Europe

European Court of Human Rights December 4, 2025 Third country: Belarus. The applicants complained that the Polish authorities ignored their requests for international protection and “pushed them back to the Belarusian side of the border”.

Disposition The Court took note of the friendly settlement and decided unanimously “to strike the applications out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 39 of the Convention”. Poland undertook to pay EUR 20,000 “jointly to the five applicants, who form one household”, and the applicants agreed “to waive any further claims against Poland in respect of the facts giving rise to these applications”. The decision was notified in writing on 8 January 2026.

The applicants complained under Articles 2 and 3, alone and with Article 13, “that the Polish authorities had ignored their requests for international protection and that, instead, they had pushed them back to the Belarusian side of the border. As the Belarusian authorities forced them back towards the Polish side, the applicants were stranded in the border forest area without access to medical aid, food, water, and shelter and in harsh weather conditions including frequent rains and low temperatures.” Their further complaints included detention under Article 5, Article 8 and collective expulsion under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (appended table). The parties signed friendly-settlement declarations, which the Court received in February 2025 (appended table). The Court was “satisfied that the settlement is based on respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols” and struck the applications out.

Pushbacks Access to asylum Friendly settlement Article 3 ECHR Collective expulsion Detention

Caution A friendly settlement is not a finding of a violation, and the decision makes no finding of fact; the account of events is the applicants’ complaint, and the decision does not date the events. The summary returns at the Belarusian border from the summer of 2021 are before the Grand Chamber in A.R. and Others v. Poland, to be ruled on 24 November 2026.

Court of Justice of the European Union August 1, 2025 ECLI:EU:C:2025:591 Third country: Albania. Held in the Gjadër detention centre under the protocol between Italy and Albania, under which Albania made available two areas of its territory “which fall entirely within the competence of the Italian authorities” (paragraph 20). They applied for international protection there on 16 October 2024 (paragraph 21).

Disposition The Court (Grand Chamber) ruled that Articles 36 and 37 and Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, do not preclude a Member State “from designating third countries as safe countries of origin by means of a legislative act, provided that that designation can be subject to judicial review” by any court hearing an action against a decision taken under the special scheme for applicants from such countries; that the Member State must ensure “sufficient and adequate access” to the sources of information on which the designation is based, for the applicant and for the court, and that the court may take account of information it has gathered itself, provided that it is reliable and the adversarial principle is observed; and that Article 37 precludes a Member State “from designating as a safe country of origin a third country which does not satisfy, for certain categories of persons, the material conditions for such a designation”. The two cases go back to the Tribunale ordinario di Roma for decision.

LC and CP were rescued at sea by the Italian authorities and “taken to Albania, where they were placed in the Gjadër detention centre” (paragraph 20). On 17 October 2024 their applications were rejected under an accelerated border procedure “on the ground that LC and CP came from a safe country of origin”. “The detention orders were not validated by the court having jurisdiction and the applicants were, therefore, released” (paragraph 22). In Italy they challenged the decisions before the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (paragraph 23). Since Italy’s Decree-Law No 158/2024 of 23 October 2024, the list of safe countries of origin, which includes Bangladesh, has appeared in a legislative act rather than in an interministerial decree (paragraphs 18, 19 and 25). The Rome court was uncertain whether that designation was compatible with EU law, in the Court’s summary because it “stems from a legislative act, that the Italian legislature did not disclose its sources of information and that it maintained the option to make that designation even though that third country may not be ‘safe’ for certain categories of its population” (paragraph 39). The Court of Justice held that designation by legislation is allowed only if a court can review it, that the sources behind it must be accessible, and that under the directive a country may be designated safe only if it is generally safe for its whole population: the directive expresses “the choice of the EU legislature to make the designation of a safe country of origin subject to the condition that the third country is generally safe for its entire population and not only for a part of it” (paragraph 96).

Safe country of origin Border procedure Accelerated procedure Offshore processing Effective remedy Judicial review Detention

Caution A preliminary ruling interprets EU law; the Tribunale ordinario di Roma decides the two cases. The Court did not decide whether Bangladesh is safe. Its third point applies Directive 2013/32. Regulation 2024/1348, which applies to applications lodged from 12 June 2026, allows a designation “with exceptions for specific parts of its territory or clearly identifiable categories of persons”, and the Court said it was for the EU legislature to choose when that rule takes effect (paragraphs 15, 17, 106 and 107). The case concerns the designation applied in the centres in Albania, not detention there; the opinions of two Advocates General on detention in the centres are reported in the Coalition’s story of 11 June 2026.

European Court of Human Rights May 20, 2025 Third country: Libya. Two of the applicants, R.J. and E.R.O., remained on the Libyan ship Ras Jadir; they said the crew bound them with ropes, beat and threatened them, and that they were taken to a detention camp in Tajura, Libya, where they were ill-treated. They were later returned to Nigeria under the voluntary humanitarian return programme run by the IOM (paragraph 15). The other fifteen were taken to Italy by the rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 (paragraph 16).

Disposition Unanimously, the Court decided “to strike the application out of its list of cases in so far as it concerns the applicants I.A., E.E.A., E.K., V.M and J.O.”, with whom their representatives had lost contact (paragraph 17), and declared “the remainder of the application inadmissible”. It held that “the applicants were not under the jurisdiction of Italy within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention in respect of the facts complained of under Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4” (paragraph 114). The decision was notified in writing on 12 June 2025.

At 6.15 a.m. on 6 November 2017 the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Rome received a distress signal from the dinghy, thirty-three nautical miles north of Tripoli; the coordination centre in Tripoli instructed the Libyan ship Ras Jadir to direct the rescue (paragraphs 5 to 8). According to the applicants, the Libyan ship’s manoeuvres caused the death of several people, who were flung into the water, and its crew struck those in the water with ropes and threatened them with weapons; Sea-Watch 3 pulled dozens aboard and recovered the dead, among them the sons of S.S. and R.J. (paragraphs 11 and 13). The Court found that Italy did not control the area: its support to Libya under the 2017 agreements, which included vessels such as the Ras Jadir, did not mean that “the international maritime area off the Libyan coast was under the effective control and decisive influence of Italy” (paragraphs 94 and 97). Nor did Italian agents control the applicants: “none of the ships involved in the rescue operation was flying the Italian flag or was under the de facto control of Italian agents” (paragraph 101), and “the mere fact that the search and rescue procedure was initiated by the Rome MRCC cannot have resulted in bringing the applicants under the jurisdiction of the Italian State” (paragraph 106). The Court added that “all the reports in its possession from international bodies and NGOs demonstrate that, at the material time, asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants in Libya were at risk of torture, slavery and discrimination, such that the situation in that country was no more favourable than it was found to have been in the Hirsi Jamaa and Others case” (paragraph 109), and that “problems with managing migratory flows cannot justify having recourse to practices which are incompatible with their obligations under the Convention” (paragraph 111).

Pushbacks Extraterritorial jurisdiction Search and rescue Bilateral agreements Outsourcing of migration control Article 3 ECHR

Caution The decision turns on jurisdiction and does not decide whether the events breached the Convention; the facts are as the applicants submitted them (paragraph 3). It distinguishes Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (see that entry), where the applicants were on Italian military ships. The Court said that the situation “is nonetheless governed by other rules of international law, in particular those regarding the rescue of persons at sea, the protection of refugees and State responsibility” (paragraph 112). The decision was adopted in French; this entry quotes the English text on HUDOC.

