Decisions

D. Nev. October 28, 2026 Third country: Mexico. ICE issued a Notice of Removal on 3 April 2026, and he “refused to consent to deportation to Mexico.”

Disposition First amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted; motion for a temporary restraining order denied as moot. Release ordered no later than 29 October 2026, subject to the conditions of his prior order of supervision. The same bars as in Santander v. Blanche on re-detention without proof of changed circumstances and on removal to a third country without notice and an opportunity to seek to reopen his immigration court proceedings.

The court held the re-detention unlawful under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i): “Because there is no indication that an informal interview was provided to Petitioner, nor an opportunity for him to respond to the reasons for revocation, the Court finds that Petitioner’s re-detention is unlawful”. Removal to Cuba or Mexico was not reasonably foreseeable: he does not consent to removal to Mexico, and “Respondents submit no evidence that DHS has attempted to coordinate a transfer to Mexico”, such as travel documents or communications with Mexican officials. On removal to a third country: “Respondents do not respond to Petitioner’s argument that he has a right to due process before third-country removal.” It held that he “has a due process right to receive meaningful notice and opportunity to present a fear-based claim to an IJ before DHS deports him to a third country.”

Third-country removal Revocation of supervision Informal interview Detention Zadvydas Notice Due process Fear-based claim Mexico Consent Habeas jurisdiction

Caution The order records no grant of protection to the petitioner. The companion order of 22 October 2026 in Santander v. Blanche, by the same judge, is recorded separately in this register.

D. Nev. October 22, 2026 Third country: Mexico. ICE issued a Notice of Removal stating that it intended to remove him to Mexico.

Disposition First amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted; motion for a temporary restraining order denied as moot. Release ordered no later than 26 October 2026 under reasonable terms of supervision. Respondents “prohibited from re-detaining Petitioner in the future absent proof of changed circumstances making his removal reasonably foreseeable”, and “prohibited from removing Petitioner to a third country without providing Petitioner with adequate notice of intent to seek removal to a third country and due process in the form of an opportunity to seek to reopen Petitioner’s immigration court proceedings to seek fear-based relief from removal.”

The court counted his detention cumulatively: “Adding together the four-month period of detention in 2002 and the five-month period of re-detention since May 19, 2026, Petitioner’s detention has long since surpassed the six-month period of presumptive reasonableness.” Removal to Cuba or Mexico was not reasonably foreseeable: “Respondents submit no evidence that DHS has attempted to coordinate a transfer to Mexico”, such as travel documents or communications with Mexican officials. It noted that courts “have also found that removal to Mexico is unlikely where the petitioner does not consent.” On removal to a third country: “Respondents mischaracterize ICE’s burden in third-country removals. Courts in this circuit have repeatedly found that the government must undertake rigorous procedures to afford a noncitizen their full due process rights before ordering him removed to a third country.” It held that he “has a due process right to receive meaningful notice and opportunity to present a fear-based claim to an IJ before DHS deports him to Mexico or another third country.”

Third-country removal Detention Zadvydas Re-detention Notice Due process Fear-based claim Mexico Consent Habeas jurisdiction

Caution The order records no grant of protection to the petitioner; the case concerns detention and the process owed before removal to a third country. The companion order of 28 October 2026 in Vega Oramas v. Bondi, by the same judge, is recorded separately in this register.

10th Cir. October 21, 2026 Investigating. Published opinion; no reporter citation established yet. Third country: The notice revoking his release stated that “[r]emoval to a country other than Iran is now a possibility.” The dissent records that, according to the district court in his second habeas case, immigration officials “were unable to remove petitioner to [Turkey or the United Arab Emirates],” the only third countries identified in the litigation.

Disposition Government's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot denied. Denial of an injunction against transfer to another facility affirmed; denial of an injunction against removal from the United States reversed and remanded. Denial of declaratory and habeas relief reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The petitioner was re-detained on 23 June 2025 after more than twenty years of compliance with an order of supervision, and held until 25 February 2026. The government did not dispute that he received no informal interview for at least six months. Mootness. The appeal was not moot after his release, because the wrong is capable of repetition yet evading review: “Given the nature of a removal order, Mr. Abedi cannot avoid recurrence of his claimed injury through good conduct” (p. 19). The court relied on the government’s litigation position and its “demonstrated pattern” of re-detaining people released on habeas (p. 23). Stay of removal. The district court applied the wrong standard in requiring that the right be “indisputably clear”; the test is whether an order is necessary or appropriate in aid of the court’s jurisdiction. As guidance on remand: “§ 1252 is not implicated by a request for a temporary injunction to stay a detainee’s removal during the pendency of a habeas proceeding challenging the legality of the detention without contesting the underlying removal order” (p. 34). Revocation. A release granted because removal was unlikely is governed by 8 C.F.R. 241.13; his release “could only have been legally authorized under § 241.13” (p. 42), and “the government cannot move a noncitizen from the § 241.13 category to the § 241.4 category without first following the process set forth in § 241.13(i)” (p. 41). Reading “promptly” with County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, without adopting a 48-hour rule, the court held that the time that elapsed “easily establishes that the Government did not promptly conduct Mr. Abedi’s interview” (p. 50). The violation was prejudicial per se under Accardi, and in any event “[t]he lack of process was itself an injury” (p. 58); habeas did not cure it. Zadvydas. “Zadvydas’s six-month presumption applies only to the first six months that elapse after the removal period is triggered” (p. 64); “[t]he government is simply no longer entitled to a presumption of reasonableness for any detention that occurs outside of the initial six-month period following the removal order becoming final” (p. 69). Remanded for a case-specific analysis without the benefit of any presumption.

CAT deferral Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Informal interview Notice Compliance with regulations Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country removal Jurisdiction Section 1252(a)(5) Due process Mootness

Caution Binding only in the Tenth Circuit (Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming). Judge Eid dissented on mootness and did not reach the merits (p. 73 n.2). The court did not decide whether a release under 8 C.F.R. 241.4 carries the same right to an interview (p. 43 n.10), did not fix a deadline for “promptly”, did not itself order a stay of removal, and did not decide whether removal to a third country is lawful. District courts elsewhere are divided on whether re-detention restarts the six-month period. The government may seek rehearing en banc or certiorari. Footnote 4 notes that an interview may have taken place in January 2026; the court found the result the same either way.

D. Ariz. October 6, 2026 Third country: Equatorial Guinea. He was removed there on 28 April 2026. The government’s declarant attested that his “placement on the manifest for this charter served as the travel document” for his removal.

Disposition Trial on the merits consolidated with the emergency motion for a temporary injunction, and final judgment entered for the plaintiff. Declaration that his removal to Equatorial Guinea without notice and a meaningful opportunity to raise a country-specific claim violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Defendants ordered to facilitate his release from custody in Equatorial Guinea and his return to the United States, and to report every seven days. Removal to any third country enjoined without notice and a meaningful opportunity to raise a country-specific claim before a neutral judge, and the defendants enjoined from requesting, arranging, funding or otherwise facilitating his transfer from Equatorial Guinea to Egypt. Administrative Procedure Act claim denied as moot. Stay pending appeal denied.

The plaintiff holds deferral of removal to Egypt under the Convention Against Torture. On 24 April 2026 he filed a habeas petition challenging his detention and seeking relief from third-country removal without notice. Before the court ruled, the defendants removed him on 28 April 2026 to Equatorial Guinea, a country not designated in his removal order and with which he has no ties. The court recorded that he “was not told his destination until shortly before the flight; when he asked for a fear interview, he was told it was too late, and he was carried onto the aircraft.” In that habeas case the government filed the declaration of Vu Cam, an ICE Acting Unit Chief, who attested that “Equatorial Guinea provided diplomatic assurances that the aliens removed from the United States pursuant to the Third Country Removal agreement will not be subjected to persecution or torture,” that the Department of State had found them credible, and that ICE had followed the March 2025 Guidance in removing him. The plaintiff later dismissed that case and brought this civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court recorded, as unrebutted by the defendants, that on arrival he was handed to Equatorial Guinean authorities and held under armed guard, with other people sent from the United States, at the decommissioned Hotel Bamy in Malabo. On 2 July 2026 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights requested provisional measures, including that Equatorial Guinea refrain “from transferring Plaintiff and thirteen other complainants against their will.” On 5 September 2026 police aimed rifles at him while he knelt with his hands raised. On 11 September 2026 Equatorial Guinean police arrested him and another detainee; witnesses reported that both men were “bound with rope, hooded, and beaten.” He “has since been held incommunicado at an unknown location, reportedly without food or water.” The record also showed that on 1 September 2026 a group of Ethiopian nationals who held United States protection against removal to Ethiopia were returned there “after an official asked whether they wanted to go to their country or to jail.” The court held that the Supreme Court’s stay orders in D.V.D. did not resolve the merits of any individual claim, exercised its discretion to hear his claims although he appears to be a member of the D.V.D. class, and rejected the defendants’ arguments based on the first-to-file rule, res judicata and the jurisdictional provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The relief granted in D.V.D. was declaratory: “A declaration that class members are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard does nothing to secure the return of a class member who has already been removed without them.” On the merits it relied on binding Ninth Circuit authority, including Andriasian v. INS (1999), recorded in this register. The defendants had identified no process the plaintiff received before removal, only the assurances: “But the assurance route is the absence of individualized process: it provides no notice of the country of removal and no opportunity to be heard.” It declared that his removal to Equatorial Guinea “without notice of the country of removal and a meaningful opportunity to raise a country-specific claim against removal there violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Relying on Noem v. Abrego Garcia (2025) and on the D.V.D. court’s order for the return of O.C.G., recorded in this register, the court ordered the defendants to facilitate his release from custody in Equatorial Guinea and his return, while not prescribing the content of any diplomatic communication or directing any act by the Government of Equatorial Guinea. It found that the defendants had placed him in that country’s custody under an agreement with its government for which, “according to a Senate committee minority report, the United States paid $7.5 million.” It recorded that Equatorial Guinean officials had repeatedly told him and the others sent there that they were not wanted and should leave, and that Equatorial Guinea had routinely sent people onward from Malabo. It enjoined the defendants from removing him “to any third country without first providing him notice of the country to which they intend to remove him and a meaningful opportunity to raise a country-specific claim against removal before a neutral judge, including appeal of any decision or part thereof in that process.” It also enjoined them from “requesting, arranging, funding, or otherwise facilitating Plaintiff’s transfer from Equatorial Guinea to Egypt.” It denied a stay pending appeal.

Third-country removal Notice Due process Diplomatic assurances Facilitation of return Onward transfer Incommunicado detention D.V.D. class action Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9) CAT deferral Travel documents

Caution The court refers to the plaintiff by his initials, consistent with its order in his earlier habeas case, and the Coalition does the same. The court did not assess the diplomatic assurances. Its holding rests on the absence of any individualised notice and opportunity to be heard before removal. The account of his treatment in Equatorial Guinea is recorded in the judgment as unrebutted by the defendants. The defendants appealed. The court’s enforcement orders of 27 and 29 October 2026 are recorded separately in this register. At a hearing on 2 November 2026 the United States Attorney for the District of Arizona, Timothy Courchaine, read into the record an order of the Ninth Circuit staying “this Court’s Order dated October 23, 2026.” The court then adjourned, recording: “The Ninth Circuit having stayed the Court’s dispositive Order, the Court adjourns the hearing without any further orders.” The minutes of the hearing (ECF No. 47) do not say whether the two descriptions refer to the same order, and the Ninth Circuit’s order itself was not read. The order of 29 October 2026, following the government’s status report, gives the date of the immigration judge’s grant as 2 October 2025; this judgment gives 1 October 2025.

D.R.I. September 29, 2026 Third country: Rwanda. On 17 September 2026 ICE informed him that it intended to remove him to Rwanda on or about 24 September 2026.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted. Immediate release ordered on the petitioner’s order of supervision.

The petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic protected from removal there under the Convention Against Torture, had been released on an order of supervision after ICE failed to remove him to Mexico. ICE revoked the order and re-detained him on or about 4 September 2026, after what it said was a violation of his release conditions, an arrest on 31 August 2026. On 17 September 2026 it informed him that it intended to remove him to Rwanda “on or about September 24, 2026.” On 18 September 2026 the District of Massachusetts dismissed his earlier habeas petition and dissolved its stay, and he filed this petition the same day. The court noted in a footnote: “He has no connection to Rwanda or even to the continent of Africa.” The court held that the earlier habeas proceeding did not bar this petition, because it challenged a new detention arising from changed circumstances, including the government’s “newly asserted plan to remove Mr. Vittini Arias to Rwanda, not Mexico.” It accepted part of the government’s case: “the Court sides with the Government’s view that Mr. Vittini Arias’ alleged conduct violated his OSUP conditions, rendering his detention under § 241.13(i)(1) proper.” But it held that the government had not established the separate ground for revocation under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. On the evidence of removal to Rwanda the court found: “The record does not even suggest a formal agreement and acceptance by the country of Rwanda”. In a footnote it added: “A good starting point might begin with record of a Memorandum of Understanding.” It held that “reliance on diplomatic assurances does not pass muster because although assurances may bear on the feasibility of removal, they do not establish, on its own, that removal is significantly likely.” Taken together, it said, “the record does not identify a completed travel arrangement, confirmed acceptance of Mr. Vittini Arias by Rwanda, or other concrete evidence showing that his removal is imminent or otherwise significantly likely to occur.” The government relied on a declaration by Vu Cam, Acting Unit Chief from the Removal Management Division, which the court noted still relied on the Guidance Regarding Third Country Removals of 30 March 2025, and on a letter from the Deputy Secretary of State, Christopher Landau, to the Acting ICE Director, Todd Lyons, which the court described as “assuring the relationship between the two countries by referring to an undisclosed Memorandum of Understanding.” The court added: “In the meantime, it is unclear whether a flight, a manifest or any form of travel documents exist for the would-be removed detainee.” Relying on the First Circuit’s decision in D.V.D. of 18 September 2026, the court said that a third-country removal requires effective notice of the particular country and a meaningful opportunity to raise a country-specific fear-of-torture claim, and concluded: “Without evidence supporting a serious agreement between the United States and the government of Rwanda indicating assurances consistent with the 1st Circuit opinion in D.V.D., the Court is not prepared to continue prolonging the violation of Mr. Vittini Arias’ liberty interest.” It ordered his immediate release on his order of supervision.

Third-country removal Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Informal interview Changed circumstances Compliance with regulations Diplomatic assurances Travel documents Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) D.V.D. class action Successive habeas petition Convention Against Torture Release from custody

Caution The court ordered release; it did not enjoin removal to Rwanda. It said that its conclusion on detention “is distinct from, and does not implicate, the separate question of whether the Government may lawfully effectuate the proposed removal to Rwanda without first providing the procedural protections applicable to third-country removals.” The order is dated 29 September 2026 and relies on the First Circuit’s decision in D.V.D. On the same day the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s judgment in D.V.D. and granted certiorari, in an order recorded separately in this register. The order does not mention the Supreme Court’s action. The Cam declaration, the Landau letter and any assurances filed with the government’s response were not obtained by the Coalition; they are described here only as the court describes them.

D. Colo. September 18, 2026 Third country: Central African Republic. He was removed there after filing his petition, having first been moved from Colorado to immigration detention in Arizona on 26 July 2026. He told the court, as the order puts it, “that the circumstances in the Central African Republic are dangerous and that he cannot speak the language.”

Disposition Motion for transfer back to the District of Colorado granted, and the respondents ordered “to transfer Petitioner from Central African Republic back to the District of Colorado”. Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted. Once he is back, immediate release on his own recognizance “without onerous conditions of release, including, without limitation, GPS monitoring, mandatory reporting, or other restrictions on his movement”; re-arrest or re-detention barred unless the respondents show “by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker” that he is a flight risk or a danger; no removal or transfer from the District of Colorado while he is in custody; a status report certifying compliance due on 25 September 2026.

The petitioner, detained by ICE since 13 May 2026, filed a habeas petition on his own on 29 June 2026. On 28 July a magistrate judge ordered the respondents to show cause and not to remove him from the District of Colorado; the respondents said they had moved him to detention in Arizona on 26 July, before that order. He was later removed to the Central African Republic. The respondents at first stated that they were “not submitting a brief in opposition to the Petition detailing the facts and circumstances of this case”. Their position was that “[a]lthough an Immigration Judge … granted Petitioner protection under the Convention Against Torture … with respect to Honduras, that protection did not invalidate the removal order or prohibit removal to a third country.” Quoting Pacheco v. Baltazar (D. Colo. 5 May 2026), the court held that “[a]ll removals to third countries … must be preceded by written notice to both the non-citizen and the non-citizen’s counsel in a language the non-citizen can understand.” It noted that his removal order of 20 August 2020 “was nearly six years old before he was detained”, that he had lived in the United States since 2016, and that “the record reflects that Petitioner was not afforded notice or opportunity to challenge his removal to the Central African Republic.” It found “that Petitioner has demonstrated that Respondents have violated his right to due process.”

Third-country removal Notice Due process CAT Facilitation of return Transfer of detainees Release from custody Redetention Bond hearing

Caution An order on a petition filed without a lawyer, made after the removal. The respondents had at first declined to oppose the petition on its facts; they then moved to withdraw that response and to have the petition denied as moot (ECF No. 19), which the order denied as moot. The court did not decide whether removal to a third country is lawful where notice is given. On 25 September 2026, the date set for the status report certifying compliance, the respondents moved for reconsideration (ECF No. 34), and on 7 October they filed a notice of supplemental authorities (ECF No. 37). The docket shows no ruling on that motion as of 7 November 2026. Represented by counsel from 15 September 2026, the petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on 29 October 2026 (ECF No. 42), and the respondents’ time to respond was extended to 12 November 2026. Whether he has been returned to the United States has not been reported in the sources read. The order cites Pacheco v. Baltazar (D. Colo. 5 May 2026) as 2026 WL 1223414 and, a page later, as 2026 WL 1453640.

