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Third-Country Removals

The Law

The rules governing removal of a protected person to a third country, as the statutes, regulations, treaties and decided cases state them, in nine parts, ending with what no court has decided.

This section sets out the law as the statutes, regulations, treaties and decided cases state it. It reports holdings; it does not argue for outcomes. Where the law is settled it says so. Where a question has not been decided, the ninth part says that, because the honest map of this subject has as many open questions as closed ones. Every authority is listed with a link under Sources.

Contents: 1. The protection · 2. The power to remove to a third country · 3. The limits · 4. Diplomatic assurances · 5. Detention while a country is sought · 6. Notice and the opportunity to be heard · 7. Which court can hear it · 8. Proving what will happen · 9. What no court has decided

1. The protection

Protection under the Convention Against Torture takes two forms in United States law, withholding of removal and deferral of removal, and both rest on the same finding: that it is more likely than not the person would be tortured if removed to the proposed country.1 Torture is defined by regulation as severe pain or suffering, physical or mental, intentionally inflicted for a proscribed purpose by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official; acquiescence includes willful blindness.2 No connection to a protected ground is required.

Withholding is barred for persons who persecuted others, were convicted of a particularly serious crime and are a danger to the community, committed a serious nonpolitical crime abroad, or are a danger to national security.3 Where the burden of proof is met but a bar applies, the immigration judge must grant deferral.4 Deferral is temporary, confers no status, and leaves the government’s detention authority in place subject to custody review.5 It can be terminated only through a prescribed procedure: new evidence, notice, and a fresh hearing before an immigration judge, with protection continuing if torture remains more likely than not.6 A protected person’s own request to be returned cannot end the protection unless the judge is satisfied the request is knowing and voluntary.7

The Supreme Court has held that factual challenges to a decision on protection under the Convention remain reviewable in the courts of appeals notwithstanding the provisions that limit review for persons with certain criminal convictions.8

2. The power to remove to a third country

Both forms of protection are country-specific. The regulation provides that nothing in it shall prevent the Service from removing an alien to a third country other than the country to which removal has been withheld or deferred.9 The Supreme Court has described withholding as preventing removal to the protected country rather than removal from the United States.10

Congress set out a hierarchy of countries to which a person may be removed, ending in a residual category reached where the earlier options are impracticable, inadvisable or impossible.11 The Supreme Court has held that the residual provision permits removal to a country without the advance consent of its government.12

Two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals govern how the power is exercised. The Board has held that where there is no final order of removal that can be executed, the Department of Homeland Security has no authority to remove a person to an alternative country, and that a judge granting withholding must include an explicit order of removal.13 And the Board has held that where the Department states that a person may be removed to a particular country, the person may seek withholding of removal from that country in withholding-only proceedings, even if it differs from the country originally designated.14

3. The limits

Article 3 of the Convention prohibits a State Party from expelling, returning or extraditing a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The Committee against Torture treats the prohibition as absolute.15 Congress implemented it in the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, declaring it the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to such a country.16

The Committee against Torture has applied Article 3 to a transfer through an intermediate country. In Turhan v. Sweden, decided in November 2024, Sweden proposed removing a Turkish national to Kosovo. Kosovo was not characterised as a country where he would be tortured; the Committee found that Sweden would nonetheless violate Article 3 because there was a foreseeable, real and personal risk that Kosovo would transfer him onward to Türkiye, where he faced torture.17 In 2026 United Nations special procedures addressed the United States programme directly, stating that a protected person must never be removed to another State from which they may subsequently face removal to a third State where torture is foreseeable, and naming the concept indirect or chain refoulement.18 The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees separately defines constructive refoulement as the deliberate creation of legal, material, economic or physical conditions that leave a protected person no meaningful choice but return to danger.

Decisions of treaty bodies are not binding on United States courts, and the Convention is not self-executing. They are evidence of the meaning of the obligation that FARRA was enacted to implement. The D.C. Circuit has construed FARRA’s judicial review provision narrowly, holding that it provides for review of conditions in the receiving country only in the immigration context, for aliens seeking review of a final order of removal.19 That construction excludes extradition and military transferees. It places persons with final orders of removal, which is to say the people this project concerns, on the side of the line where review is available.

Congress addressed transfer to third countries directly in a different setting. The asylum statute permits an applicant to be sent to a third country only under a bilateral or multilateral agreement, where the person would not face persecution there, and where he would have access to a full and fair procedure for protection.20 That provision does not govern removal after a final order, which proceeds under a separate section. It shows what Congress required of a third-country transfer when it legislated for one expressly.