Court of Appeal of England and Wales January 22, 2025 [2025] EWCA Civ 33

Disposition Appeal of the Secretary of State allowed: “For the reasons explained at [45] to [71] above, I would allow the appeal” (Males LJ, paragraph 88). Phillips LJ: “I agree.” Elisabeth Laing LJ: “I also agree, with one minor qualification.” The decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission that the revocation of his refugee status and the refusal of his further claim were unlawful was reversed. The Supreme Court refused permission to appeal on 5 June 2025: “The application does not raise an arguable point of law.”

The Special Immigration Appeals Commission had held the revocation unlawful because the Home Secretary had not balanced the danger D8 posed “against the cost, practicability and feasibility of any measures that might be taken to ameliorate the risk” and had not shown that revocation “was a measure of last resort” (paragraph 1). The Court of Appeal disagreed: “Once she has concluded that a refugee is a danger to national security, she is entitled to revoke his refugee status.” … “I accept that submission and would therefore allow the appeal” (paragraphs 2 and 3). Return to Iran was not in issue: “as SIAC found that D8 would face at least a real risk of torture if returned, contrary to Article 3 ECHR, and even the risk of a violation of his right to life under Article 2 ECHR, there is now no question of him being returned. Thus, whatever the outcome of this appeal, the Secretary of State accepts that some form of leave to remain will have to be granted to D8” (paragraph 12). The court put the principle in one sentence: “Put another way, we do not send people back to be killed or tortured even if they are a danger to the national security of United Kingdom” (paragraph 26). It drew the line between the two: “If it were not for the fact that to return him to Iran would put his life at risk and would expose him to a real risk of torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment, she would be entitled to refoule him.” … “Although refoulement is not possible, the Secretary of State was entitled to take the lesser steps of revoking D8’s refugee status” (paragraph 71).

Refugee status National security Article 3 ECHR Non-refoulement Refugee Convention Article 33(2)

Caution The label records that D8 lost this appeal. It does not mean that he may be sent to Iran: the Commission found a real risk of torture there, the Home Secretary did not challenge the finding, and the court recorded that there is “no question of him being returned”. What he lost was refugee status. The Commission had observed that “the distinction between full refugee status and the lesser form of discretionary leave which will have to be granted to him is significant”, a point the court was not asked to consider (paragraph 89). The court decided the appeal on the Commission’s open judgment and did not see the closed judgment or the closed material (paragraph 4).

European Court of Human Rights April 4, 2024 Third country: Ukraine. From December 2016 to January 2017 border guards at Medyka and another crossing on the Polish-Ukrainian border turned each of them away to Ukraine at least four times, and one of them fourteen times (paragraph 5); on 1 February 2017 all four were sent back again (paragraphs 9 and 10). The Court noted that Ukraine was “a Contracting Party to the Convention” (paragraph 47).

Disposition Unanimously: the applications joined and declared admissible; “a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention”; a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; a violation of Article 13 taken with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; and no need to examine the complaint under Article 8 in application no. 54255/17. EUR 13,000 to each applicant for non-pecuniary damage; the remainder of the claims dismissed. The judgment became final on 4 July 2024.

The four men said they asked each time for international protection “because they were at risk of political persecution in Tajikistan” (paragraph 5). On 1 February 2017 all four presented themselves at Medyka and asked to apply; a lawyer from the Helsinki Foundation, who had written authority from two of them, asked to attend their interviews and was refused (paragraph 9). The border guards recorded economic and personal reasons, and all four were sent back to Ukraine (paragraph 10). The Polish administrative courts later found that the border guards had not properly established whether the men wished to apply. The Supreme Administrative Court held on 20 September 2018 that “the official notes could not have been considered sufficient evidence of the applicants’ intentions as expressed at the border” (paragraphs 17, 19 and 20). The European Court observed that those findings “did not result in any change of the applicants’ situation, given that the appeal to those courts did not have automatic suspensive effect” (paragraph 49). That Ukraine was a party to the Convention “did not exempt the Polish authorities from conducting a thorough examination of the applicants’ situation” (paragraph 48). Poland “should either have allowed the applicants to remain in Polish territory pending the examination of their asylum application or, before sending them back to Ukraine, they should have examined whether that State was safe for the applicants and whether they would have access to an adequate asylum procedure there” (paragraph 48). Sending them back without that examination “constituted a violation of the procedural limb of that Article” (paragraph 50).

Access to asylum Pushbacks Safe third country Collective expulsion Effective remedy Article 3 ECHR Access to a lawyer

Caution The violation is of the procedural limb of Article 3: Poland did not examine whether Ukraine was safe for the applicants before sending them there. The Court did not find that Ukraine was unsafe for them or that they were ill-treated there. The judgment lists one applicant as living in Warsaw, two in Austria and one in Ukraine (appended table).

Supreme Court of the United Kingdom November 15, 2023 [2023] UKSC 42 Third country: Rwanda, under the Migration and Economic Development Partnership: a memorandum of understanding between the two governments “entered into on 13 April 2022”, and two notes verbales (paragraph 8). Rwanda was to decide their asylum claims and grant asylum in Rwanda to those who succeeded. The case summary records: “None of the claimants has any connection to Rwanda.”

Disposition “For the reasons we have explained in our discussion of Issues 2 and 3, at paras 42-105 above, we conclude that the Court of Appeal was correct to reverse the decision of the Divisional Court, and was entitled to find that there are substantial grounds for believing that the removal of the claimants to Rwanda would expose them to a real risk of ill-treatment by reason of refoulement. It was accordingly correct to hold that the Secretary of State’s policy is unlawful. The Secretary of State’s appeal is therefore dismissed. For the reasons explained in our discussion of Issue 4, at paras 107-148 above, the cross-appeal by ASM is also dismissed.” (paragraph 149)

The policy was that certain people claiming asylum in the United Kingdom “should not have their claims considered here, but should instead be sent to Rwanda in order to claim asylum there” (paragraph 1). The claimants’ claims were declared inadmissible between May and July 2022 on the basis that Rwanda was a safe third country (paragraph 13). The Divisional Court held the policy lawful; the Court of Appeal, by a majority, held it unlawful; the Home Secretary appealed (paragraphs 14 to 16). The Supreme Court held that the court must assess the risk itself: “As authorities such as Othman and Zabolotnyi make clear, the court has to make its own assessment of whether there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of refoulement. It is not required to accept the government’s evaluation of assurances unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary” (paragraph 52). The evidence it relied on concerned “the general human rights situation in Rwanda; the adequacy of Rwanda’s asylum system, including its history of refoulement; and Rwanda’s non-compliance with assurances given under the arrangement which it entered into with Israel” (paragraph 74). Its conclusion: “As matters stand, the evidence establishes substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that asylum claims will not be determined properly, and that asylum seekers will in consequence be at risk of being returned directly or indirectly to their country of origin. In that event, genuine refugees will face a real risk of ill-treatment in circumstances where they should not have been returned at all.” … “The structural changes and capacity-building needed to eliminate that risk may be delivered in the future, but they were not shown to be in place at the time when the lawfulness of the policy had to be considered in these proceedings” (paragraph 105). On ASM’s cross-appeal, the court held that articles 25 and 27 of the Procedures Directive, under which removal to a safe third country requires a connection with it, no longer have effect in United Kingdom law (paragraphs 16 and 148).

