2280485; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153228 Third country: Guatemala

The emergency motion was denied: section 241.4(l)(2) required no notice or interview and both were in fact given, the Zadvydas claim was premature, and the regulatory stay barred removal to Mexico only.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g) Transfer out of district Bond hearing

Caution The brief records that this decision resolves the project's ledger claim 10 against the version previously carried: the motion was denied, and no appellate stay is supported, only the district court's interim order of June 12, 2025 staying transfer and removal. The decision splits from Grigorian, Zhu, Ceesay and Torres on whether section 241.4(l)(1) process attaches to an (l)(2) revocation, and from Gonzalez v. Noem and Zhu on jurisdiction to restrain a transfer.

N.D. Cal. August 6, 2025 2025 WL 2243616

Serious questions exist that due process bars detention or removal to any third country without notice and an opportunity to present a fear-based claim; sections 1252(g), (a)(5), (b)(9) and FARRA do not bar review.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9)

Caution Preliminary injunction on the 'serious questions' standard, converted from a temporary restraining order by consent; every merits finding is framed as a serious question and none is final; no third country is identified anywhere in the file, and the court did not identify the governing detention statute by number.

W.D. Wash. July 30, 2025 2025 WL 2165995

The court restrained removal to any country other than Vietnam pending a preliminary-injunction ruling, relief the government did not oppose, and denied immediate release as falling outside the limited purpose of a temporary restraining order.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation

Caution Interim order that replaced a July 25, 2025 ex parte order and was to last only until a written order on the preliminary injunction; the court expressly declined to elaborate on the merits of the third-country claims and gave the government more time to rebut the Zadvydas showing; the government conceded that its revocation notice was incorrect; the Tang order cites this decision as decided July 20, 2025 although the document reads 'Signed July 30, 2025'.

N.D. Cal. July 26, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143161 Third country: Jordan

The court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the government from re-detaining the petitioner without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice

Caution Not read directly; known only through the October 10, 2025 order, which quotes a single phrase from it and records that it was granted by 'the duty judge' and that the parties stipulated it would remain in effect pending the later ruling.

N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. No third country appears in this decision.

Frescia Garro Pinchi had been released on bond. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested her again, without a warrant, at a courthouse. The court held that a person previously released on bond holds a protected liberty interest, that she was therefore likely to succeed on her claim that due process entitles her to a hearing before a neutral immigration judge before any re-arrest, and that the government may not re-detain her absent clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger to the community.

Redetention Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Arrest at a courthouse

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. It is about warrantless re-arrest and the right to a hearing before re-detention. It does not concern a final order of removal, protection under the Convention against Torture, or removal to a third country. The case is now docketed as Garro Pinchi v. Mullin after a change of respondent; the surname is Garro Pinchi, not Pinchi.

N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. No third country appears in this decision.

The petitioner holds a final administrative order of removal and has proceedings on withholding of removal and protection under the Convention against Torture on foot. What the court decided was narrower than that background suggests. It enjoined and restrained the government from re-detaining him without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, held before he is taken into custody, to evaluate whether re-detention is warranted on grounds of flight risk or danger to the community.

Redetention Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Withholding of removal CAT

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. The petitioner’s protection claims form the background to the case and are not what was decided. There is no holding here about removal to a third country. The case appears on the public docket under the petitioner’s full name, Reyes v. Kaiser; the anonymised form used here is the one the court uses in the caption of its own order.

E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025 2025 WL 1993771 Third country: None identified. The government said only that it intended to pursue a travel document.

Quoc Chi Hoac had a final order of removal to Vietnam from September 2023 and had been released on an Order of Supervision. In June 2025 he was re-detained. Immigration and Customs Enforcement may revoke supervised release only on a showing of changed circumstances making removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government offered its intention to seek a travel document. The court held that this was not enough: "Respondents’ intent to eventually complete a travel document request for Petitioner does not constitute a changed circumstance", and the fact that the government intends to complete such a request does not make it significantly likely that the person will be removed in the foreseeable future. He was ordered released, and the government was barred from re-detaining him or removing him to a third country without notice and an opportunity for a hearing.

Redetention Order of supervision Compliance with regulations Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country removal Notice Due process Changed circumstances

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. An earlier application for a restraining order in the same case had been refused on 30 June 2025, so the sequence matters when the case is cited. The order does not address protection under the Convention against Torture, and nothing in it turns on that.

N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025 2025 WL 1940179

A man released on bond in 2013 and detained at a scheduled ICE interview must be released immediately and may not be re-detained without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice Transfer out of district

Caution Ex parte temporary restraining order on a preliminary record, with the government not heard; it expired July 25, 2025 and the file contains no later order; the decretal language contains no removal bar and omits the transfer bar the petitioner requested in the alternative; the nature of the 2019 conviction is not in the record.

