Decisions

6th Cir. October 9, 2026 Third country: Ghana. The government planned to remove her there on 11 October 2026. The court records a State Department official’s declaration that Ghana “entered into an arrangement with the Department of State” to accept certain people, including her, and gave “assurances that aliens removed from the United States pursuant to this arrangement will not be subjected to persecution or torture in Ghana nor in any country they may be further transferred to.” She told the court that she had never visited Ghana and had no connections there.

Disposition Emergency motion for a stay of removal pending appeal denied.

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, was ordered removed to Nigeria in 2013 by an immigration judge who at the same time granted her withholding of removal to that country. Detained when she reported in person on 21 September 2026, she was to be removed to Ghana on 11 October 2026 under the Department of Homeland Security’s policy of March 2025. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over her petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed it, and she moved in the court of appeals for an emergency stay. The court held “that Ojukwu has not shown a likelihood of success because her stay motion pursues the same claims that the Supreme Court held did not warrant an injunction,” and described her claims as “squarely controlled” by the Supreme Court’s stays in the D.V.D. class action. She did not dispute that she is a member of the class. The court accepted that “class claims do not always bar individual claims”, but held that the class suit precludes the same “pattern and practice” claim in an individual case, and that she “fails to explain why her unique facts would establish the district court’s jurisdiction even if the D.V.D. district court lacked jurisdiction over the class claims.” On irreparable harm it found the evidence “(at most) in equipoise”: she cited “only dated or generalized statistics about Ghana’s generic country conditions”, while officials of Ghana “have credibly assured the Department of State that aliens like Ojukwu would not be tortured or persecuted in that country.” The court added: “A district court involuntarily forced her into a class action in a faraway venue and thereby undermined her ability to pursue her own equitable relief in a court closer to her Ohio home.”

Third-country removal Stay of removal D.V.D. class action Class relief Preclusion Withholding of removal Country-specific nature of withholding Diplomatic assurances Irreparable harm Due process Mandamus Contrary authority

Caution A ruling on an emergency motion for a stay, not a decision of the appeal, which continues: on 14 October 2026 the court set the appellant’s brief for 23 November 2026 and the appellees’ for 23 December 2026. Whether she was removed to Ghana is not recorded on the appeal docket as read on 7 November 2026. On the assurance, the court cites only the government’s declaration. The order does not mention D.A. v. Noem (D.D.C. 15 September 2025), recorded in this register, in which government counsel accepted that, on the plaintiffs’ allegations, Ghana appeared to be violating the assurances it had given about people sent there in September 2025. The class counsel practice advisory of 21 October 2026 cites the order as 2026 WL 3032742 and argues that, because class members are not seeking the same relief as the class, district courts should not refuse to hear their individual habeas petitions because of the class action. The district court’s decision, Ojukwu v. Lynch (N.D. Ohio 26 September 2026), is described in the entry for Rascol v. Raycraft, recorded in this register, but is not entered separately.