Decisions

UN Committee against Torture November 14, 2025 CAT/C/83/D/1121/2022

Disposition The Committee decided “That the communication is inadmissible under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention”, having found that “the complainant had an available and effective remedy that he failed to exhaust” (paragraphs 7.6 and 8).

The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees rejected his asylum application on 22 November 2019, and the Augsburg Administrative Court dismissed his appeal on 28 April 2020 (paragraphs 2.3 and 2.5). His second application, based on documents from the Turkish police investigation file, was rejected on 10 March 2021, and the Augsburg court upheld that decision on 20 May 2021 (paragraphs 2.6, 2.7 and 2.10). He did not seek leave to appeal to the Higher Administrative Court of Bavaria, citing a lack of money and that court’s rejection of his earlier appeal (paragraph 2.15). On 11 February 2022 the Committee asked Germany “not to deport the complainant to Türkiye while the communication was being considered by the Committee”, and on 29 May 2025 it “denied a request by the State Party to lift the interim measures” (paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3). It then held that a request for leave to appeal “would have allowed the Higher Administrative Court of Bavaria to examine this new evidence”, that he had not produced “any proof of lack of financial resources or of an attempt to have sought legal aid”, and that “the mere fact of doubting the effectiveness of a remedy does not absolve the complainant from the obligation to exhaust” (paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5).

Convention Against Torture Non-refoulement Deportation Interim measures Exhaustion of remedies

Caution The Committee did not decide whether deportation to Türkiye would expose him to torture. The decision does not record whether he has since been deported, and the Coalition has not read a source that does.

Court of Appeal of England and Wales January 22, 2025 [2025] EWCA Civ 33

Disposition Appeal of the Secretary of State allowed: “For the reasons explained at [45] to [71] above, I would allow the appeal” (Males LJ, paragraph 88). Phillips LJ: “I agree.” Elisabeth Laing LJ: “I also agree, with one minor qualification.” The decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission that the revocation of his refugee status and the refusal of his further claim were unlawful was reversed. The Supreme Court refused permission to appeal on 5 June 2025: “The application does not raise an arguable point of law.”

The Special Immigration Appeals Commission had held the revocation unlawful because the Home Secretary had not balanced the danger D8 posed “against the cost, practicability and feasibility of any measures that might be taken to ameliorate the risk” and had not shown that revocation “was a measure of last resort” (paragraph 1). The Court of Appeal disagreed: “Once she has concluded that a refugee is a danger to national security, she is entitled to revoke his refugee status.” … “I accept that submission and would therefore allow the appeal” (paragraphs 2 and 3). Return to Iran was not in issue: “as SIAC found that D8 would face at least a real risk of torture if returned, contrary to Article 3 ECHR, and even the risk of a violation of his right to life under Article 2 ECHR, there is now no question of him being returned. Thus, whatever the outcome of this appeal, the Secretary of State accepts that some form of leave to remain will have to be granted to D8” (paragraph 12). The court put the principle in one sentence: “Put another way, we do not send people back to be killed or tortured even if they are a danger to the national security of United Kingdom” (paragraph 26). It drew the line between the two: “If it were not for the fact that to return him to Iran would put his life at risk and would expose him to a real risk of torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment, she would be entitled to refoule him.” … “Although refoulement is not possible, the Secretary of State was entitled to take the lesser steps of revoking D8’s refugee status” (paragraph 71).

Refugee status National security Article 3 ECHR Non-refoulement Refugee Convention Article 33(2)

Caution The label records that D8 lost this appeal. It does not mean that he may be sent to Iran: the Commission found a real risk of torture there, the Home Secretary did not challenge the finding, and the court recorded that there is “no question of him being returned”. What he lost was refugee status. The Commission had observed that “the distinction between full refugee status and the lesser form of discretionary leave which will have to be granted to him is significant”, a point the court was not asked to consider (paragraph 89). The court decided the appeal on the Commission’s open judgment and did not see the closed judgment or the closed material (paragraph 4).

UN Committee against Torture November 1, 2024 CAT/C/81/D/1138/2022

Disposition “At its meeting on 1 November 2024, the Committee, having been informed by the complainants’ counsel that they had been granted refugee status and residence permits, decided to discontinue the consideration of communication No. 1138/2022.”

The complaint was submitted against Germany on 3 June 2022 by counsel for five complainants and concerned their deportation to Türkiye. On 1 November 2024 counsel informed the Committee that they had been granted refugee status and residence permits, and the Committee discontinued its consideration of the communication.

Convention Against Torture Non-refoulement Deportation Discontinuance

Caution The Committee decided nothing on the merits. The decision is a single paragraph and gives no facts about the complainants or about any interim measures. The Coalition’s page on Germany cites it among the cases in which the protection mechanisms worked.

European Court of Human Rights November 15, 1996 Reports 1996-V

Disposition By twelve votes to seven, that “in the event of the Secretary of State's decision to deport the first applicant to India being implemented, there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention”. By thirteen votes to six, no violation of Article 5 § 1. Unanimously, a violation of Article 5 § 4, and a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3. By seventeen votes to two, not necessary to consider the complaint under Article 8. The findings of violation held to be sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage; £45,000 awarded for costs and expenses, less 21,141 French francs; the remainder of the claim dismissed.