4. Diplomatic assurances

The regulations permit the Secretary of State to obtain assurances from the government of a receiving country that the person will not be tortured there. Where the Executive determines those assurances sufficiently reliable, the immigration judge, the Board and the asylum officer do not further consider the claim.21 An assurance found reliable therefore does not enter the adjudication as evidence to be weighed; it takes the place of the adjudication.

The Third Circuit has held that a person already granted deferral is entitled to due process before it is terminated on the basis of assurances, and that termination without an opportunity to test their reliability violated the Due Process Clause. The court described the process required as an opportunity to present, before a neutral and impartial decisionmaker, evidence and arguments challenging the reliability of diplomatic assurances proffered by the Government, and the Government’s compliance with the relevant regulations, together with an individualised determination on a record disclosed to the person.22 The decision has not been overruled, limited or distinguished. The Ninth Circuit, in an extradition case, took a narrower view, holding that the inquiry ends once a properly signed declaration from the Secretary of State is received.23

International bodies have found assurances insufficient against a known risk. In Agiza v. Sweden the Committee against Torture found a violation of Article 3 where Sweden had removed a person to Egypt on assurances that he would not be tortured; in Alzery v. Sweden the Human Rights Committee held that the content, enforcement, reliability and monitoring of assurances all bear on their weight.24 The Committee against Torture’s General Comment No. 4 warns that assurances must not be used as a loophole to undermine the prohibition.25

An assurance that a receiving state will not torture a person says nothing about whether he will be admitted, detained, permitted to remain, permitted to work, given access to a procedure, or sent onward to the country he fled. Those are the questions on which the lawfulness of a transfer turns, and an assurance limited to torture by the receiving state’s own officials does not reach them.

5. Detention while a country is sought

After a removal order becomes final, the government may detain the person for a period reasonably necessary to bring about removal. The Supreme Court has held that six months is presumptively reasonable and that detention beyond it is permitted only while removal remains reasonably foreseeable.26 Release is on an order of supervision.27 That remedy does not depend on any finding about a third country; it depends only on whether removal is foreseeable at all.

The two rules interlock in a way that matters for a protected person. A district court has held that a person granted protection under the Convention failed in his claim for release because the government was actively pursuing his removal to a third country.28 On that reasoning the search for a receiving state is at once the thing the person fears and the legal justification for continuing to hold him while it goes on. Where the search fails, the same doctrine produces release: in 2026 district courts ordered the release of persons holding deferral where no third country was likely to accept them.29 In one case a court first dismissed the person’s challenge to a third-country designation for want of jurisdiction and, months later, ordered his release because no country would take him.30

United States courts have also addressed pressure applied to detained people to accept return. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a permanent injunction on findings that the immigration agency engaged in a pattern and practice of pressuring or intimidating detained Salvadorans to request voluntary departure to El Salvador.31 A district court has described the processing environment for detained people as inherently coercive and held waivers obtained in it to be involuntary.32 Another has noted that detained persons refused return despite the coercive pressure of incarceration.33 Against these, the Board of Immigration Appeals has held that a judge may condition voluntary departure on continued detention, and a state supreme court has treated a departure negotiated while incarcerated as voluntary.34

Inside the United States, a protected person’s request to be returned to the country of feared torture cannot be acted on unless an immigration judge is satisfied it is knowing and voluntary.35 No equivalent examination takes place after transfer, because no United States judge has jurisdiction over a person held in another country.

6. Notice and the opportunity to be heard

In a class action in the District of Massachusetts, the court entered a preliminary injunction in 2025 and final judgment on 25 February 2026 declaring that persons subject to third-country removal have a right to meaningful notice of the proposed country and a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of fear concerning it, and setting aside the government’s third-country removal policies of March and July 2025 as not in accordance with law.36 The Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction in June 2025 without opinion; the First Circuit stayed the final judgment in March 2026, heard argument in May 2026 and, according to the parties’ Supreme Court filings, largely affirmed it on 18 September 2026. On 29 September 2026 the Supreme Court stayed the judgment and agreed to hear the case, with argument set for 9 December 2026. The judgment is not in effect. The Coalition reports it as a district court’s holding now before the Supreme Court.