Third-country removal Safe third country Chain refoulement Diplomatic assurances Article 3 ECHR Evidence of destination conditions Judicial review

Caution The court decided on the evidence about Rwanda when the decisions were made in 2022, and said that the changes needed “may be delivered in the future”. Parliament then passed the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, which provided: “Every decision-maker must conclusively treat the Republic of Rwanda as a safe country.” The Act was repealed with effect from 2 December 2025. The Coalition’s page on the United Kingdom quotes the Act and sets out what followed.

Court of Appeal of England and Wales June 29, 2023 [2023] EWCA Civ 745 Third country: Rwanda, under the Migration and Economic Development Partnership, which “comprises a Memorandum of Understanding of 13 April 2022 (MoU) and three Notes Verbales” (paragraph 3). The Home Secretary declared the claims of “some 47 asylum seekers” inadmissible in May and June 2022, intending to remove them to Rwanda by charter flight on 14 June 2022 (paragraph 17).

Disposition “I would, as I have said, allow the appeal on the Soering issue. The Lord Chief Justice, for the reasons he gives, would dismiss the appeal. Since Underhill LJ agrees with me on the Soering issue, the appeal will be allowed.” (Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, paragraph 119.) All three judges held that the other grounds of appeal failed (paragraphs 14 and 527), and Asylum Aid’s appeal on the fairness of the decision-making process was dismissed (paragraph 455).

The Divisional Court had rejected all the generic challenges to the policy (paragraph 1). The Master of the Rolls held that it “did not universally apply the correct test to the issues relating to the safety of Rwanda”, that the Court of Appeal had to consider those issues afresh, and that “special regard should be paid by the court to the views of the UNHCR on the grounds of its special expertise and the fact that the subject matter is within its remit” (paragraph 13). He concluded that “there were substantial grounds for thinking that there were real risks that the asylum seekers that the SSHD decided to send to Rwanda in May 2022 would be refouled or subject to breaches of article 3, or that their asylum claims would not be properly or fairly determined in Rwanda” (paragraph 13). Underhill LJ agreed that the evidence “established that there were substantial grounds to believe that asylum-seekers relocated to Rwanda under the MEDP were at real risk of refoulement, and that accordingly such relocation would constitute a breach of article 3 of the ECHR and contravene section 6 of the 1998 Act” (paragraph 293). The Lord Chief Justice dissented on that issue: “My conclusion accords with that of the Divisional Court. The evidence taken as a whole does not support such a real risk in either case.” … “In the result, I would dismiss the appeals” (paragraph 527). The Master of the Rolls also held that “the SSHD’s certification under [19(c)] was unlawful, because the asylum seekers’ ECHR claims were not clearly unfounded”, and that it was unnecessary to decide whether the Home Secretary had failed in her duties of inquiry (paragraph 13).

Third-country removal Safe third country Chain refoulement Diplomatic assurances Article 3 ECHR Evidence of destination conditions UNHCR evidence Judicial review

Caution The decision on the safety of Rwanda was by two votes to one, and all three judges agreed that the other grounds failed. In Underhill LJ’s words, “the position should now be judged as at the dates of the hearing in the Divisional Court” (paragraph 262). The Home Secretary appealed; the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 15 November 2023, and its entry records what Parliament did next.

European Court of Human Rights October 13, 2022 Third country: Belarus. Between August 2016 and April 2017 the family went to the crossing at Terespol on twenty-two occasions and then three more times with a written application for international protection, and was each time sent back to Belarus (paragraphs 2 to 4).

Disposition Unanimously: the application admissible; a violation of Article 3; and violations of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and of Article 13 taken with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 “as regards the other complaints raised under the well-established case-law of the Court”. EUR 28,000 to the applicants jointly for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and EUR 480 for costs and expenses; the remainder of the claim dismissed. As a Committee judgment it was final when delivered.

The Court recorded: “At 10.05 a.m. on 13 June 2017 the Court (the duty judge) decided to apply Rule 39, indicating to the Polish Government that the applicants should not be removed to Belarus until 27 June 2017. The Government were informed of the interim measure before the planned time of the expulsion. Nevertheless, the applicants were returned to Belarus at 11.25 a.m.” (paragraph 6). On 19 June 2017 they came back with an application and a copy of the Court’s letter and were allowed to enter Poland (paragraph 7). Following M.K. and Others v. Poland, the Committee held that “the fact that no proceedings in which the applicants’ applications for international protection could be reviewed had been initiated when the applicants were at the Polish border crossing constituted a violation of Article 3 of the Convention”, and that the authorities “knowingly exposed them to a serious risk of chain refoulement and treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 19). It found the other violations “in the light of its findings in previous judgments” (paragraph 21). It rejected the Government’s argument that the family should have appealed against the refusals of entry: such an appeal had no suspensive effect and could not have prevented their return to Belarus (paragraphs 12 to 15).

Access to asylum Pushbacks Chain refoulement Collective expulsion Effective remedy Interim measures Article 3 ECHR

Caution A three-judge Committee decided the case under the Court’s well-established case law. After the applicants were admitted to Poland, the head of the Aliens Office refused them international protection on 20 April 2018 and the Refugee Board upheld the refusal on 2 October 2019 (paragraph 10); the judgment does not record what happened to them after that. Their complaints did not include Article 34 (paragraph 11), so the judgment makes no finding on the interim measure. Like M.K. and Others v. Poland (see that entry), the judgment concerns an official border crossing in 2016 and 2017. It does not decide the summary returns at the Belarusian border from the summer of 2021, which are before the Grand Chamber in A.R. and Others v. Poland, to be ruled on 24 November 2026.

European Court of Human Rights June 30, 2022 Third country: Belarus. Border guards at Terespol turned the family away to Belarus sixteen times between October 2016 and June 2017 (paragraphs 6, 11, 13, 15 and 45). On 25 May 2017 the Belarusian authorities told them that “they had to leave Belarus by 4 June 2017, otherwise they would face deportation” (paragraph 12).

Disposition Unanimously: the application admissible; violations of Article 3, of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, and of Article 13 taken with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. EUR 28,000 to the applicants jointly for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and EUR 750 for costs and expenses; the remainder of the claim dismissed. The judgment became final on 14 November 2022.

The family went to the crossing at Terespol thirteen times in October and November 2016, and again in March and May 2017 with a written application for international protection (paragraphs 6, 11 and 13). Each time the border guards issued decisions turning them away, recording that they had not said they were at risk of persecution but were trying to emigrate for economic or personal reasons (paragraph 9). The Court recorded: “At 10.10 a.m. on 2 June 2017 the Court (the duty judge) decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Polish Government that the applicants should not be removed to Belarus until 16 June 2017. The Government were informed of the interim measure before the planned time of expulsion. Nevertheless, the applicants were returned to Belarus at 11.25 a.m.” (paragraph 15). They came back that afternoon with an application for international protection and a copy of the Court’s letter, and were allowed to enter Poland (paragraph 16). The Court held: “The fact that no proceedings in which the applicants’ applications for international protection could be reviewed were initiated on the sixteen occasions when the applicants were at the Polish border crossing constituted a violation of Article 3 of the Convention”; the Polish authorities “knowingly exposed them to a serious risk of chain refoulement and treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 45). The applicants had “attempted to cross a border in a legal manner, using an official checkpoint and subjecting themselves to border checks as required by the relevant law” (paragraph 55), and their case was “an exemplification of a wider State policy of refusing entry to foreigners coming from Belarus” (paragraph 56).

