He Reported for More Than Twenty Years. A Federal Appeals Court Says ICE Broke Its Own Rules When It Took Him Back.

Kaveh Abedi was ten when his family fled Iran in 1991. They were granted asylum in the United States. After a single drug possession conviction in his early twenties he was ordered removed, and on 30 September 2002 an immigration judge granted him deferral of removal under the Convention against Torture, which bars his return to Iran. He was released under an order of supervision. For more than twenty-two years he reported as required and asked permission before leaving the state where he lived. Nobody has suggested he broke a single condition.

On the morning of 23 June 2025, about three weeks after a move to Kansas that Immigration and Customs Enforcement had approved, officers handcuffed him in his front yard. One of them told his wife he was being deported to Iran. A notice of revocation that, according to the court, officials allegedly gave him in detention stated only that [r]emoval to a country other than Iran is now a possibility (p. 5). It promised that he would promptly be afforded an informal interview to answer it. He was held for eight months. For at least the first six of them, nobody interviewed him.

On 21 October 2026 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the government broke its own rules, that the breach was enough in itself to entitle him to relief, and that it could not count those months as a fresh, presumptively reasonable period of detention. The decision is Abedi v. Carter, No. 25-3179. It is published, which means it binds every federal court in Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.

What happened

The officers took Mr Abedi to a county jail. They told him they meant to send him to Iran despite the judge’s order, gave no other explanation, and did not accuse him of breaking any condition of his release. Four weeks after his arrest he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal court in Kansas. The district court refused to stop his transfer or removal while the case was heard, then denied the petition in October 2025. It told him he could file again if he was still detained after six months.

He was. He filed a second petition in January 2026. The government had tried to send him to Turkey and to the United Arab Emirates, and the district court recorded that it had been unable to (dissent, p. 71). The court found his removal was not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, and he was released on 25 February 2026, two hundred and forty-seven days after his arrest. The government then asked the court of appeals to throw out his appeal as moot.

What the court decided

The opinion is by Judge Carolyn McHugh, joined by Judge Gregory Phillips. Judge Allison Eid dissented on mootness, as described below. There are four holdings.

1. Release does not end the case, because it can happen again

The court applied the rule for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review. A prisoner who can stay out of a disciplinary unit by behaving well holds the keys to his own freedom. Mr Abedi does not:

“Given the nature of a removal order, Mr. Abedi cannot avoid recurrence of his claimed injury through good conduct.” (p. 19)

The court relied on the government’s own litigation position and on what it called the government’s demonstrated pattern of re-detaining people who had been released by a federal judge (p. 23). It listed cases from several districts in which people released on habeas were taken back into custody within weeks or months, in one case without any change in circumstances and without a hearing (p. 22).

2. A court may consider stopping a removal while it decides whether the detention is lawful

The district court had refused to bar Mr Abedi’s removal while his case was heard, on the view that the law had to be indisputably clear, and had added that the immigration statute probably stripped it of power to interfere with a removal order. The court of appeals held that it applied the wrong standard, sent the request back to be reconsidered, and gave guidance on the second point for the remand. The indisputably clear test comes from orders by single Supreme Court Justices sitting alone and does not govern a district court (pp. 28–33). The ordinary test is whether an order is necessary or appropriate in aid of the court’s jurisdiction. And:

“§ 1252 is not implicated by a request for a temporary injunction to stay a detainee’s removal during the pendency of a habeas proceeding challenging the legality of the detention without contesting the underlying removal order.” (p. 34)

The court did not order a stay itself. It held that a district court has power to consider one, under the ordinary standard, where the person challenges the detention and not the removal order.

3. ICE must follow the rule it wrote, and breaking it is enough

People released because they could not be removed are released under a specific regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. The government argued that Mr Abedi’s release had been revoked under a different and more general rule, § 241.4, which in its view required no interview unless a release condition had been broken. The court disagreed. His release could only have been legally authorized under § 241.13 (p. 42), and

“the government cannot move a noncitizen from the § 241.13 category to the § 241.4 category without first following the process set forth in § 241.13(i).” (p. 41)

That process requires notice of the reasons and an informal interview promptly after the person is taken into custody. The court read promptly alongside the Supreme Court’s rule that a person arrested without a warrant must generally receive a judicial determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours. It did not adopt a forty-eight-hour limit for these interviews. It did not need to: the time that passed here easily establishes that the Government did not promptly conduct Mr. Abedi’s interview (p. 50), whether counted as four weeks, three months or more than six. The government offered no reason for the delay and asked not to be held to any time frame at all. That, the court said, would render the promptness requirement meaningless (p. 51).