E.D. Cal. September 1, 2026 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Mexico

The district judge adopted the findings in part and granted the petition. The court assumed the more demanding Zadvydas standard applied, because the record did not make clear whether the re-detention rested only on changed circumstances or also on violations of the order of supervision. On that assumption the petitioner had shown no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future: the government produced no evidence that Mexico had formally accepted him, and removal to Mexico under the informal arrangement depends on the person’s consent, which he had refused on five occasions. Immediate release was ordered, and re-detention under 8 C.F.R. 241.13(i)(2) was enjoined unless there are material changed circumstances and a neutral decisionmaker finds a significant likelihood of removal.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Due process Pre-deprivation hearing

Caution The injunction against third-country removal that the magistrate judge had recommended was refused as premature, the court finding nothing in the record to suggest removal to any country other than Mexico was contemplated. A footnote preserves the government’s ability to re-detain for a further six months under 8 C.F.R. 241.13(i)(1) if the conditions of release are violated. The court noted concerns about the petitioner’s criminal history but held that Ninth Circuit authority directed release on conditions. Unpublished; no reporter citation established. The order cites the findings and recommendations as Document 32 where the docket shows Document 13.

E.D. Cal. August 28, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 2547035 Third country: Mexico

The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, finding nothing in the record to show that ICE gave the required informal interview on revoking the order of supervision, and that the government failed to carry its burden of changed circumstances because removal to Mexico under the standing arrangement depends on consent, which he refused at every service. She recommended release, a hearing before any re-detention, and an injunction barring third-country removal without fourteen days’ notice and an immigration judge hearing.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Notice Due process Pre-deprivation hearing

Caution This is a findings and recommendation, not a decision of the court, and as of 7 September 2026 no order adopting or rejecting it had issued. It should not be cited as a final holding. Unpublished slip copy. It issued before the petitioner’s reply deadline had run and on an untimely government response, and the court expressly declined to reach his other claims. The petitioner is self-represented. His criminal history was acknowledged and held not to justify continued detention, a point a reviewing judge could weigh differently.

E.D. Cal. August 27, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 2532065 Third country: Mexico

The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, finding that ICE revoked the order of supervision without the informal interview the regulations require, and failed to show changed circumstances making removal reasonably foreseeable, because removal to Mexico under the standing arrangement depends on the person’s consent, which he had repeatedly refused. She recommended release, a hearing before any re-detention, and an injunction barring third-country removal without fourteen days’ notice and an immigration judge hearing.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Notice Due process Reasonable fear Pre-deprivation hearing

Caution This is a findings and recommendation by a magistrate judge, not a decision of the court. It was adopted in part by the district judge on 1 September 2026, who granted the petition and ordered immediate release, but refused as premature the recommended injunction against third-country removal. That order is the court’s final position and has its own entry in this register. Unpublished slip copy. The third-country analysis is largely a block quotation of A.A.M. v. Andrews, so the language about a full and fair hearing before a neutral adjudicator is A.A.M.’s, not this court’s.

C.D. Cal. August 24, 2026 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190133

The subsequent-history line records that the writ of habeas corpus was granted, an injunction was granted, and judgment was entered.

Redetention Notice Withholding of removal

Caution Not read directly and not supplied; recorded only in the subsequent-history line of the printout of the February 26, 2026 order in the same case. No docket, judge, or terms are given for it.

C.D. Cal. August 24, 2026

Accepting the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge after de novo review of the portions to which the government objected, the court granted the petition. It ordered that Respondents are “ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) unless his re-detention is ordered at a custody hearing before a neutral arbiter in which the government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community.” Judgment was entered the same day in favour of the petitioner.

Order of supervision Revocation Redetention Custody hearing Burden of proof

Caution An unreported district court order. The reasoning is in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, which the Coalition has not obtained; this order adopts it without restating it. Note also that the injunction is framed in terms of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), whereas the February 2026 preliminary injunction in the same case turned on 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i); the file does not explain the shift.

W.D.N.Y. August 24, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The government stated only that ICE was “presently seeking to remove [Al Nassar] to a country other than Iraq.”

Disposition Petition granted in part. The Zadvydas claim granted and the government ordered to release the petitioner within 24 hours and to certify compliance within three days; the remaining claims, including those on the revocation of his order of supervision, dismissed without prejudice as moot.

The petitioner came to the United States as a refugee in 2010, at fifteen, and became a lawful permanent resident two years later. After a 2017 conviction in New York State court, an immigration judge revoked that status and ordered him removed to Iraq, but granted deferral of removal to Iraq under the Convention Against Torture. ICE held him for three months from 20 December 2018 and released him on an order of supervision on 20 March 2019 because it was unable to “deport him to Iraq.” On 9 January 2026, at a “routine check-in,” ICE revoked his order of supervision and sent him to the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, where he remained. A post-order custody review panel recommended on 9 July 2026 that he stay detained. The government’s answer stated that “[d]ue to the grant of deferral of removal to Iraq, ICE is presently seeking to remove [Al Nassar] to a country other than Iraq.” The court held that he had met his initial burden: the government conceded that it released him in 2019 because it could not remove him, and it “does not offer any evidence showing that its ability to deport him has changed whatsoever in the intervening period.” In rebuttal the government relied on a five-month-old declaration and “includes no details about any efforts that it is making to remove Al Nassar to a third country, much less the status of those efforts,” and the custody review recommendation was “just as conclusory.” Rejecting the government’s call for deference, the court wrote: “the Government does not ask the Court to defer to its foreign policy judgment here: It asks the Court to defer to its say-so. Zadvydas does not demand such deference; it counsels its opposite.” It also held that “the Government cannot use Al Nassar’s criminal past to justify detaining him indefinitely when his removal is not reasonably foreseeable.” His continued detention was “neither statutorily nor constitutionally permissible,” and the court ordered his release within 24 hours.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Third-country removal Burden of proof Changed circumstances

Caution Release was ordered on the detention claim alone. The court did not resolve the parties’ dispute over whether ICE gave sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard before revoking supervision; those claims were dismissed without prejudice as moot. No third country was named in the record. The docket text filed with the decision describes the petition as granted; the decision itself grants it in part. The court’s earlier decision denying the government’s motion to dismiss was not read.

S.D. Fla. August 21, 2026 Third country: Mexico

The revocation notice cited an unchanged file, an unchanged interview, and bedspace availability, and the claimed interview came more than four months late, so the re-detention violated the regulation; release ordered.

Redetention Notice Informal interview Prolonged detention (Zadvydas)

Caution The Zadvydas claim was held premature at 120 days because this court does not aggregate detentions, and the brief sets out the split on aggregation. The account of the March 9, 2026 bus trip toward the Mexican border is the petitioner's, credited as the record before the court on an unopposed point, not a judicial finding. No reporter or unofficial citation is printed in the brief.

C.D. Cal. August 19, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 2434858 Third country: Mexico; a screening notice of 1 June 2026 recorded a finding that he had established it is more likely than not he would be persecuted in Mexico

The court held the petitioner was not subject to mandatory detention, his theft charge having been dismissed on completion of diversion, and that re-detaining him and revoking his order of supervision without a pre-deprivation hearing violated procedural due process. It ordered immediate release and entered a limited permanent injunction requiring seven days’ notice and a bond hearing before any re-detention, written notice and reopened proceedings before any third-country removal, and barring removal to Mexico outright.

Redetention Pre-deprivation hearing Due process Third-country designation Notice Withholding of removal Credible fear

Caution Unpublished slip copy. A final decision on the parties’ consent to a magistrate judge, not a recommendation, so no district-judge adoption was required. No subsequent history appears as of 7 September 2026. The court resolved the case on procedural due process and did not adjudicate the grounds concerning flight risk or conditions of detention, did not apply the substantive due process standards it set out, and did not reach an indefinite-detention analysis. The printed text contains an apparent drafting error describing removal to a country other than Cuba, which is language from a cited case and not this petitioner, and an inconsistent docket reference to the screening notice.

E.D. Va. August 18, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The respondents stated that they expected to remove him to Honduras.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 denied. The part of the court’s order of 21 July 2026 prohibiting the respondents from removing or transferring the petitioner from the district vacated.

The petition, filed by the petitioner without a lawyer, contained “very little background information,” so the court relied on the respondents’ account. He had been removed to Honduras in 2011 and 2022 without claiming fear. On 23 May 2026 immigration officers took him into custody near Salisbury, Maryland, and reinstated the 2011 removal order; “Petitioner claimed fear of removal to Honduras.” He was referred for a reasonable fear interview on 15 July 2026. On 11 August 2026 an immigration judge took testimony and “concurred with the Department of Homeland Security’s determination that Petitioner’s fear of returning to his home country was not credible.” The court recorded that “Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(1), no administrative appeal is available.” On custody, the court held that “because Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1231 and a reinstated order of removal, he is not entitled to a bond hearing,” and that he “is not entitled to ‘any neutral custody determination’ as he suggests.” It treated the reinstated order as starting a new removal period: “Petitioner has only been detained on the reinstated order of removal since May 23, 2026, which is less than three months, and far less than the presumptively reasonable six-month period.” It stated that it “will not consider Petitioner’s assertions concerning the foreseeability of removal until after the six-month removal period has elapsed.” The petitioner relied on decisions concerning people re-detained for removal to a third country, including one in which removal to Mexico was enjoined. The court held that those decisions “are factually distinguishable from the instant case and are therefore inapposite.” The respondents told the court that “upon the conclusion of this habeas proceeding or the vacatur of the no movement order, Respondents should be able to promptly effectuate Petitioner’s final order of removal to his native Honduras.”

Bond hearing Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Reinstated removal orders Reasonable fear Self-represented petitioner Transfer out of district

Caution Not a third-country removal case. The facts are the respondents’ account, adopted because the petition gave little background. The negative reasonable fear determination was made by the immigration judge after the petition was filed and was not under review in this case. The court declined to consider whether removal is reasonably foreseeable until the six-month period has run, so the denial does not decide that question. With the no-transfer order vacated, the respondents said they expected to remove him promptly to Honduras. The copy is a scanned image with a machine-read text layer; quotations were checked against the page images.

C.D. Cal. August 17, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 2395216 Third country: Mexico

The court granted the petition, holding that re-detaining a person who had complied with an order of supervision since 2018, at a scheduled check-in and without notice or a hearing, violated procedural due process, and ordered her immediate release. It entered a limited permanent injunction requiring at least seven days’ notice and a hearing before an immigration judge before any re-detention, and written notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond in reopened proceedings before any attempt to remove her to a country other than Guatemala.

Redetention Due process Notice Third-country designation Withholding of removal CAT

Caution Unpublished slip copy. Decided by a magistrate judge on the parties’ full consent, so unlike the recommendations in this collection it is a final and appealable judgment. As of 7 September 2026 no subsequent history appeared, but the decision is recent enough that the appeal window and any post-judgment motions may still be open. The printed text carries several original typographical errors.

D.N.M. July 27, 2026 Third country: Equatorial Guinea: “Respondents are removing Petitioner to Equatorial Guinea on a charter flight.”

Disposition Respondents’ emergency motion to lift the order enjoining transfer granted; stay of transfer lifted.

The court lifted its stay of transfer. The petitioner had not carried his burden under Zadvydas, because, as the respondents showed, his “removal is not only foreseeable but already scheduled within the presumptively constitutional detention period.” It added: “Additionally, Respondents are removing Petitioner to Equatorial Guinea on a charter flight.” And: “This alternative destination is consistent with Petitioner’s withholding of removal to Cameroon.”

Third-country removal Detention Zadvydas Stay of transfer Withholding of removal CAT protection

Caution Superseded the next day: on 28 July 2026 the court granted a temporary restraining order in part and reinstated the stay, as recorded separately in this register. This order gives 30 April 2025 as the date the removal order became administratively final; the order of 28 July gives 25 April 2025.

E.D. Cal. July 10, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 1999108 Third country: None identified; the third-country analysis is general and no destination was named

The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, finding detention had passed the presumptively reasonable six months with no significant likelihood of removal, and that ICE revoked release without the notice and prompt informal interview the regulations require. He recommended release, an injunction against re-detention absent strict compliance, and an injunction against third-country removal without at least ten days’ notice and a meaningful opportunity to raise a fear-based claim before an immigration judge.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Due process Third-country designation Notice CAT

Caution This is a findings and recommendation, not a decision of the court, issued with a shortened seven-day objection period. It was ADOPTED IN PART AND REJECTED IN PART by the district judge on 21 July 2026, so parts of what is recommended here do not stand; the 21 July order must be read before this is relied on. Unpublished slip copy. The magistrate judge expressly declined to reach the claim that the detention hearing was constitutionally inadequate.

W.D. Mich. July 8, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The government sought removal to Iran by charter flight.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 granted. Respondents directed to release the petitioner within five days, subject as applicable to an order of supervision, and to file a status report certifying compliance within six business days.

ICE arrested the petitioner on 20 March 2025 when he appeared for a scheduled check-in, and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Iran on 26 November 2025. On 2 January 2026 ICE “nominated [Petitioner] for the next Special High-Risk Charter Mission to Iran, which was scheduled for January 25, 2026.” He was not removed then because of “mandatory quarantine protocols” at the staging facility where he was awaiting removal. ICE submitted a travel document request on 29 April 2026 and had not acquired travel documents. On 28 May 2026 it nominated him for an “upcoming” charter flight to Iran and was told that more information would follow, but the court recorded that “There is no indication that the local ICE office has received that information.” The court also recorded that the last removal mission to Iran took place in late January 2026, that removal missions were then paused because of the conflict with Iran, and that the conflict remains ongoing. The court concluded that the petitioner “has met his burden of providing ‘good reason’ to believe that ‘there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’” and that the respondents “have failed to respond with sufficient evidence to rebut Petitioner’s showing.” It granted the petition, ordered his release, and did not address his other claims.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Burden of proof Travel documents

Caution Not a third-country removal case. No third country was proposed and the order records no fear-based claim; the removal in prospect was to Iran, the country named in the removal order. It is included for its record of post-order detention pending charter removal to Iran while removal missions were paused. Release is subject, as applicable, to an order of supervision, and the court did not reach the petitioner’s other claims. The separate order directing release was not read.

D. Colo. June 10, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 1678205 Third country: Cameroon; ICE had earlier sought acceptance from Libya, Tanzania and Lebanon, and had arranged a flight toward Equatorial Guinea

The court refused immediate release and a bond hearing, holding that the petitioner’s own refusal to board his flight made him the impediment to removal. It granted relief in part, ordering that notwithstanding Cameroon’s diplomatic assurances he receive written notice in a language he understands, and at least ten days and a hearing before an immigration judge to raise a fear-based claim, before removal to Cameroon or any other third country.

Third-country designation Notice Due process Diplomatic assurances Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction Class action

Caution Unpublished slip copy. The petitioner was self-represented and the application was liberally construed. The order rests on Pacheco v. Baltazar and on A.A.M. v. Andrews, and presumes familiarity with an earlier related habeas case. Respondents were ordered to file a status report within five days of the hearing, so the operative outcome post-dates this order.

W.D. Mich. June 4, 2026 Third country: Palau, under a Third Country Removal agreement between the United States and Palau signed on 24 December 2025. ICE planned to remove her on a charter flight on 4 May 2026.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 granted. The petitioner’s continued release ordered on the conditions of the District of Arizona’s release order, with a status report certifying compliance due within five days.

An immigration judge ordered the petitioner removed on 7 October 2025 but granted withholding of removal after finding it “more likely than not that [Petitioner’s] life or freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground if she were removed to Vietnam.” After nearly six months of post-order detention, the District of Arizona granted her first habeas petition on 17 March 2026, when the government conceded that it could not establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. She was released on 20 March 2026 on an order of supervision. On 27 April 2026 she attended a routine check-in at the Detroit ICE Field Office and was re-detained for removal to a third country. A declaration by an Acting Deputy Assistant Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations stated that she had been “accepted to be removed to Palau pursuant to a Third Country Removal agreement between the United States and Palau that was signed on December 24, 2025,” and that “The Petitioner’s acceptance by Palau and placement on the manifest for this charter serves as the travel document in the Petitioner’s removal.” The court granted a temporary restraining order on 1 May 2026 and she was released on 6 May 2026, so she was not on the 4 May 2026 flight. The government argued that Palau’s acceptance was a change of circumstances making removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court found that the respondents “do not provide any more details as to when the ‘next scheduled charter to Palau’ is scheduled to occur or whether Respondents have currently valid travel documents to allow Respondents to effect Petitioner’s removal,” and that “There is nothing in the record before the Court to indicate that Respondents have taken any further action since May 4, 2026, including securing currently valid travel documents, to effect the deportation of Petitioner.” The court held that “at this time, the Court is unable to conclude that Respondents have provided sufficient facts to show that removal is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.” It granted the petition, did not address the petitioner’s other claims, and kept all named respondents in the case so that its order would bind one with authority to act if she were transferred.

Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Informal interview Third-country removal Withholding of removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Changed circumstances Travel documents Habeas jurisdiction

Caution The finding is tied to the record before the court “at this time”; the court did not rule on removal to Palau as such and did not reach the petitioner’s other claims. In one section the opinion describes the grant as conditional; its conclusion states that a judgment granting the petition will be entered. That separate judgment was not read. The description of acceptance and manifest placement as the travel document is the government’s statement in a declaration, not a finding of the court.

C.D. Cal. May 26, 2026 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115713; 2026 WL 1471864

The court adjudged the revocation of the order of supervision and the re-detention unlawful and permanently enjoined re-detention without an individualized pre-detention hearing before a neutral arbiter and third-country removal without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral

Caution Entered over objections after de novo review of a magistrate judge's report that is not in the supplied file, so the reasoning behind the 'neutral arbiter' requirement has not been read; the brief notes these requirements go further than any other order in the collection.

N.D. Ind. May 22, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The government identified Iran as the only country under consideration.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted. Release ordered on the same conditions of supervised release that existed before his re-detention, with compliance to be certified by 26 May 2026.