Access to asylum Pushbacks Chain refoulement Collective expulsion Effective remedy Interim measures Article 3 ECHR

Caution After they were admitted to Poland, the head of the Aliens Office refused them international protection on 14 December 2017, the Refugee Board upheld the refusal on 12 June 2018, and the applicants did not appeal to the administrative courts (paragraph 19). The judgment does not record what happened to them after that. Although they were returned to Belarus after the interim measure had been indicated, the Court made no finding under Article 34: notice of the application was given to the Government only for the complaints under Article 3, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and Article 13. Like M.K. and Others v. Poland (see that entry), the judgment concerns an official border crossing in 2016 and 2017. It does not decide the summary returns at the Belarusian border from the summer of 2021, which are before the Grand Chamber in A.R. and Others v. Poland, to be ruled on 24 November 2026.

European Court of Human Rights June 30, 2022 Third country: Belarus. The family went to the crossing at Terespol again and again between February and June 2017 and was each time sent back to Belarus (paragraphs 5 to 11). On 17 July 2017 they told the Court that “they had left the area of the Polish border and returned to Russia” (paragraph 16).

Disposition Unanimously: the application admissible; violations of Article 3, of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, and of Article 13 taken with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; and “there has been a violation of Article 34 of the Convention”. EUR 30,000 to the applicants jointly for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and EUR 700 for costs and expenses; the remainder of the claim dismissed. The judgment became final on 14 November 2022.

From 21 February 2017 the family came to Terespol repeatedly, from April with a written application for international protection, and was refused entry each time (paragraphs 5, 7 and 8). The Court recorded: “At 10.48 a.m. on 16 June 2017 the Court (the duty judge) decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Polish Government that the applicants should not be removed to Belarus until 30 June 2017. The Government were informed of the interim measure before the planned time of expulsion. The applicants were nevertheless returned to Belarus at 11.25 a.m.” (paragraph 10). On 19 June 2017 they came back with a copy of the Court’s letter and a written application for international protection, “clearly expressed a wish to lodge this application”, and were turned away again, while a lawyer sent the application to the Border Guard by email, fax and ePUAP (paragraphs 11 and 12). The Court held that the failure to begin any asylum procedure on “the thirty-three occasions when the applicants were at the Polish border crossing constituted a violation of Article 3 of the Convention”, and that Poland “knowingly exposed them to a serious risk of chain refoulement and treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 42). Their case was “an exemplification of a wider State policy of refusing entry to foreigners coming from Belarus” (paragraph 53), and Poland breached Article 34 by not complying with the interim measure.

Access to asylum Pushbacks Chain refoulement Collective expulsion Effective remedy Interim measures Article 3 ECHR Article 34 ECHR

Caution The judgment does not record what happened to the applicants after they returned to Russia; the interim measure was discontinued on 19 July 2017 (paragraph 16). It describes twenty-four visits to the crossing between 21 February and 14 April 2017, eight more in April and May, and two in June (paragraphs 5, 8, 10 and 11), and gives the total as thirty-three (paragraph 42). Like M.K. and Others v. Poland (see that entry), the judgment concerns an official border crossing in 2016 and 2017. It does not decide the summary returns at the Belarusian border from the summer of 2021, which are before the Grand Chamber in A.R. and Others v. Poland, to be ruled on 24 November 2026.

European Court of Human Rights June 14, 2022 Third country: Rwanda, under the asylum partnership arrangement in the memorandum of understanding the United Kingdom entered into with Rwanda on 13 April 2022. He was served with removal directions to Rwanda for 14 June 2022, on a charter flight due to leave at 22:30 (BST) that evening (press releases ECHR 197 (2022) and ECHR 199 (2022)).

Disposition On 14 June 2022 the Court decided “in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before it, to indicate to the Government of the United Kingdom, under Rule 39, that the applicant should not be removed until the expiry of a period of three weeks following the delivery of the final domestic decision in the ongoing judicial review proceedings.” On 3 October 2024 a Committee struck the application out of the list after the applicant said that he wished to withdraw it “as he had been afforded access to the United Kingdom asylum system” (decision notified on 24 October 2024).

On 24 May 2022 he was served with a notice that the authorities were considering treating his asylum claim as inadmissible and relocating him to Rwanda. On 27 May 2022 a doctor at the immigration removal centre issued a report “indicating that the applicant might have been a victim of torture”. On 6 June 2022 he was told that his claim had been deemed inadmissible. The High Court refused interim relief, though it accepted that the question whether the decision to treat Rwanda as a safe third country was irrational or based on insufficient enquiry raised serious triable issues; an appeal was dismissed on 13 June, and the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal on 14 June 2022 (press release ECHR 197 (2022)). The Court had regard to the concerns of UNHCR that asylum seekers transferred from the United Kingdom to Rwanda “will not have access to fair and efficient procedures for the determination of refugee status”, and to the High Court’s finding. It decided: “In light of the resulting risk of treatment contrary to the applicant’s Convention rights as well as the fact that Rwanda is outside the Convention legal space (and is therefore not bound by the European Convention on Human Rights) and the absence of any legally enforceable mechanism for the applicant’s return to the United Kingdom in the event of a successful merits challenge before the domestic courts, the Court has decided to grant this interim measure to prevent the applicant’s removal until the domestic courts have had the opportunity to first consider those issues.” Five other people due on the same flight applied to the Court that day. It stayed the removal of R.M. and H.N. until 20 June 2022 to consider their requests in more detail; it rejected two requests “as those applicants had not made use of the suspensive remedies available before the national courts”; and one request was withdrawn after the Home Office withdrew the removal directions (press release ECHR 199 (2022)). The stays for R.M. and H.N., which concerned Iranian and Vietnamese asylum seekers, were not extended and expired (press release ECHR 112 (2023)). The Court of Appeal later recorded that NSK, RM and HTN were granted interim measures and that “The practical consequence was that no removals to Rwanda have yet taken place” ([2023] EWCA Civ 745, paragraph 17). On 24 June 2022 the Government asked the Court to lift the measure. The Court confirmed it on 1 July 2022, because the material the Government presented did not satisfy it that he “could and would be returned to the United Kingdom” if his legal proceedings succeeded. On 19 December 2022 the High Court held the Rwanda arrangement lawful in principle but quashed the decisions in his case, because the Home Secretary had not given adequate reasons for treating his asylum claim as inadmissible and the decision refusing his human rights claim had not considered the evidence he put forward; an order of 16 January 2023 formally quashed them. The Court then informed the parties that the measure “ceased to have effect on 6 February 2023, being three weeks after the individual decisions in N.S.K.’s case were formally quashed” (press release ECHR 112 (2023)). The complaint under Article 3 was communicated to the Government on 5 April 2023, with the question whether he could still claim to be a victim, given that he “cannot be removed to Rwanda without the Home Secretary reconsidering the decisions in his case”. The Court never decided it: on 2 September 2024 he told the Court that he wished to withdraw the application, and it was struck out.

Interim measures Third-country removal Safe third country Offshore processing Article 3 ECHR Judicial review

Caution An interim measure is not a judgment. In the Court’s words, measures under Rule 39 “are decided in connection with proceedings before the Court, without prejudging any subsequent decisions on the admissibility or merits of the case”. The measure, its reasons and its end are known from the Court’s press releases and its communication of the case, which quote the decisions; press releases state that they do not bind the Court. The Court’s documents give two different years of birth for him, so this entry gives none. The domestic courts later held the Rwanda policy unlawful: see the entries for the Court of Appeal (29 June 2023) and the Supreme Court (15 November 2023).