Individual decisions have reached the same conclusion in particular cases. Courts in California and Washington have ordered, as reported, that a person holding protection may not be removed to a newly designated country without written notice and an opportunity to present a claim of fear before an immigration judge, including in cases where the fear asserted was that the new country would send the person onward to the country his protection concerned.37 One court expressly found that a screening which asked only whether the receiving country would torture the person was not a meaningful opportunity to present his claim that it would return him to the country he fled.38 In one 2026 case the court both ordered the person’s release and enjoined his removal to any third country without such process.39 Earlier authority in the District of Arizona described the Department’s affirmative obligation to make a determination regarding an alien’s claim of fear before deporting him to such country.40

In the case of a man removed to El Salvador despite a withholding order against that country, the government conceded the removal was unlawful, and the Supreme Court held that the district court’s order properly required the government to facilitate his release from foreign custody and to handle his case as if the removal had not occurred.41 The district court later ordered seventy-two hours’ written notice to him and his counsel of any intended third country before removal.

Government guidance issued in July 2025 provides, as reported, that where the United States has received credible assurances from a receiving country, removal may proceed without further procedures, and that otherwise the person is notified but not asked whether he fears the country, with an interval ordinarily of twenty-four hours and in exigent circumstances of six.42 Several courts have found that process constitutionally inadequate in the cases before them.

7. Which court can hear it

Three provisions of the immigration statute limit the jurisdiction of district courts. One removes jurisdiction over decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal orders.43 One channels questions arising from any action taken to remove a person into a petition for review in the court of appeals.44 One makes the petition for review the sole means of reviewing a final order of removal.45 The Supreme Court has held that the first of these applies only to three discrete actions and does not cover every claim connected with removal.46

The Ninth Circuit held in 2025 that the first provision did not bar a claim by a Cuban national, granted withholding against Cuba, who had been removed to Mexico, a country never designated in his order. The court treated the post-hearing selection of Mexico as a separate decision, distinct from execution of the order, and its legality as a question the court could reach.47 The decision concerned a claim for damages. Rehearing en banc was denied in June 2026 over a dissent joined by twelve judges, which argued that the panel had nullified the provision and that every other circuit to consider the distinction had rejected it.48 District courts within the Ninth Circuit have since applied the decision’s reasoning to petitions seeking to prevent a removal before it happens.49 No court of appeals has yet held that it extends that far, and the Third, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have taken the narrower view. A person’s ability to reach a federal district court on this question therefore depends, as the law now stands, on which circuit he is in.

Courts have also addressed the channelling provision. A district court has held that it is a judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring one, and does not apply to claims that cannot be raised within the administrative process.50 The Ninth Circuit has held that the Board of Immigration Appeals lacks jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions.51 The Supreme Court has stated that challenges to inhumane conditions of confinement are not channelled.52 Where the channelling provisions do apply, the statute preserves review of constitutional claims and questions of law in the court of appeals: the effect is to move the forum, not to close the door.53

Two courts of appeals have held that FARRA’s judicial review restriction removes habeas jurisdiction over claims under the Convention, but each confined that holding to persons outside the immigration removal process, and each stated that persons seeking review of a final order of removal are within the review the statute allows.54 The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that the statute does not contain the clear statement needed to remove habeas jurisdiction.55 The Supreme Court has held that repeal of habeas jurisdiction requires specific and unambiguous statutory language, and district courts have held that the Suspension Clause preserves jurisdiction where removal would foreclose any other means of review.56

8. Proving what will happen

The Attorney General has held that a claim under the Convention cannot be established by stringing together a series of suppositions where the evidence does not establish that each step in the hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to happen.57 On that formulation a claim resting on one long sequence of contingencies fails.

The Ninth Circuit has limited the rule to a single dependent sequence. Where there are multiple independent ways in which torture may occur, the adjudicator must consider their aggregate probability, and precise mathematical quantification is neither always possible nor desirable.58 In a published decision of August 2026 the same court held that an adjudicator may not demand statistical evidence of future torture that may not exist, since the regulation requires consideration of all relevant evidence.59

Courts give State Department country reports considerable deference and have described them as the most appropriate resource on country conditions, while holding that such a report standing alone cannot rebut a showing of past persecution.60 The Coalition’s country profiles link to those reports for each receiving state.

A person who already holds protection against his own country is in a different evidentiary position from an applicant starting afresh. The last step in any chain, that torture is likely in that country, has already been adjudicated in his favour and remains in force. The contested question is whether, and how probably, transfer to the intermediate country will result in his arrival there.