The petitioner, an Iranian citizen who entered the United States in 1999, was ordered removed on 13 November 2002 after criminal convictions in Illinois. ICE released him on an order of supervision on 22 October 2012, and he remained on release for nearly thirteen years until ICE detained him on 17 September 2025. He was held at the Miami Correctional Facility, a facility of the Indiana Department of Correction, and filed the petition without a lawyer. The court held, by reference to its earlier decision in Liang v. English, that “jurisdiction is secure insofar as this opinion goes,” despite the government’s reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and § 1252(b)(9). The government identified Iran as the only country under consideration. An ICE official attested on 13 April 2026 that “the airspace over Iran is closed which has paused removals to Iran” and that “[r]emovals will resume once the airspace reopens.” The court found that the petitioner had shown good reason to believe removal was not foreseeable, noting the recent military conflict “between the United States and Iran and the present uncertainty of a resolution, which reasonably impedes any removal to Iran for the foreseeable future.” The court held that the government had not rebutted that showing. It found that “the precise relationship between the efforts to remove Mr. Khodabakhsh and the closure of Iran’s airspace is unclear,” that “it is less clear how closed airspace would hinder efforts to obtain travel documents,” and that the government did not explain why travel documents had not been obtained “after eight months of detention, five of which predate the current conflict with Iran,” or suggest that a formal request had been submitted. The court said it “has no insight into if or when an agreement allowing removals to continue might be reached. More important, the government has presented no such insight, so has not met its burden today.” It ordered his release on the same conditions as his last release, adding that efforts to remove him “may continue while he returns to supervision.”

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Order of supervision Travel documents Jurisdiction 1252(g) Self-represented petitioner

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The order concerns detention only: removal to Iran remains the government’s stated aim, and the court said efforts to remove him may continue. No third country and no protection from removal appear in the order. The court’s assessment of the conflict with Iran and the closure of Iranian airspace is as of 22 May 2026.

W.D. Tex. May 22, 2026 Third country: Sierra Leone. On 29 April 2026 the government told the court that it expected to remove her there in May, under the DHS guidance of 30 March 2025 and Sierra Leone’s assurances. She argued that she had never been told of the plan.

Disposition Emergency motion, construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction, granted in part. The respondents enjoined from removing her from the United States until “the Government provides Petitioner with the opportunity to seek withholding of removal in the manner prescribed by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208 and 1208” or the court orders otherwise. The temporary restraining order of 15 May 2026 dissolved. The parties to report material developments, and in any event by 12 June 2026.

The petitioner, Budude Allison Zawu Roberts, a Liberian citizen subject to a removal order from 2003, holds withholding of removal to Liberia under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). ICE detained her on 16 January 2026 to carry out her removal, before any third country had been designated, and she petitioned for habeas corpus under Zadvydas v. Davis. On 29 April 2026, answering the court’s order, the government said it expected to remove her to Sierra Leone in May. It argued that it need not let her apply for withholding because “Sierra Leone has issued Department of State approved assurances” that “any aliens removed there will not be persecuted or tortured,” and that accepting those assurances was a matter for the executive. The court rejected six jurisdictional objections. Reading 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) narrowly under Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, it held that “whether the Government may lawfully remove an alien is a purely legal issue, meaning that § 1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction to decide it.” It also held that sections 1252(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(5) and (b)(9) and FARRA § 2242(d) did not bar review. On the merits: “the Government’s categorical determination that ‘aliens removed . . . [to Sierra Leone] will not be subject to persecution or torture’ is a far cry from the ‘individualized determinations’ that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and CAT demand. Indeed, there is absolutely no indication that the Government considered Petitioner’s specific circumstances (as it was required to do) before it designated Sierra Leone as her country of removal.” Agency guidance, it said, cannot “supplant the INA’s removal procedures.” It distinguished Munaf v. Geren: “The issue here isn’t whether the Government was justified in accepting Sierra Leone’s assurances that aliens removed there won’t be persecuted or tortured. Rather, the issue is whether the Government may remove aliens to any third country without allowing them to seek withholding of removal.”

Third-country removal Withholding of removal CAT Diplomatic assurances Rule of non-inquiry Notice Third-country fear screening Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(a)(4) Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Preliminary injunction

Caution A preliminary injunction, not a final judgment, and it decides only that she must be allowed to seek withholding of removal before any removal to Sierra Leone. The court said that the government “may well determine that Petitioner isn’t entitled to withholding of removal from Sierra Leone even after following the procedures prescribed by regulation”, and that Munaf would then bar it from second-guessing that determination. On the Munaf point it cited, with a “but see”, an order of the same district to the contrary: Torrez Lopez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (W.D. Tex. 23 April 2026). The later filings, status reports of 12 June, 26 June and 6 July 2026 and orders of 30 June and 21 July 2026 (ECF Nos. 19 to 24), are not available on CourtListener, so whether she was screened, released or removed is not known from the sources read. The order of 15 May 2026 (ECF No. 16), which restrained her removal on the day she expected to be removed, rested on the same reasoning. In October 2026 the Fifth Circuit, which hears appeals from this court, held in Gakou v. Warden of the Prairieland Detention Center, recorded in this register, that a request for a stay of removal falls within § 1252(g)’s jurisdiction-stripping effect.

N.D. Cal. May 14, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 1915726 Third country: Saint Kitts and Nevis

The court granted a preliminary injunction barring removal to Saint Kitts and Nevis, or any other country not designated on the removal order, unless the petitioner is first given notice and an opportunity to pursue fear-based protection, and barring re-detention without notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. It held that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions did not apply because he challenges the manner of his detention and removal rather than the removal order, and declined to treat the March 2025 policy memorandum or the State Department’s credibility finding on Saint Kitts’ diplomatic assurances as displacing binding circuit precedent on due process.

Third-country designation Notice Withholding of removal CAT Redetention Due process Jurisdiction Diplomatic assurances

Caution A preliminary injunction, resting on likelihood of success and not a final merits ruling; the habeas petition remains pending and the order runs until further order of the court. Unpublished slip copy. An APPEAL WAS FILED IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT ON 14 JULY 2026, so its status should be checked before reliance. The court expressly declined to weigh the evidence about conditions faced by third-country deportees, and did not reach the substantive due process claim.

S.D. Fla. April 28, 2026

Exhaustion was excused as futile and the detention is governed by section 1226(a), so the government must hold a bond hearing within five days at which it bears the burden by clear and convincing evidence, or release him.

Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing

Caution The brief treats this and Euceda v. Noem as a different question from third-country removal; no reporter or unofficial citation is printed and the brief does not name the judge (the docket suffix is BLOOM).

E.D. Cal. April 27, 2026 Slip Copy; 2026 WL 1133268 Third country: None identified; the government said it was pursuing removal to China, but the court reached the third-country claim because ICE was operating under its third-country removal policy

The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition on the claims that re-detention breached the changed-circumstances requirement and amounted to unconstitutionally indefinite detention, China having repeatedly declined to issue travel documents, and that an earlier preliminary injunction be made permanent. Reaching the third-country claim, she recommended barring any third-country removal without twenty-one days’ written notice in a language the petitioner understands, at least ten days to raise a fear-based claim, a government motion to reopen if reasonable fear is shown, and at least fifteen days to seek reopening if it is not.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Due process Third-country designation Notice Reasonable fear CAT Jurisdiction

Caution This is a findings and recommendation, not a decision of the court, with a seven-day objection period. As of 7 September 2026 no order adopting it appeared, so the docket should be checked before it is treated as operative. Unpublished slip copy. The detention holdings are not independent analysis: the magistrate judge rests on the district judge’s earlier preliminary injunction reasoning because the evidentiary record had not changed. Three of the claims were not reached. The printed text repeatedly miscites the governing regulation.

D. Nev. April 24, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted and immediate release ordered on the conditions of his prior order of supervision. Re-detention enjoined absent proof of changed circumstances making removal reasonably foreseeable, and removal to any country not listed on his removal order enjoined unless the government first complies with the notice-and-hearing requirements in the order. Case closed.

Mr. Hassan was admitted to the United States in 2006 as a Sudanese refugee “fleeing genocide.” He was ordered removed on 8 February 2021 because of criminal convictions, but the immigration judge deferred his removal to Sudan under the Convention Against Torture “because it is likely that he will be tortured if returned to that country.” He was held for about 90 days and released because the government could not carry out his removal. On 15 January 2026 he was arrested in Weber, Utah, for riding a train without a ticket; four days later ICE took him into custody and moved him to the Nevada Southern Detention Center. The court counted his 2021 detention together with his 2026 detention, holding that “the government cannot simply restart the six-month clock whenever it chooses to re-detain him.” It found the government’s response “woefully insufficient to show that there is a significant likelihood of Hassan’s removal at all, let alone in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and granted the petition on that ground. It also held that ICE had given him neither notice of the reasons for revoking his release nor an informal interview: “It’s undisputed that those regulations were not followed here.” On third-country removal, the court described an ICE policy under which no notice or opportunity to be heard is given where “the United States has received diplomatic assurances from the country of removal that [noncitizens] removed from the United States will not be persecuted or tortured” and the Department of State deems them credible, and which otherwise allows removal on as little as six hours’ notice without asking whether the person fears removal. It held that where assurances are relied on, “Notice, let alone an opportunity to be heard, is not available to a noncitizen in that situation,” and that the notice route “does not comport with the fundamental requirements of due process.” Because removal to Sudan is deferred, the court found that any removal “will likely be effectuated under its unconstitutional third-country-removal policy.” It barred removal to any country not listed on his removal order unless the government first meets the requirements the order sets out: notice, asking whether he fears persecution or harm in the designated country and recording the answer in writing, telling him that he may seek protection by a motion to reopen, and adequate time to prepare and file it.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Informal interview Compliance with regulations Third-country removal Notice Diplomatic assurances Due process CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(g) Changed circumstances

Caution The ruling on the third-country policy concerns the policy as described in the record (ECF No. 8-5); no particular third country had been designated for him. The court did not reach his separate constitutional challenge to prolonged detention or his claim under the Administrative Procedure Act. The government filed its response late, and the court accepted it. After the order, the docket shows a motion to enforce filed on 27 April 2026 and a minute order on it on 1 May 2026, which have not been reviewed.

11th Cir. April 21, 2026

Disposition Preliminary injunction vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

The appeal concerned the same Florida facility, built by the State of Florida in the Everglades to assist federal immigration enforcement. The court framed the question in its opening line: “This appeal requires us to decide if the National Environmental Policy Act governs a facility constructed by the State of Florida to assist in federal immigration enforcement.” The district court had ordered the site closed and dismantled. An earlier panel of the same court stayed that injunction in September 2025. On the merits the court held that the challengers had not shown either a final agency action or the degree of federal control that would bring the facility within the statute, because Florida had built it with state funds, state employees and state property and had retained control of construction decisions. The holding, in the court’s own words: “Because the environmentalists and Tribe failed to prove either a final agency action or federal control, and because the injunction, in part, violates a statutory prohibition of enjoining immigration enforcement, we vacate and remand.” Disposition: “We VACATE the preliminary injunction and REMAND for further proceedings.” The second ground was that the part of the injunction preventing federal officers from bringing people to the facility ran against the statutory bar on enjoining the operation of the immigration removal provisions, 8 U.S.C. section 1252(f)(1). Judge Abudu dissented, closing: “the majority’s decision to vacate the district court’s order is just plain wrong. I dissent.”

National Environmental Policy Act Final agency action Federal control Injunctions against immigration enforcement Section 1252(f)(1) Conditions of detention

Caution The challengers lost. Any account describing this case only as an environmental challenge to the facility, without saying that the injunction was vacated, is incomplete. The decision is about environmental review and the reach of a jurisdictional bar. It makes no finding about conditions inside the facility and no finding about the treatment of anyone held there. A reporter citation, 174 F.4th 822, is in circulation. The decision is marked for publication and will receive a citation in due course, but the Coalition has not been able to verify that one and does not reproduce it. The earlier order staying the district court’s injunction is reported at 2025 WL 2598567 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025), Jordan, Circuit Judge, dissenting. That citation is quoted inside the April 2026 opinion.

W.D. Wash. April 15, 2026 Third country: Canada, Mexico or the United Kingdom. The government said ICE was determining whether any of the three would accept him; it also said the petitioner had asked to be removed to Canada or Mexico.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted on prolonged detention grounds. Release within 72 hours on reasonable conditions of supervision ordered. Re-detention barred without adequate notice and a hearing before an immigration court, and removal to a third country barred without adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond.

The petitioner entered the United States in December 2005 at the age of eleven. Earlier in his removal case an immigration judge found him not competent to represent himself and a qualified representative was assigned. On 11 September 2025 an immigration judge ordered him removed to Iran and granted him deferral of removal to Iran under Article III of the Convention Against Torture. He was detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma. According to the government, immediately after the removal order ICE began “efforts to identify a third country for Petitioner’s removal,” and was “currently determining whether Canada, Mexico, or the United Kingdom, will accept Petitioner.” The government also said he had refused to cooperate with removal efforts and had received multiple failure to depart warnings. The government acknowledged that the presumptively reasonable six-month period had lapsed. The court held that the government’s statements about a third country “alone do not automatically render Petitioner’s removal” reasonably foreseeable, and that the government did not provide “any specific evidence or other information on what steps they have taken, or imminently intend to take, to effectuate Petitioner’s removal and ensure that he is not indefinitely detained.” On cooperation, it found that the government did “fail to identify how Petitioner has purportedly refused to cooperate with ICE, let alone how such a refusal has contributed to the delay.” The court ordered release within 72 hours, declining to prohibit GPS monitoring. It barred re-detention “unless and until he is provided with adequate notice and a hearing before an immigration court to determine whether re-detention is appropriate,” and barred removal to a third country “unless and until he is provided with adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, in accordance with all applicable laws.” Because it granted relief on prolonged detention, it did not reach the arguments on procedural due process, fear of removal and “punitive third-country banishment.”

CAT deferral Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Pre-deprivation hearing Notice Travel documents

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The court decided the petition on prolonged detention alone and expressly did not reach the claims on procedural due process, fear of removal or punitive third-country removal. The third-country protection it ordered is adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond; unlike several other orders from this district in the register, it does not specify reopened proceedings before an immigration judge. The statements about the petitioner’s refusal to cooperate are the government’s, and the court found them unsupported. The copy has no electronic filing stamp; the date given is the date the judge signed the order. The court’s docket heading on the copy reads “Babakhanlou v. Bondi et al”, but the caption of the order names Todd Blanche as first respondent.

D. Md. April 7, 2026 Third country: Mexico (notices of revocation of release and of removal served 15 February 2026).

Disposition Motion for a preliminary injunction granted, with bond waived. The government must either refer the petitioner’s claim of fear of removal to Mexico to an immigration judge or release her from ICE custody; the injunction remains until an immigration judge affirms the negative fear determination, plus 48 hours. The motion to dismiss was not decided.

Ms. Mendoza Palacios was ordered removed on 2 August 2019 but granted withholding of removal as to El Salvador under the Convention Against Torture, because she had shown that she would more likely than not be tortured there. She was released on an order of supervision, has no criminal convictions, and was not alleged to have breached her supervision. ICE detained her without prior notice on 14 February 2026 and the next day served notices of its intent to remove her to Mexico; at the informal interview she said “she doesn’t have any family member in Mexico.” After the court entered a temporary restraining order, an asylum officer gave her a telephone “third country screening” on 10 March 2026. By her account she described being kidnapped in Mexico in about October 2012 by “gang members acting in concert with a uniformed police officer” and held for about two weeks. The officer found that she “did not establish that it is more likely than not that [she] will be persecuted or tortured in Mexico.” The government filed no opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that she “has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that until and unless an immigration judge concurs with the asylum officer’s determination that she lacks a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico, due process precludes her removal to Mexico.” It found that “a single review by an asylum officer creates an unacceptably high risk of erroneous deprivation,” and that the government had given no reason why that risk is any lower for a third-country removal proposed years after the original proceedings. The court declined to defer the case because of the D.V.D. class action or the pending appeal in Bojorquez v. Baker, because “Permitting removal without adjudicating her claim of entitlement to IJ review would effectively constitute ruling for Respondents on the merits.” On detention, it held that the government’s refusal to provide immigration judge review was “the source of delay,” entitling her to an order that the government “either (a) refer her case for immigration judge review, or (b) release her from detention.” It described the threatened harm as “persecution, torture, or death.”

Third-country removal Withholding of removal CAT Reasonable fear Due process Country-specific nature of withholding Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) D.V.D. class action Habeas jurisdiction

Caution Interim relief only. The operative terms are in a separate preliminary injunction order of the same day (ECF No. 24), which is not in the file. The court did not decide the government’s motion to dismiss. The kidnapping account is the petitioner’s description of what she told the asylum officer, not a finding of the court. The docket shows a final joint status report on 14 April 2026 and an order of 21 April 2026 dismissing the petition as moot without prejudice; the reason for mootness is not stated in the docket text reviewed.

E.D. Cal. March 27, 2026 832 F. Supp. 3d 1071; 2026 WL 849579 Third country: Mexico

The court granted a temporary restraining order in full, finding the petitioner likely to succeed both on her claim that ICE revoked her release without the changed-circumstances determination required by 8 C.F.R. section 241.13(i)(2), there being no evidence that travel documents had been sought or that Mexico had agreed to accept her, and on her due process claim that she could not be removed to Mexico without notice and an opportunity to present a fear-based claim to a neutral adjudicator.

Redetention Third-country designation Notice Due process CAT Withholding of removal

Caution Interim relief on a likelihood-of-success standard, not a final ruling; the matter was referred onward to the assigned magistrate judge. The court expressly rejected part of the petitioner’s regulatory argument, finding she had not shown a failure to comply with the notice and informal-interview requirements; relief rested on section 241.13(i)(2) alone. The opinion contains two apparent typographical date errors.

M.D. Fla. March 27, 2026

Disposition Provisional class certification granted. Preliminary injunction granted in part and denied in part.