S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025 2025 WL 1895479

The court denied a temporary restraining order.

Redetention

Caution The brief records this decision only by date and citation in its identification of the case and does not describe its reasoning; the docket and judge given here are those the brief gives for the case as a whole. The petition was later granted on September 9, 2025.

N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025 2025 WL 1771438

The court granted a temporary restraining order against arrest, detention, and third-country removal without notice and a hearing, while giving the government an opportunity for further briefing and a hearing.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation

Caution Not read directly; known from the recital in the August 6, 2025 preliminary-injunction order in the same case and from a parenthetical description in the Nguyen v. Scott printout. It ran until July 10, 2025, was extended by stipulation, and was superseded by the August 6 injunction.

D.N.J. June 24, 2025 Third country: Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Honduras during the removal period that began in December 2022 (Guatemala and the Dominican Republic declined; Honduras did not respond). Canada, Guatemala and Honduras after re-detention, by requests of 12 May 2025; each had refused by the hearing of 9 June 2025.

On 15 December 2022 an immigration judge ordered the petitioner removed but granted withholding of removal to Mexico, the only country of which he is a citizen. During the 90-day removal period ICE asked Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Honduras to accept him; Guatemala and the Dominican Republic declined and Honduras never responded, and he was released on an order of supervision on 15 March 2023. On 28 March 2025 ICE re-detained him at a regularly scheduled check-in in Newark; the respondents alleged that revocation was warranted because he “failed to provide written travel document requests or acceptance letters from alternate countries to facilitate his removal.” His petition was filed on 2 April 2025 while he was in transit to Texas and ICE had not told his lawyers where he was. The court applied the unknown custodian exception, finding that “his custodian was, for all practical purposes, unknown at the time of filing. This not only deprived Petitioner of meaningful access to counsel and the courts, but also rendered any attempt to seek habeas relief during transit impossible if the Court applied the district of confinement and immediate custodian rules.” The court rejected the argument that a challenge before six months of detention is premature, noting that “a detainee might be able to show that he is barred from returning to his country of origin and that no other country is willing to accept him.” It recorded that ICE made no inquiry to any country between March 2023 and the re-detention, and that “Respondents offer no explanation for the lack of any efforts whatsoever to remove Petitioner during this two-year period of time.” ICE did not ask Canada, Guatemala and Honduras until 12 May 2025; Guatemala replied that it had “not received instructions about accepting migrants from other nationalities,” and by the 9 June 2025 hearing all three had refused. ICE conceded that “Petitioner’s removal is not, at present, imminent.” The court also considered evidence that third-country removal of people granted withholding is rare, finding that “the data nevertheless supports the general inference that removal for this particular class of detainees is substantially more difficult.” It held that the petitioner “has sufficiently established that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable and that his detention has exceeded the ‘period reasonably necessary to secure [his] removal,’” overcoming the presumption for his 164-day detention. It rejected as lacking credibility a danger argument first raised at the hearing, and removed a location monitoring condition from the proposed release order.

Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Withholding of removal Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Burden of proof Travel documents Transfer out of district Access to counsel Habeas jurisdiction

Caution The release order was entered on 9 June 2025 (ECF No. 23) after a ruling on the record; this opinion of 24 June 2025 gives the written reasons. The court released the petitioner on his detention claim and declined to address his claims about the revocation of supervised release and the commencement of removal proceedings. The account of his transfer to Texas rests on email exchanges whose authenticity the respondents did not dispute.

W.D. Wash. December 6, 2019 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210865; 2019 WL 6683512 Third country: Somalia

The government's position was not substantially justified, and the court awarded $36,720 in fees and $2,170 in expenses at $450 per hour under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Attorney fees Notice Third-country designation

Caution Fees were denied for the unsuccessful motion-to-enforce phase. The brief notes that a Fifth Circuit decision cited elsewhere in the collection holds the Act does not authorize fees for successful section 2241 motions, so fee recovery depends on the circuit.

W.D. Wash. June 20, 2019 409 F. Supp. 3d 998; 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103569; 2019 WL 2548137 Third country: Somalia

DHS may designate a removal country outside removal proceedings, but designating Somalia without notice or an opportunity to be heard violated due process, so proceedings must be reopened before any removal there.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation Withholding of removal CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Bond hearing Prolonged detention (Zadvydas)

Caution The four-step notice procedure often attributed to this case comes from subsection D of the magistrate judge's report, which the district judge did not adopt; the court's statement that failing to advise of the right to apply for asylum or withholding is itself a due process violation is hedged as what Ninth Circuit case law 'suggests'; the court held detention was not indefinite under Zadvydas and granted only a bond hearing on that score. Any account presenting the case as forbidding administrative designation misstates it.