9. What no court has decided

The following questions are open as of 3 September 2026. No United States court has adopted, or squarely rejected on the merits, the proposition that removal to a country which will foreseeably return a person to the country of feared torture is itself prohibited; the cases that approached it were decided on jurisdictional or other grounds.61 No court has read the phrase otherwise effect the involuntary return in FARRA to reach an indirect return, and none has held that it does not. No court or Board decision has held that the regulation permitting removal to a third country is subject to an assessment of torture risk there, or that it is not. No court has held that a person’s agreement to return, given in detention in a third country, is or is not voluntary. No court has held that a grant of withholding or deferral is a protected liberty interest for constitutional purposes, though the Third Circuit has held that a person granted deferral is entitled to due process before it is terminated.62 No court has considered payments to a receiving state as evidence of whether onward removal is foreseeable. No court of appeals has applied the six-month detention rule to a person holding deferral whose third-country removal is not foreseeable; district courts have gone both ways. And no court of appeals has decided whether the Ninth Circuit’s 2025 jurisdictional holding extends to a petition seeking to prevent a removal before it occurs.

On one further question the courts have spoken, and against the theory. Three courts of appeals have held that the doctrine of state-created danger, under which a government that places a person in danger owes him a duty of protection, has no application to a claim that a person should not be removed from the United States.63 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, in 1996, an injunction against returning a government witness to a country where he faced torture, on the ground that the government’s conduct in constructing the choice he faced shocked the conscience; no court has extended that decision beyond a government witness, and the one asked to do so declined.64 The courts that rejected the doctrine did not cite it.

This page describes the law and the public record. It is not legal advice, and it is not a substitute for a lawyer. The Coalition does not represent individuals. Organisations that do are listed under Where to Find Help.

10. The memorandum, in its own words

This page has until now described the Immigration and Customs Enforcement guidance of 9 July 2025 as it was characterised in filings. A federal court has since set out what it provides, quoting the document as it was put before it.

Removal to a third country with no notice at all where the receiving state has given assurances that the person will not be persecuted or tortured. Otherwise twenty-four hours, or as little as six if the person is given a reasonable means and opportunity to speak to a lawyer before removal. And, in the memorandum’s own words as the court reproduced them, the government “will not affirmatively ask whether the alien is afraid of being removed to the country of removal.”

The court held that those policies, implemented without further procedures, would violate due process, and it enjoined removal of the petitioner to any third country unless he were given written notice in a language he understands, a minimum of ten days to raise a claim under the Convention against Torture, and fifteen days to seek reopening.

Feh v. Noem, No. 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM (S.D. Cal. 11 March 2026), Judge Linda Lopez, ECF 6, read in full. The memorandum is described at ECF 1-3 at 2. The Coalition sets out what the court recorded and does not interpret it.

11. Where the challenge to the policy now stands

On 25 February 2026 the District of Massachusetts held that the third-country removal policy “is contrary to section 1231(b)(2)-(3) and the Due Process Clause,” and set aside the policy as embodied in two named memoranda: the Department of Homeland Security’s of 30 March 2025 and Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s of 9 July 2025.

The same order also dissolved the preliminary injunction of 18 April 2025 and dismissed four of the six counts. The First Circuit granted a stay on 16 March 2026 and heard argument on 13 May 2026 before Judges Montecalvo, Howard and Aframe. According to the parties’ Supreme Court filings, it largely affirmed the judgment on 18 September 2026 (No. 26-1212) and dissolved its stay on 23 September 2026.

On 29 September 2026 the Supreme Court granted the government’s application and stayed the February 2026 order and judgment. It treated the application as a petition for certiorari and granted it (No. 26-426), with argument set for 9 December 2026. It directed the parties to brief: “(1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over Respondents’ claims. (2) Whether the district court had authority to enter classwide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U. S. C. §1252(f)(1). (3) Whether the Government’s Guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U. S. C. §1231(b), the Due Process Clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations. (4) Such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case.” The order gives no reasons. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson would have denied the application.

Anyone relying on the February decision should know that it is not currently in force while the Supreme Court’s stay lasts.

D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, No. 1:25-cv-10676-BEM (D. Mass.), Judge Brian E. Murphy, docket 241, 25 February 2026, 81 pages, read in full. Appeal No. 26-1212 (1st Cir.). The Supreme Court stayed the earlier preliminary injunction on 23 June 2025, No. 24A1153, Justice Sotomayor dissenting with Justices Kagan and Jackson. The order of 29 September 2026, No. 26A406, was read from the Supreme Court’s docket and the filings there. The Coalition’s news report on the order is here. Register entries: D. Mass., 25 February 2026; 1st Cir., 16 March 2026; U.S., 29 September 2026.