This is the continuation of C.M. v. Noem after transfer. The court provisionally certified a class defined as “All persons who are currently, or in the future, held at the Alligator Alcatraz detention facility.” Three barriers to access to counsel remained before the court: the requirement that in-person legal visits be arranged in advance, the absence of confidential, free and unmonitored outgoing calls to lawyers, and the failure to publish protocols for attorney access. On telephone calls the court found for the detained plaintiffs, and rejected the account given by the government’s witnesses: “unlike Saunders’ and Lumm’s testimony about unscheduled legal visits, the Court finds their testimony regarding unmonitored, unrecorded legal calls lacking in credibility for the reasons below.” It held that the plaintiffs “have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claims asserting that the facility’s policies regarding monitoring legal phone calls violate their First Amendment free speech rights.” An attorney declaration recorded in the order: “The only way that clients . . . detained at Alligator Alcatraz can call me is still via a monitored, recorded outgoing phone line.” On in-person visits the court found the other way, and believed the same two witnesses: “The Court finds Saunders’ and Lumm’s testimony that unscheduled visits have occurred and will continue to occur credible. And therefore, neither Detained Plaintiffs nor Organizational Plaintiffs can demonstrate a First Amendment violation based on a scheduling requirement for in-person visits.”

Access to counsel First Amendment Class certification Preliminary injunction Monitored telephone calls Conditions of detention

Caution The credibility finding is specific to the evidence about telephone calls. The same witnesses were believed on the separate question of in-person visits. Any account describing the court as having found the government generally not credible overstates the order. At the hearing the plaintiffs abandoned several claims and the court recorded that it therefore did not consider them: the timeliness of legal mail, the confidentiality of in-person and video legal visits, and delays in updating the online detainee locator. This decision circulates under the incorrect caption H.C.R. v. Mullin. There is no party of that name in the case. It also circulates with a description of legal conferences conducted in a cage within earshot of officers. The words cage and auditory appear nowhere in the order, and the confidentiality claim on which such a finding would have rested was withdrawn. That material appears to originate in the report of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General of September 2026, which is a separate document and not a judicial finding. A reporter citation, 825 F. Supp. 3d 1267, is in circulation and the Coalition has not been able to verify it.

E.D. Cal. March 26, 2026 833 F. Supp. 3d 1092; 2026 WL 849861. Findings and recommendations 10 March 2026, order adopting them 26 March 2026. Third country: None identified. The injunction is prospective.

Disposition Petition granted on all three due process grounds. Immediate release ordered on prior conditions. Revocation of supervision permanently enjoined absent compliance with the regulations. Third-country removal permanently enjoined absent specified notice periods. Judgment entered for the petitioner.

A man ordered removed to Vietnam in 1998, released by a federal court in 2000 because there was no reasonable likelihood of removal, and living under an order of supervision since then, was taken into immigration custody in July 2025 on the day he was due to be paroled from a state sentence. He filed a habeas petition himself, without a lawyer, after his request for appointed counsel was refused. He won on every ground he raised. The magistrate judge recommended, and the district judge adopted, an order releasing him immediately on his previous conditions, requiring the government to hand back his identification, passport, work permit and social security card at release, and permanently barring the government from revoking his supervision again without following 8 C.F.R. 241.13(i) and due process. The order also set out, in numbers, what the government must do before it may remove him to any third country: a meaningful opportunity and at least ten days to raise a fear-based claim; if he shows a reasonable fear, the government must move to reopen his removal proceedings; and if he does not, a meaningful opportunity and at least fifteen days to seek reopening himself. On the punitive question the court found that, to the extent the policy deliberately seeks to remove people to countries where they will be imprisoned on arrival, it is punitive and violates due process, following Baltodano v. Bondi. It reached that finding on the petitioner's uncontested allegations, and explained why they were uncontested: the government did not address them, and under Rule 8(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure an allegation that is not denied is admitted. The same silence appears in Nguyen v. Scott, Abubaka v. Bondi and Baltodano v. Bondi, where courts recorded that the government argued only that the question was foreclosed and never answered it on the merits. The findings also record the state of D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security as at 10 March 2026: the District of Massachusetts had set the third-country removal policy aside as unlawful on 25 February 2026 and held that class members have a right to meaningful notice before removal to any third country and a meaningful opportunity to raise a country-specific claim against it; that judgment was stayed until 12 March 2026 or until the First Circuit ruled on a stay motion; and an appeal was pending.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Revocation of supervision Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Rule 8(b)(6) admission Self-represented petitioner D.V.D. class action

Caution The punitive finding rests on allegations the government never answered, treated as admitted under Rule 8(b)(6). That is a rule of pleading, not a finding on evidence, and the decision says so. It is a description of what happens when the government declines to contest a claim, and it would carry less weight against a government that had. This is a district court decision and binds only the parties. The petitioner had serious convictions, including a sentence of twenty-five years to life, and still obtained the injunction, because the protection does not depend on the record of the person invoking it. The account of D.V.D. above is the state of that case as the court recorded it on 10 March 2026, not as at today. Anyone relying on it should check where the appeal now stands.

M.D. Fla. March 20, 2026 2026 WL 787639 Third country: Mexico

Because ICE gave written notice and an informal interview, the petitioner received what the Fifth Amendment requires, and his Zadvydas claim was premature at four months; the petition was denied.

Redetention Notice Informal interview Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9)

Caution Denied without prejudice to refiling after six months. This is a different petitioner from Chavez Barrios v. Ripa and the brief warns that the two Barrios cases must be kept separate in every list.

W.D. Wash. March 12, 2026 829 F. Supp. 3d 907; 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51428; 2026 WL 698786 Third country: None identified. No country had agreed to accept him.

Disposition Petition granted in part and denied in part. Immediate release ordered. Re-detention and third-country removal restrained. Claim that third-country removal is unconstitutional punishment refused for want of evidence specific to this petitioner.

A twenty-two year old Egyptian man was ordered released after roughly seventeen months in immigration detention, eight of them after his removal order became final. An immigration judge had ordered him removed but granted withholding of removal to Egypt, which the court described, following the Ninth Circuit, as a powerful indication of the improbability of his foreseeable removal by any objective measure. He held no other citizenship and no country had agreed to take him. The court recorded what brought him to the United States. His father was arrested, detained, tortured and deprived of medical care after a dispute with a member of the Egyptian parliament over corruption in their village, and died. He then campaigned for an opposition candidate and continued that activity at his university, where he was a law student, and was himself arrested, detained and tortured as a political prisoner. The court ordered immediate release, required the government to confirm the release within forty-eight hours, prohibited re-detention without first complying with 8 C.F.R. 241.13(i) and 8 U.S.C. 1231, and prohibited removal to any third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. It set out what compliant notice requires: written notice of the country designated, the statutory basis for the designation, and an affirmative question to the person about whether they fear persecution or harm there, with the answer recorded in writing. It said the government's own policy does not inspire confidence that it can be relied on to provide that process without a court order. The punitive claim was refused, and the reason matters. The court held it did not have a sufficient basis to find the third-country removal programme unconstitutional as a whole, or punitive as applied to this man. The declaration he relied on came from Nguyen v. Scott and concerned pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants and the resulting removals to South Sudan and Eswatini. He is Egyptian, and offered nothing about a removal practice specific to him or to people like him. The findings in the other cases, the court held, were specific to a particular population and particular destination countries and do not extend to these circumstances. The court also refused two further requests: a hearing before an immigration judge at which the government would have to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence before any re-detention, and a set of four conditions the petitioner asked to be imposed before re-detention, neither of which it found any authority for.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal CAT Redetention Revocation of supervision Third-country removal Notice Meaningful opportunity Diplomatic assurances Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Evidence of destination conditions

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The petitioner won release and the procedural protections, and lost on punishment. That loss is the reason this entry is here. Read alongside Nguyen v. Scott, Abubaka v. Bondi, Hambarsonpour v. Bondi, Baltodano v. Bondi and Pham v. Warden, it shows that the punitive argument has so far turned on evidence about the destination rather than on the doctrine. Where a court has been shown what happens to people on arrival in a named country, it has found the practice punitive. Where it has not, it has declined, and has said the earlier findings were tied to a particular population and particular destinations. Judge Lasnik refused the same claim in Baltodano in November 2025 for want of that evidence and granted it in December once the evidence was supplied. The commercial reporter carried a positive signal on this decision as of September 2026.

C.D. Cal. February 26, 2026 2026 WL 855153

The boilerplate notice of changed circumstances did not justify revoking supervision; the court ordered immediate release and enjoined removal to Mexico or any third country and transfer out of the district.

Redetention Notice Withholding of removal Transfer out of district

Caution Temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on a preliminary record; the government stated it had no opposition argument to present; a final judgment in the same case is recorded for August 24, 2026 and was not supplied.

C.D. Cal. February 26, 2026

Granting a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to a petitioner who filed pro se, the court ordered Respondents “to immediately release Petitioner from custody and restore him to the status quo prior to his detention by reinstating his supervision,” and enjoined them “from removing Petitioner to Mexico or any third country or transferring him from the Central District of California pending adjudication of his Petition.” The court applied 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), under which ICE may re-detain a person released on an order of supervision only “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and § 241.13(i)(3), which requires that the person “be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release” and be given an initial informal interview promptly after return to custody. The notice given here said only that “there are changed circumstances in your case.” The court found that the petitioner could not be expected to “respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification” when the notice stated no reasons. Respondents did not contest the allegations, stating: “At this time, Respondents do not have an opposition argument to present.” The bond requirement was waived.

Order of supervision Revocation Redetention Third-country designation Notice

Caution An unreported district court order. The petitioner is a Mexican national who had been on an order of supervision; the order records prior arrests and convictions, which are not summarised here. The court cited Roble v. Bondi, Chavez Barrios v. Ripa, Nguyen v. Hyde, Tran v. Baker, Zadori v. Noem and Diaz v. Kaiser; the first two are registered separately in this collection and the remainder are not, because they have not been read directly.

E.D. Cal. February 25, 2026 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: No third country was ever identified by the government. The injunction runs against removal to any of them without a fear hearing first.

Disposition Petition granted. A bond hearing ordered within fourteen days, the government to prove flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence, with release if the hearing was not held in time. Removal to a third country enjoined without an individualised opportunity to assert fear of that country.

Sam Sarfarzi-Esfahari had a final order of removal to Iran dating from 8 October 2004, deferral of removal under the Convention against Torture, and had been living under an Order of Supervision. He was re-detained. The court held that re-detaining him under the written policy he challenged violated due process, granted the petition, and ordered a bond hearing within fourteen days at which the government would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was a flight risk or a danger, failing which he was to be released. It separately barred the government from removing him to any third country without first giving him an individualised opportunity to say that he feared that country. On the question whether a challenge to a written policy is ripe before any particular third country has been named, the court held that it is, quoting the Ninth Circuit: where the harm alleged is directly traceable to a written policy there is an implicit likelihood of its repetition in the immediate future.

Third-country removal CAT deferral CAT Order of supervision Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Notice Due process Standing Ripeness Bond hearing Burden of proof Compliance with regulations ICE policy of 9 July 2025

Caution A district court decision. It binds the parties to it and nobody else. The relief has two halves and they are not the same: the detention half was granted in a narrower form than the magistrate judge had recommended, because the district judge ordered a hearing rather than immediate release. Note also the date. A document of 26 January 2026 in this case is findings and recommendations by a magistrate judge, which is a proposal and not an order. The operative decision is the order of 25 February 2026 adopting it in part. Citing the January date as the grant of relief would be wrong.

W.D. Wash. February 24, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted in part. Release within twenty-four hours on reasonable conditions of supervision ordered. Request for relief against third-country removal denied without prejudice.

The petitioner was born in Vietnam in 1970 to a United States citizen father and came to the United States in May 1990 as a lawful permanent resident under the Amerasian Homecoming Act. An immigration judge ordered him removed to Vietnam on 11 June 2009, and he was released on an order of supervision in August 2009 “because he could not be removed.” He was detained at his yearly check-in on 22 August 2025. The court recorded that the record “does not reflect whether or when any travel document request was submitted to Vietnam.” It was undisputed that he had been held longer than six months. The government relied on Vietnam’s agreement in February 2025 to accelerate travel document issuance and on media reports of hundreds of removals to Vietnam, but offered no information on removals of people who arrived before 1995 except to acknowledge “additional hurdles.” The court held that “The assertion that some Vietnamese nationals have been removed to Vietnam offers no evidence that Petitioner, or others in similar circumstances, is likely to be removed in the foreseeable future,” and that the government “has not obtained travel documents for Petitioner, does not know when such documents might issue, and does not know if they will issue at all.” The court denied without prejudice his request for an order against third-country removal because “He does not claim that he is likely to be subject to such removal.” It did not reach his claims that the re-detention violated procedural due process and ICE regulations, and it ruled before his reply was due, finding habeas relief warranted on the government’s return.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Travel documents Third-country removal Ripeness

Caution A district court decision by a magistrate judge sitting with the parties’ consent, binding only on the parties. The petitioner obtained release only: the request for protection against third-country removal was denied without prejudice, so the order gives no protection against removal to a third country. Not to be confused with Nguyen v. Bondi (C25-2674-SKV, slug van-nguyen-v-bondi), already in the register, which concerns a different petitioner.

W.D. Wash. February 11, 2026 826 F. Supp. 3d 1282; 2026 WL 381163 Third country: Uganda, by notice of intent September 2025. Requests later sent to Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with no reply.

Disposition Petition granted. Release within one day ordered. Third-country removal permanently enjoined without notice and reopened proceedings before an immigration judge. Claim of unconstitutional punishment refused without prejudice for want of evidence specific to this petitioner.

A Russian man who arrived at a port of entry and was detained in May 2024 sought asylum on the ground that he feared persecution in Russia for opposing corruption. An immigration judge found he had a well-founded fear of future persecution by the Russian government and granted withholding of removal, recording that but for the presumption of ineligibility required by the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule she would have granted asylum outright. The government appealed, never filed a brief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal in June 2025. The government then kept him in detention while it looked for a third country. The court ordered his release within one day. Removal to Russia was barred by the immigration judge's order, and the government did not address the point in its brief at all. Its own declaration showed it had served him with a notice of intent to remove him to Uganda in September 2025, had then asked him to complete forms for the countries he had named, had not sent those requests to Denmark, Norway and Sweden until January 2026, and had received no reply from any of them. The court permanently barred removal to any third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in reopened removal proceedings with a hearing before an immigration judge. It set out the 9 July 2025 ICE memorandum in its own words, including the provision that where the Department of State believes diplomatic assurances credible, a person "may be removed without the need for further procedures." It recorded that the government itself accepts that courts in the district have found due process requires more than that policy, and it quoted the observation from Nguyen v. Scott that it would be impossible to comply both with Ninth Circuit precedent and the policy. It also held that the Supreme Court's stay in the D.V.D. class action does not bar an individual habeas petition, since it is not clear whether the stay rested on jurisdiction or on the merits, and one of the government's main arguments there concerned the power to grant class-wide relief, which has no bearing on individual cases. The punitive claim was refused, without prejudice. The court accepted that there is extensive evidence across multiple cases that the government is carrying out some third-country removals that are unconstitutionally punitive. But the law of permanent injunctions did not let it infer from those cases that everyone facing third-country removal is likely to suffer the same harm. It gave its reasons on these facts: this petitioner has no criminal record, and the countries the government had actually approached were Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Political persecution Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Diplomatic assurances Unconstitutional punishment D.V.D. class action Effect of the Supreme Court stay

Caution The petitioner won release and the notice protections, and lost on punishment. That loss is the reason this entry is here. Read with Saadhom v. Bondi and with the two-stage sequence in Baltodano v. Bondi, it shows what the punitive finding has so far depended on. It is not a doctrinal dispute. Every court to consider it has accepted that some of these removals are punitive. What divides the outcomes is whether the person before the court was shown to be at risk of that particular fate, which has turned on who they are and where the government was actually trying to send them. Here the court pointed to a petitioner with no criminal record and to proposed destinations in northern Europe. The refusal was without prejudice, so it decides nothing for the future if the destination changes. The Uganda notice recorded in this decision is a court record of a proposed destination, not a finding about conditions there. A district court decision, binding only on the parties.

D. Mass. February 6, 2026

A Rwandan citizen was ordered removed on 26 March 2025, but the immigration judge “also found that Petitioner’s life or freedom would be threatened should he be returned to Rwanda and restricted his removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).” The court records what happened next: “Subsequently, ICE attempted to remove Petitioner to several ‘third countries,’ none of which would accept him.” After more than ten months beyond the effective date of the removal order, and more than a year in detention overall, the court granted the writ, finding the petitioner had shown no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future under Zadvydas v. Davis and that “Respondents have failed to respond with any contrary evidence.” It ordered him transported to Maine and released on an order of supervision under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(3) and (6), and declined to set limits on the conditions of release.

Withholding of removal Third-country designation Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Order of supervision

Caution An unreported district court order on detention, not on the lawfulness of any removal. The order records a misdemeanor conviction and pending state proceedings, which are not summarised here. Respondents conceded the issues resembled those in Siguenza v. Moniz, 2025 WL 2734704 (D. Mass. 25 Sept. 2025), which the Coalition has not read. The docket shows an emergency motion to amend the petition and an order to show cause in April 2026, so the matter did not end with this order; what followed has not been established.

W.D. Wash. February 6, 2026 824 F. Supp. 3d 1124; 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25338 Third country: Mexico proposed; twenty-four countries approached

Disposition Petition granted. Release ordered. Third-country removal enjoined without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Punishment claim denied without prejudice.