On 14 August 1990 the Home Secretary decided that Karamjit Singh Chahal should be deported to India because his presence in the United Kingdom was “unconducive to the public good for reasons of national security and other reasons of a political nature, namely the international fight against terrorism” (paragraph 25). He said that on a visit to Punjab in 1984 the police had held him for twenty-one days, beaten him to unconsciousness, electrocuted him and subjected him to a mock execution (paragraph 18). The Home Secretary obtained an assurance from the government of India, repeated in December 1995, that he “would enjoy the same legal protection as any other Indian citizen, and that he would have no reason to expect to suffer mistreatment of any kind at the hands of the Indian authorities” (paragraph 37). The Grand Chamber held that the risk could not be weighed against the danger he was said to pose: “The prohibition provided by Article 3 (art. 3) against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases.” … “In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) is thus wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees” (paragraph 80). On the assurance: “Although the Court does not doubt the good faith of the Indian Government in providing the assurances mentioned above (paragraph 92), it would appear that, despite the efforts of that Government, the NHRC and the Indian courts to bring about reform, the violation of human rights by certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India is a recalcitrant and enduring problem (see paragraph 104 above). Against this background, the Court is not persuaded that the above assurances would provide Mr Chahal with an adequate guarantee of safety” (paragraph 105). It concluded that “the order for his deportation to India would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3 (art. 3)” (paragraph 107). The Court also found that “neither the advisory panel nor the courts could review the decision of the Home Secretary to deport Mr Chahal to India with reference solely to the question of risk, leaving aside national security considerations” (paragraph 153), so that he had no effective remedy, and that neither habeas corpus, judicial review nor the advisory panel met the requirements of Article 5 § 4 for the review of his detention (paragraph 132). The detention itself, with a view to deportation, did not breach Article 5 § 1.

Article 3 ECHR Non-refoulement National security Diplomatic assurances Detention pending removal Effective remedy Judicial review

Caution The Article 3 finding was made by twelve votes to seven. The judgment decides whether the deportation order could be carried out on the evidence before the Court in 1996, when Mr Chahal was still detained; it does not record what happened to him afterwards, and the Coalition has not read a source that does. The Court applied the same rule, that the risk of ill-treatment cannot be weighed against the reasons for removal, in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom in 2012 (see that entry), where it accepted the assurances Jordan gave.

European Court of Human Rights October 30, 1991 Series A no. 215

Disposition The Court held “by eight votes to one that there has been no violation of Article 3” and “by seven votes to two that there has been no violation of Article 13”.

After the House of Lords upheld the refusals of asylum on 11 December 1987, the European Commission of Human Rights refused on 18 December 1987 to indicate that the men should not be removed (paragraphs 68 and 70), and they were sent back to Sri Lanka in February 1988. Their appeals went on from abroad. On 13 March 1989 an Adjudicator held that they had had a well-founded fear of persecution, largely believed their accounts, and directed “that they should be returned to the United Kingdom with the minimum of delay” (paragraph 71). They came back in August and October 1989 and were given exceptional leave to remain (paragraphs 20, 31, 44, 58 and 66). Three of them described ill-treatment after their return. The second applicant said he was taken to a camp of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces in Jaffna, “where he was beaten for about three hours” (paragraph 28); the third that, in the custody of those forces, he was “tortured every four or five days” (paragraph 43); the fourth that the police arrested him and he was “beaten with belts and kicked for about half an hour” (paragraph 56). The Court judged the risk as it stood when the men were removed: the examination “must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the removal of the applicants to Sri Lanka in the light of the general situation there in February 1988 as well as on their personal circumstances” (paragraph 108). It found that the evidence did “not establish that their personal position was any worse than the generality of other members of the Tamil community or other young male Tamils who were returning to their country”, and that “A mere possibility of ill-treatment, however, in such circumstances, is not in itself sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3” (paragraph 111). Of the later ill-treatment it said: “Be that as it may, however, there existed no special distinguishing features in their cases that could or ought to have enabled the Secretary of State to foresee that they would be treated in this way” (paragraph 112). On Article 13 the majority held that the courts’ powers in judicial review “do provide an effective degree of control over the decisions of the administrative authorities in asylum cases and are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 13” (paragraph 126). Judge Walsh, joined by Judge Russo, disagreed: “Judicial review cannot grant any relief simply on the grounds that the facts of any given case disclose a breach of the Convention.”

Article 3 ECHR Non-refoulement Removal already carried out Evidence of destination conditions Effective remedy Judicial review

Caution The Court decided on what the Home Secretary knew or ought to have known in February 1988. It said that it may have regard to information that comes to light after an expulsion, but that the risk “must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of the expulsion” (paragraph 107). It did not find the men’s accounts of ill-treatment untrue. By the time it ruled, all five had been allowed to return to the United Kingdom. The Coalition’s page on the United Kingdom discusses the judgment among the material that runs the other way.