The district court had excused the breach because Mr Abedi had a lawyer and could argue his case in habeas. The court of appeals held that a breach of a regulation that protects due process is prejudicial in itself, under Supreme Court decisions including Accardi (1954) (pp. 52–58). The government did not dispute that rule; it argued only that Mr Abedi had not raised it properly, and the court held that he had (pp. 55–57). It added that even if he had to show harm, he had: The lack of process was itself an injury (p. 58). Habeas is not a substitute. Quoting an earlier Tenth Circuit decision, the court noted that about 38,000 people were in immigration detention at the end of fiscal year 2024, while just 448 habeas petitions were filed on behalf of immigration detainees in calendar year 2024 (p. 59).

4. Re-detention does not buy the government a fresh six months

In Zadvydas v. Davis (2001) the Supreme Court held that a person under a final order may be detained only for a period reasonably necessary to carry out removal, and treated the first six months as presumptively reasonable. The government argued that the six months start again every time a person is re-arrested. The court called that a resettable six-month grace period (p. 64) and rejected it:

“Zadvydas’s six-month presumption applies only to the first six months that elapse after the removal period is triggered.” (p. 64)

“The government is simply no longer entitled to a presumption of reasonableness for any detention that occurs outside of the initial six-month period following the removal order becoming final.” (p. 69)

The reasoning is what matters for people the United States is trying to send to a third country. The six months exist to give the government time to arrange a removal. Someone ordered removed in 2002 has given it more than twenty years. Quoting a federal court in Maryland, the opinion observes that some if not most of those arrangements, such as securing approval from a foreign country to remove an individual to that nation, can likely be pursued even while the noncitizen is on release (p. 65).

This does not mean anyone detained after six months must be released. It means that for detention outside the first six months after the removal order became final, a court must decide on the facts whether removal is reasonably foreseeable, without the benefit of any presumption (pp. 7, 69). The case returns to the district court to do that.

The dissent

Judge Eid would have dismissed the appeal: Kaveh Abedi has been released from immigration detention. His habeas petition is therefore moot, and no mootness exception applies (p. 70). She pointed to local immigration officials’ own view that his removal was not imminent, to twenty years without a revocation, and to six months without re-detention since his release. Because she found the case moot she expressly did not reach the merits (p. 73, n.2), and expressed no view on the regulations or on Zadvydas.

What it means for people who cannot be returned

The situation in this case recurs across the reports on this site: a person who won protection from an immigration judge years ago, was released because they could not be removed, reported for years, and was then re-detained while a third country was sought. Rabbiatu Kuyateh had attended check-ins for nearly twenty years. Alex Pereira-Alves had held protection since 2018. For people in that position, in the six states of the Tenth Circuit, the court held:

• Reasons, and a prompt interview. A person whose release under § 241.13 is revoked must be told the reasons and interviewed promptly. Four weeks without an interview, with no explanation offered, was held not to be prompt.
• No need to prove harm. A breach of that regulation entitles the person to relief without showing that an interview would have changed the outcome.
• No fresh six months. Detention outside the first six months after the removal order became final carries no presumption of reasonableness. A court must look at the actual prospects of removal.
• A stay can be considered. Section 1252 does not bar a district court from considering a request to stay removal, including to a third country, while it decides a challenge to the detention that does not contest the removal order.

The interview: what the rule says, and what it does not

The word “interview” carries a great deal of weight in this decision, and the rule that creates it is short. This is the whole of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3):

“Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release. The Service will conduct an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification. The alien may submit any evidence or information that he or she believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order of supervision. The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.”

What it gives. Four things: the reasons, in writing; a prompt chance to answer them; the right to submit any evidence or information; and an evaluation of any facts in dispute.

What it does not give. The interview is “informal” and is conducted by an immigration officer, not a judge. The rule says nothing about a lawyer or an interpreter, sets no time to prepare, and does not require the government to show the person its evidence. There is no appeal from a custody decision (8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)), although a decision to keep someone detained must briefly set forth the reasons.

What courts have added. Federal courts in California have filled in some of the gaps. Notice and interview are separate steps: ICE cannot serve a noncitizen with notice mere moments before conducting the informal interview, and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation is instead required (Sipaseuth v. Becerra, N.D. Cal., 26 August 2026). When ICE changes its reason, for example after obtaining a travel document, the person must be given a chance to answer the new one (Saeteun v. Albarran, N.D. Cal., 22 May 2026). A notice that gave no real reason has led to release (Juarez Gonzalez v. Noem, C.D. Cal.).

The question the interview decides. It is whether removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Under § 241.13(f), that question is decided by looking at all the facts, including the person’s history of complying with efforts to remove them, the government’s history of efforts to remove people to that country or to third countries and the reasonably foreseeable results of those efforts, and the views of the Department of State.