A Venezuelan man granted withholding of removal to Venezuela under the Convention against Torture was detained eleven months while ICE approached twenty-four countries for acceptance. Five replied and all five refused. The court ordered his release under Zadvydas, holding there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and enjoined his removal to any third country without meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard. It held that the ICE memorandum of 9 July 2025 falls far short of due process, noting with alarm that the policy permits removal with no further procedure at all where the Department of State credits a diplomatic assurance, and that ICE will not affirmatively ask whether the person fears the country of removal.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country removal Notice Meaningful opportunity CAT Withholding of removal Diplomatic assurances Unconstitutional punishment

Caution The separate claim that third-country removal is itself unconstitutional punishment was denied without prejudice on the record before the court, not rejected as a theory. The court recorded that the petitioner did not substantiate his allegations but that the government did not deny them, and quoted the finding that courts in this district and across the country have recognised that the government is intentionally removing individuals to countries where they will be imprisoned. It distinguished the cases so finding as specific to a particular population and particular destination countries.

W.D. Wash. February 3, 2026 818 F. Supp. 3d 1235; 2026 WL 408098 Third country: None identified. The government was seeking removal to Vietnam.

Disposition Petition granted. Immediate release on conditions ordered. Re-detention prohibited without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge. Removal to any country other than Vietnam prohibited without notice and reopened proceedings, and to any country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm.

A lawful permanent resident admitted in March 1995, ordered removed to Vietnam in March 2008 and released on an order of supervision in April 2009 because the government could not obtain travel documents, was re-detained in June 2025. The court ordered his immediate release. It recorded that the government had failed to remove him in almost eighteen years, that seven months after re-detaining him it had still not sent a travel document request to Vietnam, and that its declaration described how the process works in general but said nothing about how it would work in his case. On the reasons given for re-detaining him the court was blunt. The government said he was a threat to public safety. His most recent conviction was six years earlier, and the court called it incomprehensible that immigration authorities would decide six years later that his re-detention was warranted on that basis. The government also said he could be removed quickly. Seven months without a travel document request made that justification implausible. On the process used, the court found no document supporting the claim that notice was given at re-detention, no mention of the required informal interview at that time, and a corrected revocation letter served more than two months later, which could in no way be deemed timely. The court then went further than the regulations. Even assuming full compliance with them, it held, those limited procedures do not provide the process due under the Fifth Amendment, following E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316. It ordered that the government may not re-detain him without first giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard before an immigration judge. The government argued the third-country claims were not ripe because it was trying to remove him to Vietnam. The court rejected that. Little in the government's own materials suggested Vietnam was likely to issue travel documents, and that, taken with the policy itself and what the court described as the recent third-country removals of hundreds of immigrants, gave rise to an imminent threat. On the merits the court found no basis to deviate from Baltodano, Abubaka and Nguyen v. Scott, and ordered that he not be removed to any country other than Vietnam without notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond in reopened removal proceedings before an immigration judge, or to any country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm. The government offered no substantive response at all to the claim that the programme is punitive.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Ripeness Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Government silence on the merits

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties, and decided by a magistrate judge. Two features are worth holding onto. First, the government again offered no substantive answer to the punitive claim. That silence now appears in Nguyen v. Scott, Abubaka v. Bondi, Baltodano v. Bondi, Pham v. Warden and this case. In Pham a court treated the equivalent silence as an admission under Rule 8(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, courts in this district do not agree about re-detention. This court ordered that there be no re-detention without a hearing before an immigration judge. Five weeks later, in Saadhom v. Bondi, another judge of the same court refused that exact request, holding she could not conclude that due process requires a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge in every case. Both decisions stand. The punitive analysis this decision follows originates in Nguyen v. Scott, decided at the preliminary injunction stage on 21 August 2025 and voluntarily dismissed by its petitioner the following month after an agreement between the parties, so it never reached a merits decision. That does not make the findings wrong, and five courts have now adopted them, but anyone relying on this line should know where it begins. The court also recorded, in a footnote, that the government's third-country removal policy was never provided to it in this case. It worked from the text set out in Nguyen v. Scott.

E.D. Cal. February 3, 2026 2026 WL 145631 (for the original order of 20 January 2026). The number itself sits behind a paid service and could not be confirmed from a public source. Third country: None identified. The removal in prospect was to China.

Disposition Reconsideration granted and immediate release ordered, 20 January 2026. Amended order 3 February 2026. Petition granted outright 25 February 2026.

Xiao Luo Huang was re-detained after Immigration and Customs Enforcement revoked his supervised release. The court held that the government had failed to show changed circumstances establishing a significant likelihood of his removal to China, and went further on what follows from that failure. In its words: "And where an immigration regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal statute and ICE fails to adhere to it, the challenged action is invalid." And: "Here, DHS’s failure to follow its own procedural regulations constitutes a due process violation." The agency’s own rules, in other words, are not internal housekeeping that it may set aside at will. Breaking them is itself the constitutional wrong. He was ordered released.

Redetention Order of supervision Compliance with regulations Due process Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Changed circumstances Burden of proof

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. Take care with which order is being cited. The order of 20 January 2026 was superseded by an amended order of 3 February 2026 carrying the same two sentences, and the petition was then granted outright on 25 February 2026. A current citation should run to the amended order rather than the first one.

D. Colo. January 23, 2026 Third country: Cameroon. He was given a notice of removal to Cameroon on or about 8 January 2026.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted and immediate release ordered, with three hours’ notice to counsel of the time and place of release and a status update within twenty-four hours. Emergency motion for a temporary restraining order denied as moot. The remaining constitutional claims not reached.

The petitioner, granted withholding of removal to Morocco on 25 June 2025 and detained from June 2025, was given a notice of removal to Cameroon on or about 8 January 2026. His petition, as the court quoted it, stated that the notice came “only after ICE was notified that this petition would be filed” and that “He has affirmatively asserted a fear of removal to Cameroon”. After he filed on 10 January 2026 the respondents transferred him to Texas, and they returned him to Colorado on 22 January 2026. The court quoted the declaration of Mark Kinsey, a deportation officer in the Denver Field Office of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, filed by the respondents. It states that the petitioner was moved to the Port Isabel Service Processing Center “for staging for removal to Cameroon”, that he claimed fear, and that after a third-country screening interview “USCIS determined that Petitioner established it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted if removed to Cameroon.” It acknowledges the court’s order “prohibiting Petitioner’s removal from the District of Colorado or from the United States without further order of the Court”, and states that ICE “will determine whether to move to reopen proceedings before the immigration court for proceedings solely related to eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT protection, or designate another country for removal.” The court held that the petitioner had shown good reason to believe that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that the respondents had not rebutted it. He had no travel documents to any other country, including Cameroon, and the respondents’ own evidence showed that removal to Cameroon was no longer in prospect. Of the declaration the court wrote: “These are not representations or arguments that demonstrate a good reason to believe removal is reasonably foreseeable.” It rejected the argument that, as a member of the D.V.D. class, the petitioner could not obtain relief in this case, because he sought release from detention rather than more or different process, as the respondents themselves acknowledged. It ordered his immediate release.

Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Burden of proof Travel documents Withholding of removal Third-country fear screening D.V.D. class action Release from custody

Caution The release rests on the Zadvydas framework for prolonged detention after a removal order. The court did not decide whether removal to Cameroon, or to any third country, would be lawful, and it did not reach the petitioner’s other constitutional claims. The finding that he is more likely than not to be persecuted in Cameroon was made by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, as reported in the respondents’ own declaration. It is not a finding of the court. The court gave only a summary of undisputed facts and presumed familiarity with the background of the case.

W.D. Wash. January 14, 2026 Third country: None identified in the order. The government said ICE may pursue removal to a third country if Iran does not issue a travel document, without naming one.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted. Immediate release ordered on the conditions that governed his release before re-detention. Removal enjoined to a third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond in reopened removal proceedings before an immigration judge, and to any third country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm.

The petitioner came to the United States as a refugee from Iran in 2001 and later became a lawful permanent resident. After criminal convictions in Oregon he was ordered removed to Iran on 11 September 2014, and was released on an order of supervision in December 2014 because “ICE was unable to obtain travel documents to Iran or a third country.” He remained on release, reporting regularly to ICE, until 9 July 2025, when he was taken into custody at an in-person check-in at the Portland ICE facility. He said he was told he was arrested because the United States had recently bombed Iran. The ICE declaration said removal had become significantly likely; the court recorded that the officer “offers no explanation as to how this determination was made or the basis for it.” ICE had sent a travel document request to Iran in July 2025 and followed it up in November 2025, with no response to either. The petitioner produced an ICE document from November 2024 listing Iran as an “uncooperative” country. The court held that the government did not explain how “these two apparently unsuccessful attempts to communicate with Iranian authorities” showed any likelihood of removal, and that “The vague suggestion that ICE might pursue removal to an unspecified third country at some future time does nothing to demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” The court rejected the government’s argument that it should decline the third-country claims because the petitioner was likely a member of the class in D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, adopting the analysis in Nguyen v. Scott as Baltodano v. Bondi and Abubaka v. Bondi had done. The government offered no substantive argument on the merits. Following those decisions and Aden v. Nielsen, the court held him entitled to an order that he not be removed to a third country “without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in reopened removal proceedings.” It recorded that the government’s current policy “has not been provided to the Court in this action.” On the claim that third-country removal is punitive, the court recorded that the government had “not provided any substantive response to this claim.” Relying on Nguyen v. Scott, Baltodano, Abubaka and Hambarsonpour v. Bondi, it concluded that “Respondents’ current practice of third country removals paired with imprisonment violates due process,” and enjoined removal “to any third country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm.”

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Travel documents Third-country removal D.V.D. class action Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing

Caution A district court decision by a magistrate judge, binding only on the parties. The court did not reach the claims that the re-detention itself violated procedural and substantive due process. The finding on the punitive nature of third-country removal was adopted from Nguyen v. Scott, Baltodano v. Bondi and Abubaka v. Bondi; it was not made on evidence about a destination specific to this petitioner, no third country had been named, and the government’s policy was not before the court.

C.D. Cal. December 30, 2025 Slip Copy; 2025 WL 4061564 Third country: None identified

The court granted a temporary restraining order, finding the petitioner likely to succeed on his claim that ICE revoked a twenty-year order of supervision without the changed circumstances the regulations require and without the informal interview they require, and ordered his immediate release and reinstatement of the prior order of supervision. It rejected his indefinite-detention claim, holding he had offered no affirmative evidence that removal to Vietnam was not reasonably foreseeable.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Due process Notice

Caution NOT A THIRD-COUNTRY REMOVAL CASE. No third country was designated; the removal at issue was to Vietnam, the country named in the removal order, and no fear-based third-country claim is discussed. It is included because it supplies the changed-circumstances and informal-interview standards that the third-country re-detention cases in this collection rely on. Beyond that: a temporary restraining order only, on a likelihood-of-success standard; the second application drew no opposition, and two earlier applications had been denied. The same order set a show-cause hearing on a preliminary injunction, whose outcome is not in this document. The petitioner lost on his indefinite-detention claim.

W.D. Wash. December 23, 2025 817 F. Supp. 3d 1102; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265398 Third country: Mauritania and then Uganda, by successive statements of intent. Neither was ever pursued to the point of a travel document.

Disposition Petition granted in part and denied in part. Immediate release ordered on preexisting conditions of supervision. Third-country removal prohibited without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge. Claim that third-country removal is unconstitutional punishment refused without prejudice.

An Egyptian man was ordered released after two hundred and twenty-five days in immigration detention. An immigration judge had denied his asylum claim and ordered him removed to Egypt, but granted withholding of removal under the Convention against Torture, which meant a finding that if returned he would more likely than not be tortured. Both sides waived appeal. He has no citizenship or significant ties to any other country, no travel document had been obtained for anywhere, and no country had been identified as willing to take him. On detention the government offered no response at all. It conceded the six month period had passed, then ignored the burden that shifts to it. The court traced what the government had actually done. In May 2025 an officer told him of an intent to attempt removal to Mauritania. A consular request in June was unsuccessful. By September that plan had apparently been abandoned, because on 2 September, in the final days of the ninety day removal period, he was served with a notice of intent to remove him to Uganda. There was no evidence that any step was ever taken towards Uganda: no travel document sought, no interest shown by Uganda, no communication with Uganda about him at all, and Uganda was not among the consulates contacted. Then on 15 December, thirteen days after this petition was filed, he was handed a Mauritanian travel document application. The court said the government cannot overcome a pending petition by handing over an application and making a request to headquarters it could have made months earlier. The court rejected the argument that he lacked standing to challenge third-country removal. Standing was obvious, because the government conceded it was pursuing his removal to third countries. It added that the government's own assertion that he "has not independently raised fear in response to a notice of removal to Uganda" showed he had already been injured, because due process requires that a person be asked whether they fear the destination rather than left to volunteer it. It also rejected the argument that his membership of the D.V.D. class barred individual relief. The order sets out the 9 July 2025 ICE memorandum in detail, and it is the fullest account of that policy in this register. Where the United States has received diplomatic assurances the Department of State believes credible, a person "may be removed without the need for further procedures." Where it has not, an officer serves a notice of removal naming the country, but the policy states that ICE "will not affirmatively ask whether the [noncitizen] is afraid of being removed to the country of removal." ICE will generally wait at least twenty-four hours before removing, and in exigent circumstances only six. If the person does not affirmatively state a fear within twenty-four hours, they are removed. The court held these procedures fall far short of what due process requires, and found that the government had misrepresented what protections the policy actually gives. The punitive claim was refused without prejudice. The court recorded the petitioner's allegation, drawn from reporting in The New Yorker, that the government had attempted and completed an end run around the Convention against Torture by deporting a group of people to Ghana, which then sent them on to their countries of citizenship despite their fears of persecution. It noted that he did not substantiate the allegations, that the government did not deny them, and that courts in this district and across the country have recognised that the government is intentionally removing individuals to countries where they will be imprisoned. Even so, on these pleadings it had no sufficient basis to find the programme unconstitutional as a whole or punitive as applied to him, because the cases so finding were specific to a particular population and particular destination countries.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT Withholding of removal Standing Ripeness Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Diplomatic assurances ICE policy of 9 July 2025 Unconstitutional punishment D.V.D. class action

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The petitioner won release and the notice protections, and lost on punishment, without prejudice. The refusal follows the same line as Saadhom v. Bondi and Vashchuk v. Bondi. The court did not doubt that some of these removals are punishment. It said the findings to that effect were tied to particular populations and particular destinations, and that this petitioner had not connected himself to them. The Uganda and Mauritania notices recorded here are court records of what the government said it intended, not findings about conditions in either country. The court's point about Uganda was that nothing was ever done about it, which raises its own question about why the notice was served at all in the last days of the removal period. The account of the Ghana removals is the petitioner's allegation as the court recorded it, sourced to a magazine article. It is not a finding. The findings on Ghana are in D.A. v. Noem, recorded separately in this register.

W.D. Wash. December 15, 2025 Third country: None identified in the order. The government was seeking a travel document from Vietnam.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted. Immediate release ordered on the conditions of his most recent order of supervision, with no re-detention until notice and a hearing before an immigration judge. Removal prohibited to a country other than Vietnam without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in reopened removal proceedings before an immigration judge, and to any country where he is likely to face imprisonment or other punishment on arrival.

The petitioner, a citizen of Vietnam admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 1990, was ordered removed to Vietnam in April 2006 and placed on an order of supervision in January 2008 because ICE could not obtain travel documents from Vietnam. There was no indication that he failed to comply with his conditions, but his supervision was revoked and he was arrested on 5 August 2025. The court recorded that he “was apparently swept back into custody during an ICE surge in immigrant re-detentions.” He had been detained for just over four months, within the six-month period treated as presumptively reasonable, but the court held the presumption rebuttable and found his removal not reasonably foreseeable. It found “no indication that respondents made an individualized determination that Mr. Wana, as opposed to a generic Vietnamese immigrant, was likely to be removed in a reasonable period of time,” and that he “is of mixed parentage, has no documentation verifying his Vietnamese identity, has two criminal convictions, and has no family, connections, or resources to assist his return to Vietnam.” The government’s declaration was held inadmissible because it was not subscribed under penalty of perjury and because the deportation officer showed no personal knowledge of agreements between the two countries. On the re-detention, ICE had given notice and an informal interview, which “seems to be all that is required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).” Following E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, the court held that “Those meager procedures do not, however, provide the process due under the Fifth Amendment.” The government argued the third-country claims were not ripe because ICE was seeking travel documents to Vietnam. The court held that ICE’s internal memorandum of 9 July 2025 on third-country removals, the likelihood that he would not be issued travel documents to Vietnam, and “the recent third-country deportations of hundreds of immigrants, including pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants,” gave rise to “an imminent threat that Mr. Wana will face third-country removal.” Applying Aden v. Nielsen, it required reopened removal proceedings before any third-country removal. Adopting the reasoning of Nguyen v. Scott, the court found “that the government is intentionally removing noncitizens to countries with which they have no connection, often in contravention of the governing statute and regulations, and knowing that they will be subject to imprisonment or other punishment.” It prohibited removal “to any country where he is likely to face imprisonment or other punishment upon arrival.”

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Compliance with regulations Informal interview Due process Pre-deprivation hearing Travel documents Ripeness Third-country removal ICE policy of 9 July 2025 Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing

Caution A district court decision, binding only on the parties. The punitive finding was made by adopting the reasoning of Nguyen v. Scott, not on evidence about a destination specific to this petitioner, and no third country had been named. The court held that the petitioner had not proven a violation of the re-detention regulations themselves; relief on re-detention rests on due process. In a footnote the court said it disagreed with cases holding that the six-month period runs from the final removal order whether or not the person is in custody.

W.D. Wash. December 4, 2025 Final order 4 Dec 2025: 815 F. Supp. 3d 1191; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250760; 2025 WL 3484769. Preliminary injunction 7 Nov 2025: 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220311; 2025 WL 3123991. Earlier order 23 Oct 2025: 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209241; 2025 WL 2987766. Third country: Any third country where imprisonment was likely

Disposition Habeas petition granted. Release ordered on conditions of supervision. Removal to any third country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm enjoined. Government appeal voluntarily dismissed 7 April 2026; injunction stands.