European Court of Human Rights July 8, 2021 Third country: Belarus. Border guards at Terespol turned them away to Belarus on five occasions in July 2017, including on the day the Court indicated an interim measure and the day after (paragraphs 5, 11, 14 and 69). The Court found that returning them there risked “chain‑refoulement” to Syria (paragraphs 63 and 64).

Disposition Unanimously: a violation of Article 3 “on account of the applicants being denied access to the asylum procedure and exposed to a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment and torture in Syria”; not necessary to examine the complaint about their treatment during border checks; a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; a violation of Article 13 taken with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; and Poland “has failed to discharge its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention”. The Court continued to indicate that the applicants should not be removed to Belarus “if and when they present themselves at the Polish border crossing” until the judgment became final, and awarded EUR 10,000 to each applicant for non-pecuniary damage. The judgment became final on 22 November 2021.

The applicants went to the border crossing at Terespol three times between 14 and 18 July 2017 and, they said, asked each time for international protection (paragraph 5). Each time the border guards issued decisions turning them away on the ground that they were “simply trying to emigrate for economic or personal reasons”, based on official notes that the applicants had not signed (paragraph 8). On 20 July 2017, “at 10.08 a.m. the Court (the duty judge) decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that the applicants should not be removed to Belarus until 3 August 2017. The Government were informed of the interim measure before the planned time of expulsion. Nevertheless, the applicants were returned to Belarus at 11.25 a.m.” (paragraph 11). The next day they came back with a copy of the Court’s letter and the conscription orders, and were sent back again (paragraphs 13 and 14). The Court held that the applicants “could arguably claim that there was no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the Belarusian authorities and that their return to Syria could violate Article 3 of the Convention”, and that Poland was obliged to allow them “to remain within Polish jurisdiction until such time that their claims had been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority” (paragraph 64). It rejected the argument that EU law required the refusals: the measure “fell outside the scope of Poland’s strict international legal obligations” (paragraph 67). Sending them back on each of the five occasions “constituted a violation of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 69). Their cases “were part of the same wider policy” found in M.K. and Others v. Poland, and the decisions “constituted a collective expulsion of aliens within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4” (paragraph 83).

Access to asylum Pushbacks Chain refoulement Collective expulsion Effective remedy Interim measures Article 3 ECHR Safe third country

Caution Like M.K. and Others v. Poland (see that entry), the judgment concerns an official border crossing in 2016 and 2017. It does not decide the summary returns at the Belarusian border from the summer of 2021, which are before the Grand Chamber in A.R. and Others v. Poland, to be ruled on 24 November 2026. The judgment records that the applicants “currently reside in Belarus” (paragraph 2); it does not record what happened to them after it was delivered.

European Court of Human Rights July 23, 2020 Third country: Belarus. Polish border guards at Terespol and Czeremcha-Połowce refused them entry and returned them to Belarus, on thirty-five, eight and nineteen or more occasions respectively (paragraph 185). The Court held that sending them back there exposed them to a serious risk of chain refoulement to Chechnya.

Disposition Applications joined and, unanimously, declared admissible. Unanimously: a violation of Article 3 “on account of the applicants being denied access to the asylum procedure and exposed to a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment and torture in Chechnya”; not necessary to examine the complaint under Article 3 about their treatment during border checks; a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; a violation of Article 13 taken with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; and Poland “has failed to discharge its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention”. The Court continued to indicate to Poland “not to remove the applicants in cases nos. 40503/17 and 43643/17 to Belarus” … “until such time as the present judgment becomes final, or until a further decision is made”. By six votes to one, EUR 34,000 for non-pecuniary damage in each of the three applications, with costs; the remainder of the claim dismissed unanimously. The judgment became final on 14 December 2020, when a panel of the Grand Chamber rejected the requests for referral by the applicants and by the government.

The applicants came to the border crossings repeatedly and asked for international protection. The border guards refused them entry and sent them back to Belarus. In June 2017 the Court indicated interim measures that they not be returned to Belarus (paragraph 3). The Court held that “pending an application for international protection, a State cannot deny access to its territory to a person presenting himself or herself at a border checkpoint who alleges that he or she may be subjected to ill-treatment if he or she remains on the territory of the neighbouring State, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk” (paragraph 179). The applicants “could arguably claim that there was no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the Belarusian authorities and that their return to Chechnya could violate Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 178), and “the Polish authorities, by failing to allow the applicants to remain on Polish territory pending the examination of their applications, knowingly exposed them to a serious risk of chain refoulement and treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 185). It found a collective expulsion. The applicants “attempted to cross the border in a legal manner, using an official checkpoint and subjecting themselves to border checks as required by the relevant law” (paragraph 207), and their cases were “an exemplification of a wider State policy of refusing entry to foreigners coming from Belarus, regardless of whether they were clearly economic migrants or whether they expressed a fear of persecution in their countries of origin” (paragraph 208).

Access to asylum Pushbacks Chain refoulement Collective expulsion Effective remedy Interim measures Article 3 ECHR Safe third country

Caution The applicants presented themselves at official border crossings, and the Court relied on that in finding a collective expulsion (paragraph 207). The judgment does not decide the summary returns at the Belarusian border from the summer of 2021, which are before the Grand Chamber in A.R. and Others v. Poland, to be ruled on 24 November 2026. Judge Eicke’s dissent concerned only the assessment of non-pecuniary damage.

European Court of Human Rights December 15, 2016 ECHR 2016 (extracts)

Disposition Unanimously: violations of Article 5 §§ 1, 2 and 4; no violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions at the Contrada Imbriacola early reception and aid centre or on the ships Vincent and Audace; and a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3. By sixteen votes to one, no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and no violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. By fifteen votes to two, EUR 2,500 to each applicant for non-pecuniary damage; unanimously, EUR 15,000 jointly for costs and expenses.

The applicants left Tunisia by boat on 16 and 17 September 2011, were intercepted by the Italian coastguard and taken to Lampedusa (paragraph 11). They were held at the early reception centre at Contrada Imbriacola until a revolt and fire on 20 September, then flown to Palermo on 22 September and held on the ships Vincent and Audace (paragraphs 14 and 15). On 27 and 29 September 2011 they were taken to Palermo airport and removed to Tunisia, after being received by the Tunisian consul before they boarded (paragraphs 17 and 18). The Grand Chamber held their confinement unlawful: “the applicants’ deprivation of liberty did not satisfy the general principle of legal certainty and was not compatible with the aim of protecting the individual against arbitrariness” (paragraph 107). They had no remedy for the conditions in which they were held, because an appeal against the refusal-of-entry orders “would have served only to challenge the lawfulness of their removal” (paragraphs 270 and 271). It found no collective expulsion: “To sum up, the applicants underwent identification on two occasions, their nationality was established, and they were afforded a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion” (paragraph 254). It left open whether the April 2011 agreement between Italy and Tunisia, “which has not been made public”, could be regarded as a readmission agreement within the meaning of the Return Directive (paragraph 255).

Collective expulsion Detention Detention conditions Readmission agreement Effective remedy Article 3 ECHR Article 5 ECHR

Caution The applicants did not claim that they faced ill-treatment in Tunisia. The Court held that the lack of suspensive effect of an appeal against removal did not in itself breach Article 13 “where, as in the present case, the applicants do not allege that there is a real risk of a violation of the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country” (paragraph 281). The Grand Chamber departed from the Chamber on the conditions at Contrada Imbriacola, on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and on Article 13 taken with it; it confirmed the Chamber on Article 5, on Article 13 taken with Article 3 and on the ships (concurring opinion of Judge Raimondi, paragraphs 1 and 2).

