The court held that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not bar habeas, because challenging the designation of a third country never named in the removal order is not a challenge to the execution of that order, and that the petitioner was substantially likely to succeed on her claim that generalised diplomatic assurances from Cameroon cannot substitute for individualised notice and an evidentiary hearing. It entered a preliminary injunction barring removal to any third country until at least ten days’ notice of the proposed country and an individualised hearing before an immigration judge.
Caution Unpublished slip copy. A preliminary injunction resting on likelihood of success, not a final merits judgment, effective until modified or superseded. The court cautioned that the law in this area is developing rapidly and said it may reconsider the order in light of new developments. It refused one request, declining to order the government itself to move to reopen the immigration proceedings, and declined to consider the status of the petitioner’s motion to reconsider in the immigration court. It treated the Supreme Court’s emergency stay in D.V.D. as not a merits holding. No subsequent history appears as of 7 September 2026.
Third-country designation Notice Withholding of removal CAT Due process Jurisdiction Diplomatic assurances Chain refoulement
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