W.D. Wash. January 23, 2019 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200381; 2019 WL 5790904 Third country: Somalia

The magistrate judge recommended relief and set out four procedural requirements DHS must satisfy before removing a person to an undesignated country.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation Withholding of removal

Caution This is a report and recommendation, not a decision of the court, and it was adopted only in part: the district judge adopted the Background section and subsections A, B, C and F, and did not adopt subsection D, which contains the four-step procedure, or subsection E. The report's statement that DHS has failed to notify other noncitizens before removing them to undesignated countries, and its description of the facts as 'alarming to say the least', are the magistrate judge's characterisations in an unadopted portion.

W.D. Mo. March 22, 2018 Unreported; order at ECF No. 20 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court denied the government’s motion to dismiss and granted the habeas petition, ordering immediate release and directing that “Petitioner’s conditions of his order of supervision which were in effect before his detention are reinstated immediately.” The court held it had no authority to examine ICE’s decision to issue or to execute the removal order, but did have jurisdiction over the request for release from detention pending removal. Applying Zadvydas v. Davis to a case where removal was reasonably foreseeable, it weighed the statutory factors and found detention not reasonably necessary to secure removal: “Most notable, is the fact that Petitioner was released on an Order of Supervision in 2012 and has for the past 6 years adhered regularly to the conditions placed upon him.” It added that he had no criminal history and strong family and community ties.

Detention pending removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Section 1231(a)(6) Order of supervision Redetention Reinstatement of supervision conditions Habeas jurisdiction

Caution It is an unreported district court order, not binding on any other court. The petitioner held no withholding of removal and no protection under the Convention Against Torture, and no third country was involved; removal was to his country of citizenship. The legal basis is Zadvydas and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), not the post-order custody review regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13. What the order records is a court treating years of compliance with an order of supervision as a reason against redetention, and restoring the supervision conditions that redetention had displaced. A docket number of 5:18-cv-06099 sometimes attached to this case in secondary sources is wrong; that number belongs to an unrelated case.

E.D. Mich. July 24, 2017 261 F. Supp. 3d 820 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court granted a class-wide preliminary injunction halting removals to Iraq until class members could seek relief in the immigration courts. Its account of what had happened: “Without warning, over 1,400 Iraqi nationals discovered that their removal orders — many of which had lain dormant for several years — were now to be immediately enforced, following an agreement reached between the United States and Iraq to facilitate removal.” One named petitioner had been living in her community under a final order of removal since 1986. The court found that the resulting search for counsel had been “significantly impeded by the Government’s successive transfers of many detainees across the country, separating them from their lawyers and the families and communities who can assist in those legal efforts,” and that people who had lived peaceably for years under limited supervision had had little reason to incur the cost of a motion to reopen before the policy changed. Rejecting the government’s position that only the immigration courts could act, it held that “a federal district court is armed with jurisdiction to act as a first responder to protect the writ of habeas corpus and the allied right to due process,” so that people facing grave harm are not removed before having their day in court.

Mass redetention Long-dormant removal orders Bilateral repatriation agreement Habeas jurisdiction Suspension Clause Due process Motions to reopen Transfer of detainees Class action Preliminary injunction

Caution Vacated. The Sixth Circuit held on 20 December 2018 that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter either injunction and remanded with directions to dismiss the removal-based claims. The Sixth Circuit did not disturb the findings of fact recorded here, which is why they are kept in this collection. Removal was to the class members’ country of origin, not to a third country.

M.D. Pa. June 15, 2007 497 F. Supp. 2d 615; 2007 WL 1746367 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court refused to dismiss the habeas petition and stayed removal pending the outcome of the proceeding. Khouzam had been released in February 2006 under an order of supervision, after eight years in custody, on a finding that there was no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. When he reported to the ICE facility in York, Pennsylvania on 29 May 2007 as that order required, he was retaken into custody and handed a three-line letter from the Assistant Secretary for ICE stating that the Secretary of Homeland Security had terminated his deferral of removal to Egypt, effective four months earlier, on diplomatic assurances the government would not show him. Rejecting the government’s arguments that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction and that the petition raised non-justiciable political questions, the court held that Khouzam had presented justiciable issues falling within its habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a stay should continue: granting one “to assure proper observance of the applicable law serves the public interest.”

Diplomatic assurances CAT deferral Termination without notice Redetention at a reporting appointment Order of supervision Habeas jurisdiction Political question Stay of removal

Caution Interim relief only. This was a ruling on a motion to dismiss and a stay application, not a final judgment. This is the first of two opinions in the same case; the merits were decided on 10 January 2008. Removal here was to the petitioner’s own country, Egypt, not to a third country. The Third Circuit later held that the District Court had no habeas jurisdiction over these claims and vacated the January 2008 order on that ground, while granting the same relief on the petition for review.