European Court of Human Rights October 21, 2014 Third country: Greece. At the port of Ancona the border police handed them to the captains of the ferries for return to Greece (paragraph 242). According to their lawyer’s letter of 13 April 2011, recorded in the judgment, Reza Karimi was later sent from Italy to Norway under the Dublin II Regulation, by a decision of 28 December 2010, and on arriving in Norway was sent straight back to Afghanistan (paragraph 39).

Disposition The operative part is in French; this is the Coalition’s summary translation. Unanimously: the application struck out for thirty-one applicants; for Reza Karimi, Yasir Zaidi, Mozamil Azimi and Najeeb Heideri (also known as Nagib Haidari), a violation by Greece of Article 13 taken with Article 3; a violation by Italy of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; a violation by Italy of Article 3, because by returning them to Greece the Italian authorities exposed them to the risks arising from the failures of the asylum procedure there; and a violation by Italy of Article 13 taken with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, for the lack of access to the asylum procedure or any other remedy in the port of Ancona. No need to examine the complaints under Article 2 or Article 34; the remainder of the application inadmissible as against each State. Greece to pay the four EUR 5,000 jointly for costs and expenses; the remainder of the claim dismissed.

The applicants said they had reached Greece in 2007 and 2008 from countries in armed conflict, boarded vessels for Italy at Patras, and were sent straight back to Greece by the border police at Bari, Ancona and Venice (press release). The Court found that at Ancona “les requérants ont été remis sur-le-champ par les autorités des frontières aux capitaines des ferry-boats et n’ont pas eu accès à un interprète ni à des agents pouvant leur fournir les informations minimales nécessaires à propos du droit d’asile et de la procédure pertinente” (paragraph 242; the Coalition’s translation: “the applicants were handed over immediately by the border authorities to the captains of the ferries and had no access to an interpreter or to officials who could give them the minimum information needed about the right to asylum and the relevant procedure”). It held that the measures taken against them at Ancona “s’analysent en des expulsions collectives et indiscriminées” (paragraph 225; the Coalition’s translation: “amount to collective and indiscriminate expulsions”). The Dublin system did not alter that. In the words of the Court’s English press release, “no form of collective and indiscriminate returns could be justified by reference to that system, and it was for the State carrying out the return to ensure that the destination country offered sufficient guarantees in the application of its asylum policy to prevent the person concerned being removed to his country of origin without an assessment of the risks faced.” Against Greece, the Court found a violation of Article 13 with Article 3 because of “l’absence d’accès à la procédure d’asile et du risque d’expulsion des requérants vers l’Afghanistan, où ils étaient susceptibles de subir des traitements inhumains et dégradants” (paragraph 233; the Coalition’s translation: “the lack of access to the asylum procedure and the risk of the applicants’ expulsion to Afghanistan, where they were liable to suffer inhuman and degrading treatment”). Against Italy, it found that by returning them to Greece the Italian authorities exposed them to the risks arising from the failures of the Greek asylum procedure.

Collective expulsion Dublin system Chain refoulement Access to asylum Effective remedy Article 3 ECHR Pushbacks

Caution The judgment was delivered in French only; the English item on HUDOC is a placeholder without text. Quotations from the judgment are given in French with the Coalition’s translation, and English quotations from the Registry’s press release are marked as such; the press release does not bind the Court. The press release says the Court held “by a majority”; the operative part of the judgment says “À L’UNANIMITÉ”, unanimously, and this entry follows the judgment. Thirty-one applicants were struck out under Article 37 § 1 (c); that is not a ruling on the merits of their complaints. The risk of onward expulsion to Afghanistan grounded the finding against Greece, not the findings against Italy.

European Court of Human Rights July 24, 2014 Third country: United States custody. The CIA flew him into Poland on 5 December 2002 and out of Poland on 6 June 2003 on its rendition aircraft (paragraph 417). At the date of the judgment he was held at the Internment Facility at the United States Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba (paragraph 41).

Disposition Unanimously: the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion dismissed; Poland “failed to comply with its obligations under Article 38 of the Convention”; violations of Article 3 in its procedural and its substantive aspect, of Articles 5, 8 and 13, and of Article 6 § 1; and a violation of Articles 2 and 3 taken with Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 “on account of the transfer of the applicant from the respondent State’s territory despite the existence of a real risk that he could be subjected to the death penalty”. EUR 100,000 for non-pecuniary damage. The judgment became final on 16 February 2015.

The Court found it “established beyond reasonable doubt” that the applicant arrived at Szymany on 5 December 2002 on the CIA rendition aircraft N63MU, was held from then until 6 June 2003 at the CIA detention facility at Stare Kiejkuty with the codename “Quartz”, was interrogated by the CIA and subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques and to unauthorised techniques, and was flown out on the rendition aircraft N379P (paragraph 417). The treatment “amounted to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 516). Poland “knew of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on its territory at the material time” and cooperated in them, and it “ought to have known that, by enabling the CIA to detain such persons on its territory, it was exposing them to a serious risk of treatment contrary to the Convention” (paragraph 442). The Court accepted the experts’ assessment that the torture was “the exclusive responsibility of the CIA” and that Polish officials were unlikely to have witnessed it, but held Poland responsible on account of its “acquiescence and connivance” in the programme (paragraph 517). On the transfer, it held that “by enabling the CIA to transfer the applicant to its other secret detention facilities, the Polish authorities exposed him to a foreseeable serious risk of further ill-treatment and conditions of detention in breach of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 518), and that “at the time of the applicant’s transfer from Poland there was a substantial and foreseeable risk that he could be subjected to the death penalty following his trial before the military commission” (paragraph 578). Under Article 46 it required Poland “to seek to remove that risk as soon as possible, by seeking assurances from the US authorities that he will not be subjected to the death penalty” (paragraph 589).

Extraordinary rendition Secret detention Article 3 ECHR Death penalty Flagrant denial of justice Effective investigation Diplomatic assurances

Caution The judgment decides Poland’s responsibility under the Convention; the United States is not a party to the Convention or to the case. The Court’s findings of fact rest on evidence assessed as a whole, and it held that Poland had failed to comply with Article 38. The Committee of Ministers’ supervision of the judgment is set out on the Coalition’s page on Poland.

European Court of Human Rights July 24, 2014 Third country: United States custody. The CIA flew him into Poland on 5 December 2002, and on 22 September 2003 transferred him “to another CIA secret detention facility elsewhere” (paragraph 419). At the date of the judgment he was held at the Internment Facility at the United States Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba (paragraph 41).

Disposition Unanimously: the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion dismissed; Poland “failed to comply with its obligations under Article 38 of the Convention”; the application admissible; violations of Article 3 in its procedural and its substantive aspect, of Article 5 and of Article 8; a violation of Article 13 “on account of the lack of effective remedies in respect of the applicant’s grievances under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention”; and a violation of Article 6 § 1 “on account of the transfer of the applicant from the respondent State’s territory despite the existence of a real risk that he could face a flagrant denial of justice”. EUR 100,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 30,000 for costs and expenses. The judgment became final on 16 February 2015.