12. The provisions, in their own words

The statutes and regulations discussed above, quoted in their own words. Each was read against the official text on 3 October 2026. Decisions applying them are in the register of court decisions.

Removal to another country

8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)(E), additional removal countries, opening words and clause (vii). “If an alien is not removed to a country under the previous subparagraphs of this paragraph, the Attorney General shall remove the alien to any of the following countries: … (vii) If impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible to remove the alien to each country described in a previous clause of this subparagraph, another country whose government will accept the alien into that country.”

8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A). “Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

8 C.F.R. 1208.16(f), removal to third country. “Nothing in this section or § 1208.17 shall prevent the Service from removing an alien to a third country other than the country to which removal has been withheld or deferred.”

8 C.F.R. 1208.17(b)(2). “The immigration judge shall also inform the alien that removal has been deferred only to the country in which it has been determined that the alien is likely to be tortured, and that the alien may be removed at any time to another country where he or she is not likely to be tortured.”

The policy against return to torture

Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, section 2242(a), policy. “It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.”

Section 2242(d), review and construction. “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in the regulations described in subsection (b), no court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations adopted to implement this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the Convention or this section, or any other determination made with respect to the application of the policy set forth in subsection (a), except as part of the review of a final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252).”

Ending deferral

8 C.F.R. 1208.17(d)(1), first two sentences. “At any time while deferral of removal is in effect, the INS District Counsel for the District with jurisdiction over an alien whose removal has been deferred under paragraph (a) of this section may file a motion with the Immigration Court having administrative control pursuant to § 1003.11 of this chapter to schedule a hearing to consider whether deferral of removal should be terminated. The Service motion shall be granted if it is accompanied by evidence that is relevant to the possibility that the alien would be tortured in the country to which removal has been deferred and that was not presented at the previous hearing.”

8 C.F.R. 1208.17(e)(1), termination at the request of the alien. “At any time while deferral of removal is in effect, the alien may make a written request to the Immigration Court having administrative control pursuant to § 1003.11 of this chapter to terminate the deferral order. If satisfied on the basis of the written submission that the alien’s request is knowing and voluntary, the immigration judge shall terminate the order of deferral and the alien may be removed.”

Diplomatic assurances

8 C.F.R. 1208.18(c)(1). “The Secretary of State may forward to the Attorney General assurances that the Secretary has obtained from the government of a specific country that an alien would not be tortured there if the alien were removed to that country.”

8 C.F.R. 1208.18(c)(2), first sentence. “If the Secretary of State forwards assurances described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section to the Attorney General for consideration by the Attorney General or her delegates under this paragraph, the Attorney General shall determine, in consultation with the Secretary of State, whether the assurances are sufficiently reliable to allow the alien’s removal to that country consistent with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture.”

8 C.F.R. 1208.18(c)(3). “Once assurances are provided under paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the alien’s claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture shall not be considered further by an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or an asylum officer.”

Detention after a removal order

8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6). “An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).”

Which court can hear it

8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(5), first sentence. “Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e).”

8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(9), first sentence. “Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”

8 U.S.C. 1252(g). “Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.”

8 C.F.R. part 1208, eCFR; 8 U.S.C. 1231, including the section 2242 note, govinfo; 8 U.S.C. 1252, govinfo.

13. Decisions in the register

Each links to its register entry, where the court’s own document is attached. They are grouped by the subjects the register uses. Further decisions are added as the Coalition obtains the court’s document.