Decided in two stages by Judge Lasnik. On 7 November 2025 the court granted a preliminary injunction on the notice and procedure claim, but refused the punitive claim, holding that the record before it lacked the specificity and examples regarding third-country imprisonment that were present in Nguyen v. Scott. On 4 December 2025, on a fuller record, the court granted the habeas petition, ordered release on conditions, and held that the practice of third-country removal paired with imprisonment is intended to be punitive and violates due process under Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236-38 (1896) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001). Wong Wing struck down a provision of the Chinese Exclusion Act imposing imprisonment at hard labour before removal, holding that Congress may expel but may not add infamous punishment without a trial by jury, and distinguishing detention while awaiting deportation from punishment. Adopting the formulation used four days earlier in Hambarsonpour v. Bondi, the court ordered the government not to remove the petitioner to any third country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm. The petitioner held deferral of removal to Nicaragua under the Convention against Torture, had been detained about twenty-four months, and the government had not requested travel documents from any third country. Two further passages matter. The court set out at length the account given in D.A. v. Noem, in which Judge Chutkan of the District of Columbia described five people who held withholding or deferral of removal being woken in the middle of the night at an ICE facility, shackled, put aboard a United States military cargo plane and flown to Ghana, a country none had any connection to, and taken to Dema Camp, described as a remote open-air detention facility surrounded by armed military guards. Judge Chutkan wrote that the case was "not an outlier" but part of what appeared to be "a pattern and widespread effort to evade the government's legal obligations by doing indirectly what it cannot do directly." Judge Lasnik called that account deeply concerning. Second, the court declined to go further. It recorded the petitioner's concern that the government is using third states as bridge countries to send people onward to the very country a United States immigration court has barred removal to, said it shared that concern, but found no sufficiently clear evidence of punitive intent on that record. It noted that the argument could be made in the reopened removal proceedings its own order required.

Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Infamous punishment Third-country removal Fifth Amendment due process Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT CAT deferral Notice Reopened removal proceedings

Caution The government appealed on 30 January 2026 and then withdrew the appeal. On 7 April 2026 the Ninth Circuit granted the appellant's own motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and ordered that the dismissal order serve as the mandate. No. 26-10166, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10166. The judgment was never reviewed on its merits and was never reversed. The injunction stands, and the government chose not to test it on appeal. The punitive holding in this line of cases traces back to Nguyen v. Scott, decided on 21 August 2025. This opinion records that Nguyen was voluntarily dismissed by its petitioner the following month after an agreement between the parties, and so never reached a merits decision. The findings that Abubaka, Hambarsonpour and this case all rest on were therefore made at the preliminary injunction stage of a case that was then settled. That does not make them wrong, and three courts have since adopted them on their own records, but anyone relying on this line should know where it begins. Note also the sequence within this case: the same judge refused the punitive claim in November for want of specific evidence about imprisonment in destination countries, and granted it in December once that evidence was supplied. The petitioner had twenty-four convictions and still obtained the injunction, because the protection does not depend on the record of the person invoking it. The court's refusal to find punitive intent in the use of bridge countries is a limit on the decision and is recorded above rather than left out.

D.N.M. December 4, 2025 Third country: In 2025 the government asked El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Peru to accept him; Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Peru declined. It also contacted ICE’s Middle East/East Africa Removal Division. Several countries, not named, declined in 2016 and 2017. The court recorded that at least five countries declined to accept him between 2016 and 2025.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted. Respondents ordered to release the petitioner within 24 hours and to restore his order of supervision on the terms in place before 14 February 2025.

The petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed to Mexico on 26 May 2016 and at the same time granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, “based on testimony and evidence that his life would be in danger if he returned to Mexico.” The government held him while it sought a third country and, after several countries declined, released him on an order of supervision on 9 March 2017. He missed an ICE appointment on 1 March 2023. On 14 February 2025 he was arrested at a Border Patrol checkpoint in New Mexico and detained at the Otero County Processing Center while the government again sought a third country. In June 2025 his former counsel asked to drop the deferral so he could be removed to Mexico; an immigration judge granted reopening and termination on 17 September 2025 without addressing his later motion to withdraw that request, and his appeal is pending. The court recorded that “the parties agreed that Petitioner’s CAT deferral remains legally operative during the pendency of the BIA appeal.” The court rejected the government’s argument that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) and (b)(9) barred review: “The government’s detention of Petitioner lacks the direct link to his removal proceedings or to the execution of his removal order to fall under the ambit of § 1252(g) or § 1252(b)(9).” It counted the four months he spent in detention in 2016 and 2017 toward the six-month period under Zadvydas v. Davis, stating that it “is disinclined to allow such gamesmanship by the government.” On the prospect of removal, the court found: “The government has also not been able to identify a third country to accept Petitioner.” It added that “between 2016 and 2025, at least five countries have declined to accept him,” and that even if a country agreed, “Petitioner may be entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek protection from removal, further prolonging his detention should he be allowed to remain in custody.” It held: “Because Petitioner has been detained more than six months and his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, his ongoing detention violates the INA.” It excused the failure to seek administrative review under 8 C.F.R. 241.13. The court did not decide whether the revocation of his supervision was lawful, but noted: “The government has provided no information about who made the decision to revoke Petitioner’s Order of Supervision, and whether it complied with § 241.4(l)(2) such that no notice or hearing was required.”

CAT deferral Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Jurisdiction 1252(g) Notice Informal interview

Caution Release rests on prolonged detention under Zadvydas alone. The court expressly did not decide whether the arrest and the revocation of supervision without notice or an interview were lawful, and it did not grant the requested order requiring notice and an opportunity to seek protection before any removal to a third country. The deferral was the subject of a pending appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals; the government argued that he would already have been removed to Mexico if not for that appeal. The court’s docket text records that the main document was replaced on 5 December 2025 at chambers’ request; the copy read is the court’s copy of Doc. 30, filed 4 December 2025, as published on govinfo.gov, and it matches the web printout on the site in substance.

European Court of Human Rights December 4, 2025 Third country: Belarus. The applicants complained that the Polish authorities ignored their requests for international protection and “pushed them back to the Belarusian side of the border”.

Disposition The Court took note of the friendly settlement and decided unanimously “to strike the applications out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 39 of the Convention”. Poland undertook to pay EUR 20,000 “jointly to the five applicants, who form one household”, and the applicants agreed “to waive any further claims against Poland in respect of the facts giving rise to these applications”. The decision was notified in writing on 8 January 2026.

The applicants complained under Articles 2 and 3, alone and with Article 13, “that the Polish authorities had ignored their requests for international protection and that, instead, they had pushed them back to the Belarusian side of the border. As the Belarusian authorities forced them back towards the Polish side, the applicants were stranded in the border forest area without access to medical aid, food, water, and shelter and in harsh weather conditions including frequent rains and low temperatures.” Their further complaints included detention under Article 5, Article 8 and collective expulsion under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (appended table). The parties signed friendly-settlement declarations, which the Court received in February 2025 (appended table). The Court was “satisfied that the settlement is based on respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols” and struck the applications out.

Pushbacks Access to asylum Friendly settlement Article 3 ECHR Collective expulsion Detention

Caution A friendly settlement is not a finding of a violation, and the decision makes no finding of fact; the account of events is the applicants’ complaint, and the decision does not date the events. The summary returns at the Belarusian border from the summer of 2021 are before the Grand Chamber in A.R. and Others v. Poland, to be ruled on 24 November 2026.

W.D. Wash. November 21, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229603; 2025 WL 3251155 Third country: None. The designated country of removal was France.

Disposition Petition granted. Immediate release ordered. Third-country removal enjoined without notice and reopened removal proceedings. Removal to any third country where he is likely to face imprisonment or harm enjoined as unconstitutionally punitive.

A man born in France in 1992 to Iranian refugee parents, brought to the United States at the age of nine and ordered removed to France in 2014, was held in immigration detention for more than eleven months while the government said repeatedly that French travel documents would issue soon. The court ordered his immediate release. It found the government had offered nothing beyond assertions, and it recorded months of inactivity on the file, including a failure to follow up until the French Embassy made contact some three months after the first approach. The court enjoined removal to any third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond in reopened removal proceedings. It agreed with Nguyen v. Scott and Abubaka v. Bondi that a voluntary promise by the government, even one carrying twenty-four hours of advance notice, does not protect the statutory and due process rights at stake. On the punitive question the court said it found no reason to deviate from Abubaka, and agreed with its holding that the practice of third-country removal paired with imprisonment is intended to be punitive and violates due process under Wong Wing v. United States (1896) and Zadvydas v. Davis (2001). The order it entered is worded more broadly than the one in Abubaka: the government may not remove him to a third country where he is likely to face "imprisonment or harm." The order describes the third-country removal programme itself as unconstitutionally punitive.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Delay in travel documents

Caution A decision of a single district court, binding only on the parties. It is the second decision in the same district, by a different judge, to reach the punitive holding, and it adopts that holding rather than reasoning to it independently: the underlying analysis was done in Nguyen v. Scott and in Abubaka v. Bondi four days earlier. The court treated the question as settled enough within the district that it found no reason to deviate. That is how a line of district decisions hardens, and it is not a ruling by any appellate court. The commercial reporter carried a positive signal on the decision as of September 2026. The punitive analysis this decision adopts was made in Nguyen v. Scott at the preliminary injunction stage on 21 August 2025. Nguyen was voluntarily dismissed by its petitioner the following month after an agreement between the parties and never reached a merits decision, a fact recorded in the published opinion in Baltodano v. Bondi, 815 F. Supp. 3d 1191. That does not make the findings wrong, and they have since been adopted on the records of other cases, but anyone relying on this line should know where it begins.

W.D. Tex. November 17, 2025 817 F. Supp. 3d 406

Mandatory detention reaches only a person currently seeking admission, so the petitioner, who holds Special Immigrant Juvenile status, must receive a bond hearing within fourteen days or be released.

Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing Attorney fees

Caution Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act were denied under Fifth Circuit authority holding the Act does not authorize fees for successful section 2241 motions, in contrast to the fee award in Aden v. Nielsen; no docket number is printed in the brief.

W.D. Wash. November 17, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225914; 2025 WL 3204369 Third country: No third country designated. South Sudan and Eswatini named in the record as destinations where others in the same position were sent.

Disposition Petition granted. Release on conditions of supervision ordered. Third-country removal barred without notice and reopened removal proceedings. Third-country removal paired with imprisonment held to be intended as punishment and to violate due process.

A man admitted to the United States in 1989 as the child of a refugee, ordered removed to Vietnam in 2016, and held in immigration detention for nine months and ten days, was ordered released on conditions of supervision. The court found no significant likelihood of removal to Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable future: the process for obtaining travel documents for immigrants who arrived from Vietnam before 1995 is uncertain and protracted, and the record did not show that the government had submitted a request at all, only that it was having forms translated. The court also held that the detention clock does not restart each time immigration authorities release and then re-detain the same person. The court separately barred removal to any third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond in reopened removal proceedings. It noted that the government had stated in a footnote that under its policy of 9 July 2025 it is "no longer fully following" the process the same court required in Aden v. Nielsen in 2019, and had offered no explanation for the change. On the third question the court held that the government's practice of third-country removal paired with imprisonment is intended to be punitive and therefore violates due process under Wong Wing v. United States (1896) and Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), and ordered that the petitioner not be removed to any third country where he is likely to face imprisonment on arrival. The court adopted the findings made in Nguyen v. Scott, which rested in part on sworn declarations that people removed from the United States to South Sudan and Eswatini have been imprisoned incommunicado since their arrival, and in Eswatini in solitary confinement, and on public statements by government officials describing removal as a punishment. The government did not address the merits of the punitive claim, arguing only that the question was foreclosed by other litigation, which left the court, in its own words, "with no argument from respondents to consider on this topic."

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country removal Notice Reopened removal proceedings Unconstitutional punishment Wong Wing Incommunicado detention Solitary confinement

Caution A decision of a single district court, binding on nobody but the parties. The court said as much about its own earlier ruling in Aden, which it described as persuasive rather than binding. The punitive holding rests on findings made in a different case, Nguyen v. Scott, which this court adopted rather than re-examined on its own record. It was also reached without argument from the government on the merits, which is a reason to read it closely rather than a defect in it, but it means the reasoning has not been tested against an opposing case. The commercial reporter carried a caution signal on the decision as of September 2026. The Coalition has not located any decision disturbing it, and records the signal rather than interpreting it. The punitive analysis this decision adopts was made in Nguyen v. Scott at the preliminary injunction stage on 21 August 2025. Nguyen was voluntarily dismissed by its petitioner the following month after an agreement between the parties and never reached a merits decision, a fact recorded in the published opinion in Baltodano v. Bondi, 815 F. Supp. 3d 1191. That does not make the findings wrong, and they have since been adopted on the records of other cases, but anyone relying on this line should know where it begins.

E.D. Cal. November 7, 2025 2025 WL 3123793 Third country: None identified in the order.

Disposition Preliminary injunction granted. Immediate release ordered.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement revoked the petitioner’s supervised release and re-detained her without showing changed circumstances or a significant likelihood that she would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, and without following its own regulations on the review of release decisions. The court granted an injunction and ordered her released. The passage of the decision that later courts cite gathers the earlier cases on where the burden lies, and it is that discussion, rather than the outcome, that has carried into the cases that followed.

Redetention Order of supervision Compliance with regulations Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Changed circumstances Burden of proof Due process

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. The court anonymised the petitioner to initials in the caption, so the case is filed on the public docket under a different name, Xie v. Lyons. Both names refer to the same case, and the anonymised form is the one the court itself uses in the decision.

D. Md. October 24, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: United Kingdom

Because the government produced no evidence of any step taken to effectuate removal to the United Kingdom or anywhere else, there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and the writ issues.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Third-country designation

Caution The earlier September 19, 2025 opinion in the same case, which held the court had jurisdiction and denied relief at that time, is not in the file; this order does not bar removal and does not address what process is due before a third-country removal; no reporter or unofficial citation is printed for this document; the supplied file name carries the date 20251025 although the document is dated October 24, 2025.

S.D. Tex. October 16, 2025 2025 WL 2937692 Third country: None identified in the order.

Disposition Preliminary injunction granted. Released back to the conditions of supervision he had been living under before he was re-detained.

Iyad Muhammad Abuelhawa was living under an Order of Supervision when Immigration and Customs Enforcement revoked it and re-detained him. The regulation that allows revocation requires changed circumstances making removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court held that the burden of showing this rests on the government and on nobody else: upon revocation of release, the government bears the burden to show a significant likelihood that the person may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, and the required showing, by its terms, can only be made by the government. Here it had identified no changed circumstances at all. He was ordered released back to his previous conditions.

Redetention Order of supervision Compliance with regulations Burden of proof Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Changed circumstances Due process

Caution A district court decision in the Southern District of Texas, binding on the parties only and persuasive at most anywhere else. It is recorded here because the burden question it decides recurs across this whole line of cases, and because later decisions in California cite it. A secondary research memorandum placed this case among decisions of the Northern District of California. It is not one.

N.D. Cal. October 10, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201666; 2025 WL 2899220 Third country: Jordan

Serious questions exist that the petitioner may not be detained without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, or removed to a third country without notice and an opportunity to apply for fear-based relief.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9)

Caution Preliminary injunction on a 'serious questions' showing, not a final merits ruling; issued by a magistrate judge, and the file does not state whether the parties consented; the supplied file is named for the July 26, 2025 temporary restraining order but contains the October 10, 2025 order.

S.D. Tex. September 26, 2025 2025 WL 2774610

ICE re-detained the petitioner without a shown lawful revocation, notice of reasons, or the required informal interview, and his removal is not reasonably foreseeable; release was ordered with notice required once a third country is identified.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution The third-country notice claim was held premature even as summary judgment on it was denied, and no fixed notice period was set; final judgment was to be entered separately and is not in the file; the government produced no copy of any order revoking supervision; the court noted a split on whether the six-month period resets on re-detention.

N.D. Cal. September 19, 2025 2025 WL 2689266

Due process bars re-detaining a noncitizen released after an individualized risk determination, even where detention is mandatory, without notice and a hearing on whether a material change of circumstances justifies re-detention.

Redetention Notice Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary injunction on the 'serious questions' standard, not a final judgment; the printed title reads 'Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order' although the body grants a preliminary injunction; the decretal paragraph states no forum, deadline, or burden of proof, although the body states a clear and convincing standard.

D. Md. September 19, 2025 2025 WL 2687354 Third country: United Kingdom

The court held that it had jurisdiction, that the petitioner had not yet carried his burden to show a Zadvydas violation, and ordered the government to produce information about efforts to effectuate his removal.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Third-country designation

Caution Not read directly; known only as summarised in the October 24, 2025 opinion in the same case, which later granted the writ. The brief does not separately name the judge for this order, describing it as 'this Court's' prior opinion.

N.D. Cal. September 18, 2025 2025 WL 2689853

Five noncitizens released under section 1226(a) and arrested at immigration court must be released immediately and may not be re-detained without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice Mandatory detention 1225(b)

Caution Ex parte temporary restraining order issued the same day as the arrests, with the government not heard; the court did not definitively decide whether section 1225(b) or section 1226(a) governs, saying only that it found section 1225(b)(2)(A) 'particularly doubtful'; it expired October 2, 2025 and the file contains no later order.

E.D. Cal. September 18, 2025 2025 WL 2675760 Third country: Kenya, Eritrea, Somalia, or Benin (mentioned to the petitioner; none secured)

The court enjoined third-country removal without written notice, a minimum of ten days to raise a Convention Against Torture claim, and reopening or fifteen days to seek reopening, but declined to order release under Zadvydas.

Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Withholding of removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Bond hearing Jurisdiction 1252(g) Diplomatic assurances

Caution Preliminary injunction converted from a temporary restraining order with merits briefing to follow, although the decretal paragraph says 'permanently enjoined'; the bond hearing within 30 days, which the government requested, appears in the analysis but not in the numbered decretal paragraphs; the judge is not named anywhere in the printout; the assurances material comes from the court's quotation of ICE's July 9, 2025 policy, not from any assurance in this case.