The Court found it “established beyond reasonable doubt” that the applicant arrived at Szymany with Mr Al Nashiri on 5 December 2002 on the CIA rendition aircraft N63MU, was held at the CIA facility at Stare Kiejkuty until 22 September 2003 and subjected there to the procedures and treatment applied to the CIA’s High-Value Detainees, and was then flown out on the aircraft N313P (paragraph 419). The treatment “amounted to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 511). As in Al Nashiri, the Court accepted that the torture was “the exclusive responsibility of the CIA”, but held Poland responsible on account of its “acquiescence and connivance” in the programme (paragraph 512), and held that “by enabling the CIA to transfer the applicant to its other secret detention facilities, the Polish authorities exposed him to a foreseeable serious risk of further ill-treatment and conditions of detention in breach of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 513). When he was transferred, “there was a real risk that his trial before the military commission would amount to a flagrant denial of justice” (paragraph 557). He had never been charged, and his detention without charge “by itself amounts to a flagrant denial of justice” (paragraph 559).

Extraordinary rendition Secret detention Article 3 ECHR Flagrant denial of justice Indefinite detention Effective investigation

Caution The judgment decides Poland’s responsibility under the Convention; the United States is not a party to the Convention or to the case. The Article 6 finding concerns the risk created by his transfer and his detention without charge; he had not been listed for trial before a military commission (paragraph 559). The Committee of Ministers’ supervision of the judgment is set out on the Coalition’s page on Poland.

European Court of Human Rights February 23, 2012 ECHR 2012 Third country: Libya. Intercepted on 6 May 2009, taken to Tripoli on Italian military ships and handed over to the Libyan authorities, under bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya that had entered into force on 4 February 2009 (paragraphs 10 to 13). The Court also found a risk that Libya would send them on to Somalia and Eritrea.

Disposition By thirteen votes to four, the application struck out for two applicants who had died. Unanimously: the applicants “were within the jurisdiction of Italy for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention”; violations of Article 3 “on account of the fact that the applicants were exposed to the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment in Libya” and “on account of the fact that the applicants were exposed to the risk of being repatriated to Somalia and Eritrea”; a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; violations of Article 13 taken with Article 3 and with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; the government’s preliminary objections rejected. EUR 15,000 to each applicant for non-pecuniary damage, to be held in trust by their representatives, and EUR 1,575.74 for costs and expenses.

The applicants were part of “a group of about two hundred individuals who left Libya aboard three vessels with the aim of reaching the Italian coast” (paragraph 9). On 6 May 2009, 35 nautical miles south of Lampedusa, ships of the Italian Revenue Police and Coastguard intercepted them; they were transferred onto Italian military ships and returned to Tripoli, where they were handed over to the Libyan authorities (paragraphs 10 to 12). The Minister of the Interior said that between 6 and 10 May 2009 “more than 471 irregular migrants had been intercepted on the high seas and transferred to Libya” under the agreements (paragraph 13). The Court held that “in the period between boarding the ships of the Italian armed forces and being handed over to the Libyan authorities, the applicants were under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities” (paragraph 81), and that “by transferring the applicants to Libya, the Italian authorities, in full knowledge of the facts, exposed them to treatment proscribed by the Convention” (paragraph 137). It found a second violation of Article 3 in the risk of onward return: “indirect refoulement of an alien leaves the responsibility of the Contracting State intact” (paragraph 146). “It is a matter for the State carrying out the return to ensure that the intermediary country offers sufficient guarantees to prevent the person concerned being removed to his country of origin without an assessment of the risks faced. The Court observes that that obligation is all the more important when, as in the instant case, the intermediary country is not a State Party to the Convention” (paragraph 147). And it found a collective expulsion: “the transfer of the applicants to Libya was carried out without any form of examination of each applicant’s individual situation” (paragraph 185), so that “the removal of the applicants was of a collective nature, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention” (paragraph 186).

Pushbacks Extraterritorial jurisdiction Chain refoulement Collective expulsion Effective remedy Article 3 ECHR Bilateral agreements

Caution The judgment decides Italy’s responsibility for people its own ships took to Libya and handed over. In S.S. and Others v. Italy, decided on 20 May 2025 (no. 21660/18), about an incident at sea off Libya on 6 November 2017, the Court declared the application inadmissible, holding that “the applicants were not under the jurisdiction of Italy within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention” (paragraph 114). The Coalition’s page on Italy sets out both.

European Court of Human Rights January 17, 2012 ECHR 2012 (extracts)

Disposition Unanimously: the application declared admissible; “the applicant’s deportation to Jordan would not be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention”; no violation of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 13; deportation to Jordan would not be in violation of Article 5; and “the applicant’s deportation to Jordan would be in violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of the real risk of the admission at the applicant’s retrial of evidence obtained by torture of third persons”. The judgment became final on 9 May 2012, when a panel of the Grand Chamber refused his request for referral.

Omar Othman, known as Abu Qatada, was recognised as a refugee in 1994 on the basis that he had been detained and tortured by the Jordanian authorities (paragraph 7). He was convicted in his absence in Jordan in April 1999, and again after a trial in the autumn of 2000, when he was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment with hard labour (paragraphs 9, 18 and 19). On 10 August 2005 the United Kingdom and Jordan signed a memorandum of understanding setting out assurances for people returned between them, and the next day he was served with notice of intention to deport (paragraphs 8 and 23). The Court restated the rule: “Article 3 is absolute and it is not possible to weigh the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for the expulsion” (paragraph 185). On assurances it held that “assurances are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill‑treatment. There is an obligation to examine whether assurances provide, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant will be protected against the risk of ill-treatment” (paragraph 187), and that “it will only be in rare cases that the general situation in a country will mean that no weight at all can be given to assurances” (paragraph 188). It concluded that “the applicant’s return to Jordan would not expose him to a real risk of ill-treatment” (paragraph 205). It held against the deportation because of the risk that evidence obtained by torturing other people would be used at his retrial: “the admission of torture evidence is manifestly contrary, not just to the provisions of Article 6, but to the most basic international standards of a fair trial. It would make the whole trial not only immoral and illegal, but also entirely unreliable in its outcome. It would, therefore, be a flagrant denial of justice if such evidence were admitted in a criminal trial” (paragraph 267). It found “a real risk that the applicant’s retrial would amount to a flagrant denial of justice” (paragraph 282). The Court’s press release called it “the first time that the Court has found that an expulsion would be in violation of Article 6”.

Article 3 ECHR Diplomatic assurances National security Evidence obtained by torture Fair trial Flagrant denial of justice

Caution The Court accepted that the assurances Jordan gave answered the risk of torture; the deportation was barred only by the risk that evidence obtained by torturing other people would be admitted at his retrial. The judgment does not record what happened after it became final, and the Coalition has not read a source on it. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom applied the Othman approach to assurances in R (AAA (Syria) and others) in 2023 (see that entry) and reached the opposite result on Rwanda.

European Court of Human Rights March 2, 2010 ECHR 2010

Disposition Unanimously: a violation of Article 3; “it is not necessary to decide whether there have been violations of Article 2 of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 13”; and no violation of Article 6. By six votes to one, “there have been violations of Articles 13 and 34 of the Convention”. Unanimously, the findings of violation “constitute sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants”, and EUR 40,000 to the applicants jointly for costs and expenses. The judgment became final on 4 October 2010.