References

  1. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17. § 1208.16 at Cornell; § 1208.17 at Cornell.
  2. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), (a)(7). § 1208.18 at Cornell.
  3. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). § 1231 at Cornell.
  4. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a).
  5. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17; 8 C.F.R. part 241.
  6. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(d).
  7. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(e).
  8. Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020). Opinion (PDF).
  9. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f).
  10. Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021).
  11. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(A)–(E).
  12. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005). Syllabus at Cornell.
  13. Matter of I-S- & C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432 (BIA 2008).
  14. Matter of A-S-M- (BIA Apr. 9, 2021).
  15. Convention against Torture, arts. 2(2), 3, text at OHCHR; Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3.
  16. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, tit. XXII, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-822 (8 U.S.C. § 1231 note).
  17. Committee against Torture, Turhan v. Sweden, communication No. 1109/2021, CAT/C/81/D/1109/2021 (8 November 2024). UN Digital Library; see also Report of the Committee against Torture, A/80/44.
  18. Communication of United Nations special procedures to the United States (2026). OHCHR.
  19. Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
  20. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A). § 1158 at Cornell.
  21. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(c).
  22. Khouzam v. Attorney General, 549 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008). CourtListener.
  23. Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012).
  24. Committee against Torture, Agiza v. Sweden, communication No. 233/2003 (2005), Refworld; Human Rights Committee, Alzery v. Sweden, communication No. 1416/2005 (2006).
  25. Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 4 (2017).
  26. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Syllabus at Cornell.
  27. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 241.5.
  28. Ali v. Barlow, 446 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. Va. 2006).
  29. Order in Hernandez Menendez (M.D. Fla. 2026), court document; Abghari v. Hermosillo, No. 2:26-cv-00269 (W.D. Wash. 2026), as reported.
  30. T.A. v. Sage (M.D. Pa. 2025–2026), as reported.
  31. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990). Justia.
  32. Perez-Funez v. District Director, 619 F. Supp. 656 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
  33. Hamama v. Adducci, 349 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
  34. Matter of M-A-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 762 (BIA 2009); Commonwealth v. Al Saud, 459 Mass. 221 (2011).
  35. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(e).
  36. D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (D. Mass.): class certification and preliminary injunction order, April 2025 (PDF); final judgment 25 February 2026, No. 25-cv-10676; DHS v. D.V.D., No. 24A1153 (U.S. 23 June 2025), respondents’ opposition to stay (PDF).
  37. Karapetyan v. Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center, No. 3:26-cv-00697 (S.D. Cal. 10 June 2026); Kumar v. Wamsley, No. 2:26-cv-00294 (W.D. Wash. 2026); Shahi v. Noem (E.D. Cal. 27 July 2026); Esmaeili v. Noem (S.D. Cal. 2026); Khazanov v. Bullock, No. 3:26-cv-00401 (E.D. Va. 2026); all as reported.
  38. Maldonado-Lux v. Hernandez (W.D. Wash. 5 Aug. 2026), as reported.
  39. Avila Castillo v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01296-SAB-HC (E.D. Cal. 16 Jan. 2026), as reported.
  40. Ibarra-Perez v. Howard (D. Ariz. 23 June 2020), citing Aden v. Nielsen.
  41. Noem v. Abrego Garcia, No. 24A949 (U.S. 10 Apr. 2025). Cornell.
  42. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, third-country removal guidance, 9 July 2025, as described in D.V.D. filings, plaintiffs’ reply, March 2026 (PDF).
  43. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
  44. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
  45. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
  46. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
  47. Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989 (9th Cir. 2025). Justia; Ninth Circuit (PDF).
  48. Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631 (9th Cir. 25 June 2026) (order denying rehearing en banc; Bea, J., dissenting). CourtListener.
  49. Avila Castillo v. Chestnut, above; Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205 (E.D. Cal. 20 Aug. 2025); Perez Canet v. Blanche, 2026 WL 1091763 (D. Nev. 22 Apr. 2026); all as reported.
  50. Jimenez v. Nielsen, 334 F. Supp. 3d 370 (D.D.C. 2018).
  51. Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 814 (9th Cir. 1996); Magana-Pizano v. INS (9th Cir. 1998).
  52. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (opinion of Alito, J.).
  53. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
  54. Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2007); Omar v. McHugh, above.
  55. Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2003); Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); Garcia v. Thomas, above.
  56. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Compere v. Nielsen, 358 F. Supp. 3d 170 (D.N.H. 2019); Ragbir v. Homan (2d Cir. 2019).
  57. Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006). Department of Justice (PDF).
  58. Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland, 49 F.4th 1149 (9th Cir. 2022).
  59. Parada Calderon v. Blanche (9th Cir. 28 Aug. 2026), as reported.
  60. Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2006); Makaj v. Mukasey, 319 F. App’x 507 (9th Cir. 2009).
  61. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); Omar v. Geren, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009); Omar v. McHugh, above.
  62. Khouzam v. Attorney General, above; Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
  63. Kamara v. Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2005), Justia; Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2006); Vicente-Elias v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2008).
  64. Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996); Ramos v. Nielsen (N.D. Cal. 2018).

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