N.D. Cal. September 15, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: None identified in the orders read.

Disposition Temporary restraining order 14 June 2025. Preliminary injunction 15 September 2025. The government has appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 25-7196, where the matter is pending.

Aroldo Alberto Rodriguez Diaz had been released from immigration custody. When the government moved to re-detain him, the court held that he had raised serious questions on his claim that he holds a protected liberty interest in remaining at liberty, that due process therefore entitles him to notice and a hearing before he is taken back into custody, and that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in his favour. A restraining order issued the same day the application was made. A preliminary injunction followed in September.

Redetention Due process Notice Custody hearing Bond hearing Appeal pending

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only, and the only decision in this register currently known to be on appeal. The government has taken it to the Ninth Circuit, No. 25-7196. If that court rules, this entry will be behind the law until it is updated. The orders read do not mention the Convention against Torture, third-country removal, or an Order of Supervision; a secondary research memorandum described this case as involving all three, and it does not.

N.D. Cal. September 12, 2025 2025 WL 2637503

An asylum seeker released on her own recognizance is detained under section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), and due process entitles her to a pre-deprivation bond hearing before any re-arrest.

Redetention Notice Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary injunction, not a final judgment; substantive due process claims were expressly not reached; the country of origin is printed throughout as 'Columbia'; the decretal language, unlike the earlier temporary restraining order, does not repeat the word 'notice'.

W.D. Wash. September 11, 2025 2025 WL 2637750

Total detention exceeding six months is not presumptively reasonable, and the petitioner is likely to show no significant likelihood of removal to Vietnam because he facially fails the memorandum of understanding's eligibility conditions; release ordered.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas)

Caution Preliminary injunction on likelihood of success, entered while the habeas petition and the government's motion to dismiss remained pending; the request for an order barring future arrest was denied; the two supplied files are duplicates of the same order and are merged into this one entry; the statelessness finding rests on a 1983 document and the petitioner's testimony, and the court decided the point only on likelihood of success.

N.D. Cal. September 9, 2025 2025 WL 2615063

Two petitioners released years earlier under a class bail process are likely to succeed on a due process claim that they may not be re-detained without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice

Caution Ex parte temporary restraining order on a preliminary record, with the government not yet heard; it expired September 23, 2025 and the file contains no later order; the order contains no third-country discussion, no protection grant, and no country of proposed removal, and the court did not identify the governing detention statute.

S.D. Fla. September 9, 2025 824 F. Supp. 3d 1243

The revocation itself was authorized under section 241.4(l)(2)(iii), but the check-in desk conversation was not the required informal interview after return to custody, so seventy-five days of detention without a meaningful opportunity to be heard violated due process.

Redetention Informal interview Notice CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution Section 241.4 applied rather than section 241.13 because the petitioner never obtained a section 241.13 determination; the court flagged its disagreement with Chavez Barrios v. Ripa, a decision of the same district, on whether section 241.4(l)(1) process attaches to an (l)(2) revocation; the court retained jurisdiction to enforce.

D. Md. September 8, 2025 2025 WL 2592543 Third country: Australia and Romania

Detention is not authorized by section 1231(a)(6) because, with withholding granted as to Iran and no response from Australia or Romania, there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding of removal Third-country designation Notice Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution The six-month Zadvydas presumption was assumed without deciding to apply; the third-country notice claim was stayed because the petitioner is a D.V.D. class member, so the court did not rule on what process is due before a third-country removal; the separate order carrying the decretal terms of release is not in the file.

N.D. Cal. September 6, 2025 2025 WL 2578275

A lawful permanent resident released in 2020 and arrested at his home must be released immediately and may not be re-detained without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice

Caution Ex parte temporary restraining order entered the same day as the arrest, without a government response; it expired September 20, 2025; the order identifies no detention statute, no removal order, and no country of removal, and does not state the petitioner's citizenship, which the September 19, 2025 order in the same case gives as Cambodia.

C.D. Cal. September 3, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809; 2025 WL 4666804

The revocation notice was not individualized and stated no reasons, and ICE's belief that removal was now possible was no changed circumstance; release was ordered and re-detention or removal barred without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Redetention Notice Informal interview CAT deferral Third-country designation

Caution Temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on a preliminary record; the Form I-294 account reaches the court through a declaration by the petitioner's brother relaying a telephone call and is the record before the court, not a judicial finding; the brief warns that the 'border on the Kafkaesque' quotation in this order follows an ambiguous 'Id.' and is now traced to Roble v. Bondi at 772.

C.D. Cal. August 28, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168233; 2025 LX 356195

The court set a briefing schedule and enjoined the government from removing the petitioner to Iran or to any third country.

Redetention Third-country designation Notice

Caution The brief describes this order only through its identification of the three decisions in the case and the Form I-294 account it records; it names Walter, D.J. and Bristow, M.J. for the case without attributing this order to either, so the judge field is left empty.

W.D. La. August 27, 2025 2025 WL 2472136

A noncitizen present since 2005 and taken into custody as she left her immigration hearing is likely detained under section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2)(A), and must receive an individualized bond hearing or be released.

Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary posture, with the habeas petition still pending; the separate motion for release was denied and release was ordered only if the bond hearing was not held by September 5, 2025, and the outcome of that hearing is not in the file; the order does not separately label the relief as a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.

S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2025 798 F. Supp. 3d 400

The government gave no notice of revocation and no interview before re-detaining a man released in 2018, violating its own regulations and due process; release was ordered, and transfer after filing did not defeat jurisdiction.

Redetention Notice Informal interview Jurisdiction 1252(g) Transfer out of district

Caution Granted in part. The court's description of Westley v. Harper as reaching the merits of the section 241.4(l) claim is in tension with the project's earlier note that Westley was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and the brief directs that neither characterisation be published until the Westley opinion itself is read.

D. Minn. August 25, 2025 803 F. Supp. 3d 766

ICE's notice merely parroted the regulation and gave no individualized reasons for re-detention, and the government bore and failed to carry the burden of showing changed circumstances; release ordered.

Redetention Notice CAT deferral Third-country designation

Caution The court declined a forward-looking injunction against future re-detention and declined class-wide relief because the petitioner had not sued as a class. The brief establishes that the 'border on the Kafkaesque' quotation belongs to this decision at 772 and not to Nouri v. Herrera or Gonzalez v. Noem.

N.D. Cal. August 22, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. A full-text search of the decision returns no occurrence of the phrase.

Disposition Temporary restraining order 8 August 2025. Preliminary injunction 22 August 2025.

Carolina Ortiz Calderon had applied for asylum, for withholding of removal and for protection under the Convention against Torture, and had been released on her own recognisance. On her re-detention the court held, in its own words, that the government "may not re-detain Ortiz Calderon during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court without providing her with a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge", and that detention requires clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger together with a showing that no lesser conditions would suffice.

Redetention Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Asylum Withholding of removal CAT

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. Her protection claims are recorded in the order as background. What was decided is the detention question alone. There is no holding here about removal to a third country and the phrase does not appear in the decision.

W.D. Wash. August 21, 2025 2025 WL 2419288

The court found the petitioner likely to succeed on his Zadvydas claim and ordered his release, rejected the argument that detention must be consecutive, and found ICE's third-country removal policy likely inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Notice

Caution Not read directly; described and quoted in the printouts of Tang v. Bondi, Villanueva v. Tate, and Y.T.D. v. Andrews, and in the D.V.D. indicative ruling. Tang distinguished it. Evidence recited in Tang indicates Vietnam issued a travel document for this petitioner on September 3, 2025, after the order.

N.D. Cal. August 21, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Guatemala was the country in dispute, by a determination that he could be removed there.

Disposition Preliminary injunction granted. The government barred from re-detaining him during the proceedings without a hearing before an immigration judge first.

Juan Edelmar Alva Alva was released on an Order of Supervision on 3 December 2018 and lived under it for nearly seven years. He did not challenge his final order of removal. What was in dispute was a determination that he could be removed to Guatemala. He was re-detained, and a restraining order of 7 August 2025 secured his release. The court then held that a person who has been at liberty on an Order of Supervision for that length of time has a liberty interest in remaining at liberty, and that the government may not re-detain him during the proceedings without first giving him a hearing before an immigration judge to decide whether detention is warranted on grounds of flight risk or danger to the community.

Redetention Order of supervision Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Third-country designation Notice

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. The order decides the detention question and does not decide whether he may lawfully be removed to Guatemala. It does not address protection under the Convention against Torture.

N.D. Cal. August 21, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. A full-text search of the decision returns no occurrence of the phrase.

Disposition Preliminary injunction granted. Re-detention enjoined without notice and a hearing; transfer or removal during the case enjoined.

The government placed Paula Sofia Ramirez Clavijo in full removal proceedings and released her on her own recognisance. It then sought to move her into expedited removal, a track with far fewer protections. The court held that having put her in full proceedings and released her, the government had given her a protected liberty interest and could not retroactively switch her to the expedited track. It enjoined the government from re-detaining her without notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and from transferring or removing her while the case runs.

Redetention Due process Expedited removal Liberty interest Custody hearing Transfer

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. It is about which removal track a person may be placed in and about re-detention. It is not about removal to a third country, and the phrase does not appear in the decision.

E.D. Cal. August 20, 2025 2025 WL 2791778

The re-detention was unlawful because ICE gave no informal interview and showed no changed circumstances making removal to China reasonably foreseeable; release was ordered and re-detention barred without notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g)

Caution Temporary restraining order granted in part on a preliminary record, with a preliminary-injunction schedule to follow; the request to enjoin third-country removal was denied without prejudice as not ripe; the order introduces 'five claims' and then lists six, and several regulatory citations are printed irregularly.

S.D. Fla. August 18, 2025

Disposition Fifth Amendment claim dismissed as moot. First Amendment claims transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida for improper venue.

The case concerned the operations of the Florida detention facility commonly called Alligator Alcatraz. The court opened its order by locating it: “This case involves the operations of Alligator Alcatraz, a detention facility designed by the State of Florida and located in Collier County, in the Middle District of Florida.” Detained plaintiffs, together with attorneys and organisations, alleged that state and federal officials had blocked confidential communication between people held at the facility and their lawyers, in breach of the First Amendment. A group of the detained plaintiffs separately alleged that the Executive Office for Immigration Review had breached the Fifth Amendment by failing to identify an immigration court with jurisdiction over their cases. The court dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim: “The Fifth Amendment claim is moot and must be dismissed.” It had been “premised entirely on the contention that ‘Defendants have failed to identify which immigration court has jurisdiction over Alligator Alcatraz.’” Two days before the order the government had given notice that the Executive Office for Immigration Review had designated Krome as the administrative control court for the facility. The court rejected both the capable-of-repetition and the voluntary-cessation exceptions. The court did not decide the First Amendment claims. It held that venue was improper: “Plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie showing that the alleged events substantially occurred here, in the Southern District of Florida.” The claims were transferred to the Middle District of Florida, where the facility sits. The court noted that the airport on which the facility was built “mostly sits in Collier County, though a small portion of the runway juts into Miami-Dade County.”

Access to counsel First Amendment Fifth Amendment Immigration court jurisdiction Venue Mootness Conditions of detention

Caution This decision settles where the case is heard and whether one claim survives. It makes no finding about conditions at the facility and no finding about the treatment of anyone held there. A reporter citation for this decision, 796 F. Supp. 3d 1198, is in circulation. The Coalition has not been able to verify it against any primary source and does not reproduce it. The docket number and the date above are verified from the court record. The transferred case continued in the Middle District of Florida as H.C.R. v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-00747, recorded separately in this register.

N.D. Cal. August 16, 2025 2025 WL 2453968

The court ordered the government to release the petitioner, to refrain from re-detaining her without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and to refrain from removing her from the United States.

Redetention Notice

Caution Not read directly; known only from the September 12, 2025 preliminary-injunction order's recital of its terms and from an editorial history note, which lists it under the name 'Aceros v. Kaiser'. Extensions of this order on August 25 and September 4, 2025 are noted in that opinion and are not registered here.

S.D. Fla. August 8, 2025 2025 WL 2280485; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153228 Third country: Guatemala

The emergency motion was denied: section 241.4(l)(2) required no notice or interview and both were in fact given, the Zadvydas claim was premature, and the regulatory stay barred removal to Mexico only.

Redetention Informal interview Notice Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Third-country designation Jurisdiction 1252(g) Transfer out of district Bond hearing

Caution The brief records that this decision resolves the project's ledger claim 10 against the version previously carried: the motion was denied, and no appellate stay is supported, only the district court's interim order of June 12, 2025 staying transfer and removal. The decision splits from Grigorian, Zhu, Ceesay and Torres on whether section 241.4(l)(1) process attaches to an (l)(2) revocation, and from Gonzalez v. Noem and Zhu on jurisdiction to restrain a transfer.

N.D. Cal. August 6, 2025 2025 WL 2243616

Serious questions exist that due process bars detention or removal to any third country without notice and an opportunity to present a fear-based claim; sections 1252(g), (a)(5), (b)(9) and FARRA do not bar review.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation CAT deferral Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Jurisdiction 1252(g) Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Jurisdiction 1252(b)(9)

Caution Preliminary injunction on the 'serious questions' standard, converted from a temporary restraining order by consent; every merits finding is framed as a serious question and none is final; no third country is identified anywhere in the file, and the court did not identify the governing detention statute by number.

Court of Justice of the European Union August 1, 2025 ECLI:EU:C:2025:591 Third country: Albania. Held in the Gjadër detention centre under the protocol between Italy and Albania, under which Albania made available two areas of its territory “which fall entirely within the competence of the Italian authorities” (paragraph 20). They applied for international protection there on 16 October 2024 (paragraph 21).

Disposition The Court (Grand Chamber) ruled that Articles 36 and 37 and Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, do not preclude a Member State “from designating third countries as safe countries of origin by means of a legislative act, provided that that designation can be subject to judicial review” by any court hearing an action against a decision taken under the special scheme for applicants from such countries; that the Member State must ensure “sufficient and adequate access” to the sources of information on which the designation is based, for the applicant and for the court, and that the court may take account of information it has gathered itself, provided that it is reliable and the adversarial principle is observed; and that Article 37 precludes a Member State “from designating as a safe country of origin a third country which does not satisfy, for certain categories of persons, the material conditions for such a designation”. The two cases go back to the Tribunale ordinario di Roma for decision.

LC and CP were rescued at sea by the Italian authorities and “taken to Albania, where they were placed in the Gjadër detention centre” (paragraph 20). On 17 October 2024 their applications were rejected under an accelerated border procedure “on the ground that LC and CP came from a safe country of origin”. “The detention orders were not validated by the court having jurisdiction and the applicants were, therefore, released” (paragraph 22). In Italy they challenged the decisions before the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (paragraph 23). Since Italy’s Decree-Law No 158/2024 of 23 October 2024, the list of safe countries of origin, which includes Bangladesh, has appeared in a legislative act rather than in an interministerial decree (paragraphs 18, 19 and 25). The Rome court was uncertain whether that designation was compatible with EU law, in the Court’s summary because it “stems from a legislative act, that the Italian legislature did not disclose its sources of information and that it maintained the option to make that designation even though that third country may not be ‘safe’ for certain categories of its population” (paragraph 39). The Court of Justice held that designation by legislation is allowed only if a court can review it, that the sources behind it must be accessible, and that under the directive a country may be designated safe only if it is generally safe for its whole population: the directive expresses “the choice of the EU legislature to make the designation of a safe country of origin subject to the condition that the third country is generally safe for its entire population and not only for a part of it” (paragraph 96).

Safe country of origin Border procedure Accelerated procedure Offshore processing Effective remedy Judicial review Detention

Caution A preliminary ruling interprets EU law; the Tribunale ordinario di Roma decides the two cases. The Court did not decide whether Bangladesh is safe. Its third point applies Directive 2013/32. Regulation 2024/1348, which applies to applications lodged from 12 June 2026, allows a designation “with exceptions for specific parts of its territory or clearly identifiable categories of persons”, and the Court said it was for the EU legislature to choose when that rule takes effect (paragraphs 15, 17, 106 and 107). The case concerns the designation applied in the centres in Albania, not detention there; the opinions of two Advocates General on detention in the centres are reported in the Coalition’s story of 11 June 2026.

W.D. Wash. July 30, 2025 2025 WL 2165995

The court restrained removal to any country other than Vietnam pending a preliminary-injunction ruling, relief the government did not oppose, and denied immediate release as falling outside the limited purpose of a temporary restraining order.

Redetention Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country designation

Caution Interim order that replaced a July 25, 2025 ex parte order and was to last only until a written order on the preliminary injunction; the court expressly declined to elaborate on the merits of the third-country claims and gave the government more time to rebut the Zadvydas showing; the government conceded that its revocation notice was incorrect; the Tang order cites this decision as decided July 20, 2025 although the document reads 'Signed July 30, 2025'.

N.D. Cal. July 26, 2025 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143161 Third country: Jordan

The court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the government from re-detaining the petitioner without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice

Caution Not read directly; known only through the October 10, 2025 order, which quotes a single phrase from it and records that it was granted by 'the duty judge' and that the parties stipulated it would remain in effect pending the later ruling.

N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. No third country appears in this decision.

Disposition Temporary restraining order and order to show cause 4 July 2025. Preliminary injunction 24 July 2025.

Frescia Garro Pinchi had been released on bond. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested her again, without a warrant, at a courthouse. The court held that a person previously released on bond holds a protected liberty interest, that she was therefore likely to succeed on her claim that due process entitles her to a hearing before a neutral immigration judge before any re-arrest, and that the government may not re-detain her absent clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger to the community.

Redetention Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Arrest at a courthouse

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. It is about warrantless re-arrest and the right to a hearing before re-detention. It does not concern a final order of removal, protection under the Convention against Torture, or removal to a third country. The case is now docketed as Garro Pinchi v. Mullin after a change of respondent; the surname is Garro Pinchi, not Pinchi.

N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025 Investigating. No reporter citation established. Third country: Not in issue. No third country appears in this decision.