British forces arrested the first applicant on 30 April 2003 and the second on 21 November 2003 and held them in British-run detention facilities in Iraq (paragraph 41). In December 2005 their cases were referred to the Iraqi courts (paragraph 162). The Divisional Court in London found: “we are satisfied that substantial grounds have been shown for believing there to be a real risk of the claimants being condemned to the death penalty and executed, contrary to Protocol No. 13, if they are transferred into the custody of the IHT”, but held that the United Kingdom was bound in international law to hand them over (paragraph 60). On 30 December 2008 the Court indicated that they “should not be removed or transferred from the custody of the United Kingdom until further notice”. The next day the Government informed it that “the applicants had nonetheless been transferred to the custody of the Iraqi authorities earlier that day” (paragraph 4). The Court held that from 1 February 2004, when Protocol No. 13 came into force for the United Kingdom, it should not have entered into any arrangement “which involved it in detaining individuals with a view to transferring them to stand trial on capital charges”, and that “the applicants’ well-founded fear of being executed by the Iraqi authorities during the period May 2006 to July 2009 must have given rise to a significant degree of mental suffering and that to subject them to such suffering constituted inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 137). Because British forces had arrested and held them, the United Kingdom “was under a paramount obligation to ensure that the arrest and detention did not end in a manner which would breach the applicants’ rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13” (paragraph 140), and the transfer “in the absence of any such binding assurance” failed to take proper account of those obligations (paragraph 143). On the interim measure: “The failure to comply with the interim measure and the transfer of the applicants out of the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction exposed them to a serious risk of grave and irreparable harm” (paragraph 165). For the same reason “the effectiveness of any appeal to the House of Lords was unjustifiably nullified as a result of the Government’s transfer of the applicants to the Iraqi authorities” (paragraph 166).

Article 3 ECHR Death penalty Transfer of custody Interim measures Article 34 ECHR Effective remedy Diplomatic assurances

Caution The Article 3 violation lies in the fear of execution to which the two men were exposed, which the Court held to be inhuman treatment; it is not a finding that they were tortured in Iraq. When the Court ruled, the Iraqi High Tribunal had cancelled the charges against them on 9 September 2009 “due to insufficient evidence”, the prosecutor had appealed, and the Court of Cassation had sent the case back for reinvestigation and retrial; they remained in custody (paragraphs 88 and 89). The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which supervised the execution of the judgment and has closed the case, records that “Al Saadoon and Mufdhi were released from custody by the Iraqi authorities in 2011”, after the Court of Cassation ratified the Tribunal’s decision to acquit them.

European Court of Human Rights November 15, 1996 Reports 1996-V

Disposition By twelve votes to seven, that “in the event of the Secretary of State's decision to deport the first applicant to India being implemented, there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention”. By thirteen votes to six, no violation of Article 5 § 1. Unanimously, a violation of Article 5 § 4, and a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3. By seventeen votes to two, not necessary to consider the complaint under Article 8. The findings of violation held to be sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage; £45,000 awarded for costs and expenses, less 21,141 French francs; the remainder of the claim dismissed.

On 14 August 1990 the Home Secretary decided that Karamjit Singh Chahal should be deported to India because his presence in the United Kingdom was “unconducive to the public good for reasons of national security and other reasons of a political nature, namely the international fight against terrorism” (paragraph 25). He said that on a visit to Punjab in 1984 the police had held him for twenty-one days, beaten him to unconsciousness, electrocuted him and subjected him to a mock execution (paragraph 18). The Home Secretary obtained an assurance from the government of India, repeated in December 1995, that he “would enjoy the same legal protection as any other Indian citizen, and that he would have no reason to expect to suffer mistreatment of any kind at the hands of the Indian authorities” (paragraph 37). The Grand Chamber held that the risk could not be weighed against the danger he was said to pose: “The prohibition provided by Article 3 (art. 3) against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases.” … “In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) is thus wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees” (paragraph 80). On the assurance: “Although the Court does not doubt the good faith of the Indian Government in providing the assurances mentioned above (paragraph 92), it would appear that, despite the efforts of that Government, the NHRC and the Indian courts to bring about reform, the violation of human rights by certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India is a recalcitrant and enduring problem (see paragraph 104 above). Against this background, the Court is not persuaded that the above assurances would provide Mr Chahal with an adequate guarantee of safety” (paragraph 105). It concluded that “the order for his deportation to India would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3 (art. 3)” (paragraph 107). The Court also found that “neither the advisory panel nor the courts could review the decision of the Home Secretary to deport Mr Chahal to India with reference solely to the question of risk, leaving aside national security considerations” (paragraph 153), so that he had no effective remedy, and that neither habeas corpus, judicial review nor the advisory panel met the requirements of Article 5 § 4 for the review of his detention (paragraph 132). The detention itself, with a view to deportation, did not breach Article 5 § 1.

Article 3 ECHR Non-refoulement National security Diplomatic assurances Detention pending removal Effective remedy Judicial review

Caution The Article 3 finding was made by twelve votes to seven. The judgment decides whether the deportation order could be carried out on the evidence before the Court in 1996, when Mr Chahal was still detained; it does not record what happened to him afterwards, and the Coalition has not read a source that does. The Court applied the same rule, that the risk of ill-treatment cannot be weighed against the reasons for removal, in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom in 2012 (see that entry), where it accepted the assurances Jordan gave.

European Court of Human Rights October 30, 1991 Series A no. 215

Disposition The Court held “by eight votes to one that there has been no violation of Article 3” and “by seven votes to two that there has been no violation of Article 13”.

After the House of Lords upheld the refusals of asylum on 11 December 1987, the European Commission of Human Rights refused on 18 December 1987 to indicate that the men should not be removed (paragraphs 68 and 70), and they were sent back to Sri Lanka in February 1988. Their appeals went on from abroad. On 13 March 1989 an Adjudicator held that they had had a well-founded fear of persecution, largely believed their accounts, and directed “that they should be returned to the United Kingdom with the minimum of delay” (paragraph 71). They came back in August and October 1989 and were given exceptional leave to remain (paragraphs 20, 31, 44, 58 and 66). Three of them described ill-treatment after their return. The second applicant said he was taken to a camp of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces in Jaffna, “where he was beaten for about three hours” (paragraph 28); the third that, in the custody of those forces, he was “tortured every four or five days” (paragraph 43); the fourth that the police arrested him and he was “beaten with belts and kicked for about half an hour” (paragraph 56). The Court judged the risk as it stood when the men were removed: the examination “must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the removal of the applicants to Sri Lanka in the light of the general situation there in February 1988 as well as on their personal circumstances” (paragraph 108). It found that the evidence did “not establish that their personal position was any worse than the generality of other members of the Tamil community or other young male Tamils who were returning to their country”, and that “A mere possibility of ill-treatment, however, in such circumstances, is not in itself sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3” (paragraph 111). Of the later ill-treatment it said: “Be that as it may, however, there existed no special distinguishing features in their cases that could or ought to have enabled the Secretary of State to foresee that they would be treated in this way” (paragraph 112). On Article 13 the majority held that the courts’ powers in judicial review “do provide an effective degree of control over the decisions of the administrative authorities in asylum cases and are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 13” (paragraph 126). Judge Walsh, joined by Judge Russo, disagreed: “Judicial review cannot grant any relief simply on the grounds that the facts of any given case disclose a breach of the Convention.”

Article 3 ECHR Non-refoulement Removal already carried out Evidence of destination conditions Effective remedy Judicial review

Caution The Court decided on what the Home Secretary knew or ought to have known in February 1988. It said that it may have regard to information that comes to light after an expulsion, but that the risk “must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of the expulsion” (paragraph 107). It did not find the men’s accounts of ill-treatment untrue. By the time it ruled, all five had been allowed to return to the United Kingdom. The Coalition’s page on the United Kingdom discusses the judgment among the material that runs the other way.