Decisions

D.N.M. July 28, 2026 Third country: Equatorial Guinea, by charter flight.

Disposition Temporary restraining order partially granted; stay of transfer reinstated. Respondents to ensure that the petitioner’s fear-based claims regarding removal to Equatorial Guinea “are evaluated by a neutral decision-maker, in accordance with the requirements of due process”, and to file a status report within 14 days of his fear-based interview or screening; respondents “temporarily enjoined from removing Petitioner to a third country, absent this Court’s order to the contrary.”

A day after lifting its stay of transfer, the court reinstated it. His counsel told the court that “ICE has not served Petitioner or counsel with any written notice designating Equatorial Guinea as a country of removal”. The court said it “does not purport to review the substance of the immigration judge’s ruling or to stay the execution of the final removal order”, but held that removal proceedings must still be conducted within the bounds of due process: “Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, noncitizens are entitled to reasonable notice of the country of removal and a meaningful chance to state their fear-based claims regarding that new country.” It rejected the respondents’ concern about the timing of removal flights: “Respondents had ample time within that timeline to properly notify Petitioner and his counsel, as well as evaluate any fear-based claims regarding Equatorial Guinea. It is not this Court’s injunction that hinders Petitioner’s removal. If Respondents had properly evaluated Petitioner’s fear-based claims, and if the record had demonstrated proper notice and screening, the Court would not have reinstated the stay of removal.”

Third-country removal Notice Due process Fear screening Temporary restraining order Stay of transfer Withholding of removal CAT protection

Caution A temporary restraining order. No later order in the case was read, and whether a fear screening took place is not known. The order cites D.V.D. v. DHS, 821 F. Supp. 3d 102 (D. Mass. 2026), and was issued before the Supreme Court’s stay of 29 September 2026 in that case. The order of 27 July 2026 lifting the stay is recorded separately in this register.

W.D. Tex. May 22, 2026 Third country: Sierra Leone. On 29 April 2026 the government told the court that it expected to remove her there in May, under the DHS guidance of 30 March 2025 and Sierra Leone’s assurances. She argued that she had never been told of the plan.

Disposition Emergency motion, construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction, granted in part. The respondents enjoined from removing her from the United States until “the Government provides Petitioner with the opportunity to seek withholding of removal in the manner prescribed by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208 and 1208” or the court orders otherwise. The temporary restraining order of 15 May 2026 dissolved. The parties to report material developments, and in any event by 12 June 2026.

The petitioner, Budude Allison Zawu Roberts, a Liberian citizen subject to a removal order from 2003, holds withholding of removal to Liberia under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). ICE detained her on 16 January 2026 to carry out her removal, before any third country had been designated, and she petitioned for habeas corpus under Zadvydas v. Davis. On 29 April 2026, answering the court’s order, the government said it expected to remove her to Sierra Leone in May. It argued that it need not let her apply for withholding because “Sierra Leone has issued Department of State approved assurances” that “any aliens removed there will not be persecuted or tortured,” and that accepting those assurances was a matter for the executive. The court rejected six jurisdictional objections. Reading 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) narrowly under Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, it held that “whether the Government may lawfully remove an alien is a purely legal issue, meaning that § 1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction to decide it.” It also held that sections 1252(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(5) and (b)(9) and FARRA § 2242(d) did not bar review. On the merits: “the Government’s categorical determination that ‘aliens removed . . . [to Sierra Leone] will not be subject to persecution or torture’ is a far cry from the ‘individualized determinations’ that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and CAT demand. Indeed, there is absolutely no indication that the Government considered Petitioner’s specific circumstances (as it was required to do) before it designated Sierra Leone as her country of removal.” Agency guidance, it said, cannot “supplant the INA’s removal procedures.” It distinguished Munaf v. Geren: “The issue here isn’t whether the Government was justified in accepting Sierra Leone’s assurances that aliens removed there won’t be persecuted or tortured. Rather, the issue is whether the Government may remove aliens to any third country without allowing them to seek withholding of removal.”

Third-country removal Withholding of removal CAT Diplomatic assurances Rule of non-inquiry Notice Third-country fear screening Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(a)(4) Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Preliminary injunction

Caution A preliminary injunction, not a final judgment, and it decides only that she must be allowed to seek withholding of removal before any removal to Sierra Leone. The court said that the government “may well determine that Petitioner isn’t entitled to withholding of removal from Sierra Leone even after following the procedures prescribed by regulation”, and that Munaf would then bar it from second-guessing that determination. On the Munaf point it cited, with a “but see”, an order of the same district to the contrary: Torrez Lopez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (W.D. Tex. 23 April 2026). The later filings, status reports of 12 June, 26 June and 6 July 2026 and orders of 30 June and 21 July 2026 (ECF Nos. 19 to 24), are not available on CourtListener, so whether she was screened, released or removed is not known from the sources read. The order of 15 May 2026 (ECF No. 16), which restrained her removal on the day she expected to be removed, rested on the same reasoning. In October 2026 the Fifth Circuit, which hears appeals from this court, held in Gakou v. Warden of the Prairieland Detention Center, recorded in this register, that a request for a stay of removal falls within § 1252(g)’s jurisdiction-stripping effect.

D. Colo. January 23, 2026 Third country: Cameroon. He was given a notice of removal to Cameroon on or about 8 January 2026.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted and immediate release ordered, with three hours’ notice to counsel of the time and place of release and a status update within twenty-four hours. Emergency motion for a temporary restraining order denied as moot. The remaining constitutional claims not reached.

The petitioner, granted withholding of removal to Morocco on 25 June 2025 and detained from June 2025, was given a notice of removal to Cameroon on or about 8 January 2026. His petition, as the court quoted it, stated that the notice came “only after ICE was notified that this petition would be filed” and that “He has affirmatively asserted a fear of removal to Cameroon”. After he filed on 10 January 2026 the respondents transferred him to Texas, and they returned him to Colorado on 22 January 2026. The court quoted the declaration of Mark Kinsey, a deportation officer in the Denver Field Office of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, filed by the respondents. It states that the petitioner was moved to the Port Isabel Service Processing Center “for staging for removal to Cameroon”, that he claimed fear, and that after a third-country screening interview “USCIS determined that Petitioner established it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted if removed to Cameroon.” It acknowledges the court’s order “prohibiting Petitioner’s removal from the District of Colorado or from the United States without further order of the Court”, and states that ICE “will determine whether to move to reopen proceedings before the immigration court for proceedings solely related to eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT protection, or designate another country for removal.” The court held that the petitioner had shown good reason to believe that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that the respondents had not rebutted it. He had no travel documents to any other country, including Cameroon, and the respondents’ own evidence showed that removal to Cameroon was no longer in prospect. Of the declaration the court wrote: “These are not representations or arguments that demonstrate a good reason to believe removal is reasonably foreseeable.” It rejected the argument that, as a member of the D.V.D. class, the petitioner could not obtain relief in this case, because he sought release from detention rather than more or different process, as the respondents themselves acknowledged. It ordered his immediate release.

Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Burden of proof Travel documents Withholding of removal Third-country fear screening D.V.D. class action Release from custody

Caution The release rests on the Zadvydas framework for prolonged detention after a removal order. The court did not decide whether removal to Cameroon, or to any third country, would be lawful, and it did not reach the petitioner’s other constitutional claims. The finding that he is more likely than not to be persecuted in Cameroon was made by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, as reported in the respondents’ own declaration. It is not a finding of the court. The court gave only a summary of undisputed facts and presumed familiarity with the background of the case.