If release is refused. Under § 241.13(i)(2), continued detention is then governed by § 241.4. That section provides for a records review, with written notice about thirty days in advance and the chance to submit written material, in which the person may be assisted by a person of his or her choice. If release is not recommended, it provides for a personal interview before a review panel, at which the person may be accompanied by someone of their choice, subject to reasonable security concerns. Where a release under § 241.4 itself is revoked, the rule expects that review within approximately three months; whether the same timetable applies after a § 241.13 revocation, the rules do not say.

What the decision does not do

• It binds only the Tenth Circuit. Elsewhere it is persuasive. District courts across the country are divided on whether re-detention restarts the six months, and the government’s brief relied on one that held it does.
• It leaves § 241.4 releases open. The court did not decide whether a person released under the general rule has the same right to an interview (p. 43, n.10).
• It sets no deadline. Four weeks was too long. Anything shorter remains to be decided.
• It does not decide whether removal to a third country is lawful. That question, and whether a person must be told of the country and allowed to raise a fear of it, is before the Supreme Court in Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426, to be argued on 9 December 2026 (the Coalition’s report). On 29 September 2026, on the government’s application (No. 26A406), the Supreme Court stayed the Massachusetts district court’s order and judgment of 25 February 2026, which had required notice and an opportunity to be heard, until it decides the case.
• It may be reviewed. The government can ask the full Tenth Circuit to rehear the case, or ask the Supreme Court to hear it.

In California

The Coalition has not found a Ninth Circuit decision, covering California, on either the six-month question or the interview question. Federal district courts in California have addressed both in a number of orders, each binding only on the parties to that case.

• The six months. Tran v. Janecka (C.D. Cal., 26 August 2026) held that the six-month presumption is not applicable to cases, like this one, where a noncitizen has already been detained and released on an OSUP, and that the government does not enjoy another six-month presumption of reasonableness when it elected to re-detain. Tran, and the decisions it relied on, count prior detention together. That differs from the Tenth Circuit’s method but leads to the same place for anyone released long ago.
• The interview. Zadori v. Noem (C.D. Cal., 7 October 2026) declared a revocation ineffective because Respondents violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Prasomsy v. Albarran (N.D. Cal., 18 September 2026) barred re-detention without compliance and seven days’ notice. The Coalition reported a similar order in Juarez Gonzalez v. Noem (C.D. Cal., judgment 24 August 2026).
• Removal to a third country. On 15 October 2026, after the Supreme Court’s stay in D.V.D., a judge in the Central District ordered that a released man not be removed to a third country without written notice and at least ten days to raise a claim under the Convention against Torture (Hernandez Martinez, No. 5:26-cv-05422). The Ninth Circuit has held that the statute’s bar on challenges to the execution of removal orders does not reach removal to a country not named in the order (Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 2025). Twelve of its judges said in June 2026 that this was wrong, but a rehearing was refused.
• Where the government has won. Where ICE has given notice and an interview and actually holds a travel document, California courts have refused relief (Lasaphangthong v. Albarran, N.D. Cal., 28 September 2026). And the court in Sipaseuth, while granting relief on other grounds, held that a two-week delay in serving the written notice did not by itself break the rule.

The wider law on removal to a third country is set out in What United States Courts Have Held on Removal to a Third Country, and this decision is entered in the court decision register.

Sources

• Abedi v. Carter, No. 25-3179 (10th Cir. 21 Oct. 2026). CourtListener
• 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. eCFR
• 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. eCFR
• Juarez Gonzalez v. Noem, No. EDCV 26-0652 JFW (PVC) (C.D. Cal.). The Coalition’s report
• Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., Nos. 26A406 and 26-426, order of 29 Sept. 2026. Supreme Court docket
• Tran v. Janecka, No. 5:26-cv-02650 (C.D. Cal. 26 Aug. 2026). CourtListener
• Zadori v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02832 (C.D. Cal. 7 Oct. 2026), judgment. CourtListener
• Saeteun v. Albarran, No. 3:26-cv-04743 (N.D. Cal. 22 May 2026). CourtListener
• Prasomsy v. Albarran, No. 3:26-cv-09534 (N.D. Cal. 18 Sept. 2026). CourtListener
• Sipaseuth v. Becerra, No. 5:26-cv-07942 (N.D. Cal. 26 Aug. 2026). CourtListener
• Hernandez Martinez v. Secretary of Homeland Security, No. 5:26-cv-05422 (C.D. Cal. 15 Oct. 2026). CourtListener
• Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989 (9th Cir. 2025); rehearing en banc denied 25 June 2026. CourtListener