Disposition Temporary restraining order 30 June 2025, extended to 17 July. Preliminary injunction 17 July 2025.

The petitioner holds a final administrative order of removal and has proceedings on withholding of removal and protection under the Convention against Torture on foot. What the court decided was narrower than that background suggests. It enjoined and restrained the government from re-detaining him without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, held before he is taken into custody, to evaluate whether re-detention is warranted on grounds of flight risk or danger to the community.

Redetention Due process Bond hearing Custody hearing Withholding of removal CAT

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. The petitioner’s protection claims form the background to the case and are not what was decided. There is no holding here about removal to a third country. The case appears on the public docket under the petitioner’s full name, Reyes v. Kaiser; the anonymised form used here is the one the court uses in the caption of its own order.

E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025 2025 WL 1993771 Third country: None identified. The government said only that it intended to pursue a travel document.

Disposition Temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction granted. Immediate release from custody. Re-detention and removal to a third country enjoined without notice and an opportunity for a hearing.

Quoc Chi Hoac had a final order of removal to Vietnam from September 2023 and had been released on an Order of Supervision. In June 2025 he was re-detained. Immigration and Customs Enforcement may revoke supervised release only on a showing of changed circumstances making removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government offered its intention to seek a travel document. The court held that this was not enough: "Respondents’ intent to eventually complete a travel document request for Petitioner does not constitute a changed circumstance", and the fact that the government intends to complete such a request does not make it significantly likely that the person will be removed in the foreseeable future. He was ordered released, and the government was barred from re-detaining him or removing him to a third country without notice and an opportunity for a hearing.

Redetention Order of supervision Compliance with regulations Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Third-country removal Notice Due process Changed circumstances

Caution A district court decision, binding on the parties only. An earlier application for a restraining order in the same case had been refused on 30 June 2025, so the sequence matters when the case is cited. The order does not address protection under the Convention against Torture, and nothing in it turns on that.

N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025 2025 WL 1940179

A man released on bond in 2013 and detained at a scheduled ICE interview must be released immediately and may not be re-detained without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

Redetention Notice Transfer out of district

Caution Ex parte temporary restraining order on a preliminary record, with the government not heard; it expired July 25, 2025 and the file contains no later order; the decretal language contains no removal bar and omits the transfer bar the petitioner requested in the alternative; the nature of the 2019 conviction is not in the record.

S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025 2025 WL 1895479

The court denied a temporary restraining order.

Redetention

Caution The brief records this decision only by date and citation in its identification of the case and does not describe its reasoning; the docket and judge given here are those the brief gives for the case as a whole. The petition was later granted on September 9, 2025.

N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025 2025 WL 1771438

The court granted a temporary restraining order against arrest, detention, and third-country removal without notice and a hearing, while giving the government an opportunity for further briefing and a hearing.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation

Caution Not read directly; known from the recital in the August 6, 2025 preliminary-injunction order in the same case and from a parenthetical description in the Nguyen v. Scott printout. It ran until July 10, 2025, was extended by stipulation, and was superseded by the August 6 injunction.

D.N.J. June 24, 2025 Third country: Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Honduras during the removal period that began in December 2022 (Guatemala and the Dominican Republic declined; Honduras did not respond). Canada, Guatemala and Honduras after re-detention, by requests of 12 May 2025; each had refused by the hearing of 9 June 2025.

Disposition Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted on the Zadvydas claim and the petitioner ordered released under appropriate conditions of supervised release. This written opinion supplements the court’s ruling on the record and its release order of 9 June 2025.

On 15 December 2022 an immigration judge ordered the petitioner removed but granted withholding of removal to Mexico, the only country of which he is a citizen. During the 90-day removal period ICE asked Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Honduras to accept him; Guatemala and the Dominican Republic declined and Honduras never responded, and he was released on an order of supervision on 15 March 2023. On 28 March 2025 ICE re-detained him at a regularly scheduled check-in in Newark; the respondents alleged that revocation was warranted because he “failed to provide written travel document requests or acceptance letters from alternate countries to facilitate his removal.” His petition was filed on 2 April 2025 while he was in transit to Texas and ICE had not told his lawyers where he was. The court applied the unknown custodian exception, finding that “his custodian was, for all practical purposes, unknown at the time of filing. This not only deprived Petitioner of meaningful access to counsel and the courts, but also rendered any attempt to seek habeas relief during transit impossible if the Court applied the district of confinement and immediate custodian rules.” The court rejected the argument that a challenge before six months of detention is premature, noting that “a detainee might be able to show that he is barred from returning to his country of origin and that no other country is willing to accept him.” It recorded that ICE made no inquiry to any country between March 2023 and the re-detention, and that “Respondents offer no explanation for the lack of any efforts whatsoever to remove Petitioner during this two-year period of time.” ICE did not ask Canada, Guatemala and Honduras until 12 May 2025; Guatemala replied that it had “not received instructions about accepting migrants from other nationalities,” and by the 9 June 2025 hearing all three had refused. ICE conceded that “Petitioner’s removal is not, at present, imminent.” The court also considered evidence that third-country removal of people granted withholding is rare, finding that “the data nevertheless supports the general inference that removal for this particular class of detainees is substantially more difficult.” It held that the petitioner “has sufficiently established that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable and that his detention has exceeded the ‘period reasonably necessary to secure [his] removal,’” overcoming the presumption for his 164-day detention. It rejected as lacking credibility a danger argument first raised at the hearing, and removed a location monitoring condition from the proposed release order.

Redetention Revocation of supervision Order of supervision Withholding of removal Third-country removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Burden of proof Travel documents Transfer out of district Access to counsel Habeas jurisdiction

Caution The release order was entered on 9 June 2025 (ECF No. 23) after a ruling on the record; this opinion of 24 June 2025 gives the written reasons. The court released the petitioner on his detention claim and declined to address his claims about the revocation of supervised release and the commencement of removal proceedings. The account of his transfer to Texas rests on email exchanges whose authenticity the respondents did not dispute.

W.D. Wash. April 24, 2025 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239

A noncitizen who entered without inspection and was arrested while living in the United States is likely detained under section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), and must receive a bond hearing within fourteen days.

Mandatory detention 1225(b) Bond hearing

Caution Preliminary injunction on the named plaintiff's individual statutory claim; the order does not certify a class and is not a final ruling on the section 1225(b)(2) versus section 1226(a) question, and the court said the government would have a full opportunity to brief that question later; immediate release was declined in favour of a bond hearing; the plaintiff's country of citizenship is not stated; the decision was later distinguished in Martinez v. Scott (W.D. Wash., 27 August 2025).

U.S. June 13, 2022 596 U.S. 543 (2022) Third country: None. The question was detention authority and the scope of relief, not destination.

Disposition Judgments of the Ninth Circuit reversed and the cases remanded. The Court held that section 1252(f)(1) deprived the district courts of jurisdiction to grant class-wide injunctions requiring bond hearings for people detained under section 1231(a)(6).

The respondents had been detained under section 1231(a)(6) while they sought withholding of removal after their earlier removal orders were reinstated. In two class actions, district courts in California and Washington ordered bond hearings for the class members after six months of detention; the Northern District of California “enjoined [the Government] from detaining [respondents] and the class members pursuant to section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a bond hearing.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed both. The Supreme Court reversed on a threshold question. It held that section 1252(f)(1) “generally prohibits lower courts from entering injunctions that order federal officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out the specified statutory provisions,” with one exception: lower courts retain authority to “enjoin or restrain the operation of” those provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” The Court concluded: “It is sufficient to hold that the classwide injunctive relief awarded in these cases was unlawful.” The opinion refers to the companion case decided the same day, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, for the detention authority under section 1231(a)(6).

Section 1252(f)(1) Class relief Bond hearing Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Withholding-only proceedings Reinstated removal orders Detention pending removal

Caution The Court decided only the availability of class-wide injunctive relief. It did not decide whether people detained under section 1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings, and it left individual relief untouched by its own terms. The Court also said it had no occasion to decide whether section 1252(f)(1) reaches declaratory relief. The text read is the slip opinion, which is subject to formal revision.

U.S. June 29, 2021 594 U.S. 523; 141 S. Ct. 2271 Third country: None (the question was detention authority, not destination)

Reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court held that the detention of a person whose earlier removal order has been reinstated after unlawful reentry is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, not § 1226, so such people are not entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge while their withholding-only proceedings are pending. On the effect of a withholding grant, the Court said the removal order “remains in full force, and DHS retains the authority to remove the alien to any other country authorized by the statute,” a list the Court sets out that ends with “any country willing to accept the alien.” And: “In short, withholding-only relief is country-specific. It relates to where an alien may be removed. It says nothing, however, about the antecedent question whether an alien is to be removed from the United States.” 594 U.S. 536. Justice Breyer, dissenting for three, would have held that § 1226 governs and that a bond hearing is required.

Detention authority Reinstated removal orders Withholding-only proceedings Bond hearing Section 1226 and section 1231 Country-specific nature of withholding Contrary authority

Caution Contrary authority, included because it cuts against the argument rather than for it, and anyone relying on the cases in this collection should read it first. The question presented was which of two detention statutes applies during withholding-only proceedings. Revocation of an order of supervision, notice of a third-country designation, and the reliability of diplomatic assurances were not before the Court and are not addressed in the opinion.

W.D. Wash. December 6, 2019 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210865; 2019 WL 6683512 Third country: Somalia

The government's position was not substantially justified, and the court awarded $36,720 in fees and $2,170 in expenses at $450 per hour under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Attorney fees Notice Third-country designation

Caution Fees were denied for the unsuccessful motion-to-enforce phase. The brief notes that a Fifth Circuit decision cited elsewhere in the collection holds the Act does not authorize fees for successful section 2241 motions, so fee recovery depends on the circuit.

W.D. Wash. June 20, 2019 409 F. Supp. 3d 998; 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103569; 2019 WL 2548137 Third country: Somalia

DHS may designate a removal country outside removal proceedings, but designating Somalia without notice or an opportunity to be heard violated due process, so proceedings must be reopened before any removal there.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation Withholding of removal CAT deferral Jurisdiction 1252(a)(5) Bond hearing Prolonged detention (Zadvydas)

Caution The four-step notice procedure often attributed to this case comes from subsection D of the magistrate judge's report, which the district judge did not adopt; the court's statement that failing to advise of the right to apply for asylum or withholding is itself a due process violation is hedged as what Ninth Circuit case law 'suggests'; the court held detention was not indefinite under Zadvydas and granted only a bond hearing on that score. Any account presenting the case as forbidding administrative designation misstates it.

W.D. Wash. January 23, 2019 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200381; 2019 WL 5790904 Third country: Somalia

The magistrate judge recommended relief and set out four procedural requirements DHS must satisfy before removing a person to an undesignated country.

Redetention Notice Third-country designation Withholding of removal

Caution This is a report and recommendation, not a decision of the court, and it was adopted only in part: the district judge adopted the Background section and subsections A, B, C and F, and did not adopt subsection D, which contains the four-step procedure, or subsection E. The report's statement that DHS has failed to notify other noncitizens before removing them to undesignated countries, and its description of the facts as 'alarming to say the least', are the magistrate judge's characterisations in an unadopted portion.

W.D. Mo. March 22, 2018 Unreported; order at ECF No. 20 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court denied the government’s motion to dismiss and granted the habeas petition, ordering immediate release and directing that “Petitioner’s conditions of his order of supervision which were in effect before his detention are reinstated immediately.” The court held it had no authority to examine ICE’s decision to issue or to execute the removal order, but did have jurisdiction over the request for release from detention pending removal. Applying Zadvydas v. Davis to a case where removal was reasonably foreseeable, it weighed the statutory factors and found detention not reasonably necessary to secure removal: “Most notable, is the fact that Petitioner was released on an Order of Supervision in 2012 and has for the past 6 years adhered regularly to the conditions placed upon him.” It added that he had no criminal history and strong family and community ties.

Detention pending removal Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) Section 1231(a)(6) Order of supervision Redetention Reinstatement of supervision conditions Habeas jurisdiction

Caution It is an unreported district court order, not binding on any other court. The petitioner held no withholding of removal and no protection under the Convention Against Torture, and no third country was involved; removal was to his country of citizenship. The legal basis is Zadvydas and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), not the post-order custody review regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13. What the order records is a court treating years of compliance with an order of supervision as a reason against redetention, and restoring the supervision conditions that redetention had displaced. A docket number of 5:18-cv-06099 sometimes attached to this case in secondary sources is wrong; that number belongs to an unrelated case.

E.D. Mich. July 24, 2017 261 F. Supp. 3d 820 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court granted a class-wide preliminary injunction halting removals to Iraq until class members could seek relief in the immigration courts. Its account of what had happened: “Without warning, over 1,400 Iraqi nationals discovered that their removal orders — many of which had lain dormant for several years — were now to be immediately enforced, following an agreement reached between the United States and Iraq to facilitate removal.” One named petitioner had been living in her community under a final order of removal since 1986. The court found that the resulting search for counsel had been “significantly impeded by the Government’s successive transfers of many detainees across the country, separating them from their lawyers and the families and communities who can assist in those legal efforts,” and that people who had lived peaceably for years under limited supervision had had little reason to incur the cost of a motion to reopen before the policy changed. Rejecting the government’s position that only the immigration courts could act, it held that “a federal district court is armed with jurisdiction to act as a first responder to protect the writ of habeas corpus and the allied right to due process,” so that people facing grave harm are not removed before having their day in court.

Mass redetention Long-dormant removal orders Bilateral repatriation agreement Habeas jurisdiction Suspension Clause Due process Motions to reopen Transfer of detainees Class action Preliminary injunction

Caution Vacated. The Sixth Circuit held on 20 December 2018 that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter either injunction and remanded with directions to dismiss the removal-based claims. The Sixth Circuit did not disturb the findings of fact recorded here, which is why they are kept in this collection. Removal was to the class members’ country of origin, not to a third country.

European Court of Human Rights December 15, 2016 ECHR 2016 (extracts)

Disposition Unanimously: violations of Article 5 §§ 1, 2 and 4; no violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions at the Contrada Imbriacola early reception and aid centre or on the ships Vincent and Audace; and a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3. By sixteen votes to one, no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and no violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. By fifteen votes to two, EUR 2,500 to each applicant for non-pecuniary damage; unanimously, EUR 15,000 jointly for costs and expenses.

The applicants left Tunisia by boat on 16 and 17 September 2011, were intercepted by the Italian coastguard and taken to Lampedusa (paragraph 11). They were held at the early reception centre at Contrada Imbriacola until a revolt and fire on 20 September, then flown to Palermo on 22 September and held on the ships Vincent and Audace (paragraphs 14 and 15). On 27 and 29 September 2011 they were taken to Palermo airport and removed to Tunisia, after being received by the Tunisian consul before they boarded (paragraphs 17 and 18). The Grand Chamber held their confinement unlawful: “the applicants’ deprivation of liberty did not satisfy the general principle of legal certainty and was not compatible with the aim of protecting the individual against arbitrariness” (paragraph 107). They had no remedy for the conditions in which they were held, because an appeal against the refusal-of-entry orders “would have served only to challenge the lawfulness of their removal” (paragraphs 270 and 271). It found no collective expulsion: “To sum up, the applicants underwent identification on two occasions, their nationality was established, and they were afforded a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion” (paragraph 254). It left open whether the April 2011 agreement between Italy and Tunisia, “which has not been made public”, could be regarded as a readmission agreement within the meaning of the Return Directive (paragraph 255).

Collective expulsion Detention Detention conditions Readmission agreement Effective remedy Article 3 ECHR Article 5 ECHR

Caution The applicants did not claim that they faced ill-treatment in Tunisia. The Court held that the lack of suspensive effect of an appeal against removal did not in itself breach Article 13 “where, as in the present case, the applicants do not allege that there is a real risk of a violation of the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country” (paragraph 281). The Grand Chamber departed from the Chamber on the conditions at Contrada Imbriacola, on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and on Article 13 taken with it; it confirmed the Chamber on Article 5, on Article 13 taken with Article 3 and on the ships (concurring opinion of Judge Raimondi, paragraphs 1 and 2).

European Court of Human Rights July 24, 2014 Third country: United States custody. The CIA flew him into Poland on 5 December 2002 and out of Poland on 6 June 2003 on its rendition aircraft (paragraph 417). At the date of the judgment he was held at the Internment Facility at the United States Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba (paragraph 41).

Disposition Unanimously: the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion dismissed; Poland “failed to comply with its obligations under Article 38 of the Convention”; violations of Article 3 in its procedural and its substantive aspect, of Articles 5, 8 and 13, and of Article 6 § 1; and a violation of Articles 2 and 3 taken with Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 “on account of the transfer of the applicant from the respondent State’s territory despite the existence of a real risk that he could be subjected to the death penalty”. EUR 100,000 for non-pecuniary damage. The judgment became final on 16 February 2015.

The Court found it “established beyond reasonable doubt” that the applicant arrived at Szymany on 5 December 2002 on the CIA rendition aircraft N63MU, was held from then until 6 June 2003 at the CIA detention facility at Stare Kiejkuty with the codename “Quartz”, was interrogated by the CIA and subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques and to unauthorised techniques, and was flown out on the rendition aircraft N379P (paragraph 417). The treatment “amounted to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 516). Poland “knew of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on its territory at the material time” and cooperated in them, and it “ought to have known that, by enabling the CIA to detain such persons on its territory, it was exposing them to a serious risk of treatment contrary to the Convention” (paragraph 442). The Court accepted the experts’ assessment that the torture was “the exclusive responsibility of the CIA” and that Polish officials were unlikely to have witnessed it, but held Poland responsible on account of its “acquiescence and connivance” in the programme (paragraph 517). On the transfer, it held that “by enabling the CIA to transfer the applicant to its other secret detention facilities, the Polish authorities exposed him to a foreseeable serious risk of further ill-treatment and conditions of detention in breach of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 518), and that “at the time of the applicant’s transfer from Poland there was a substantial and foreseeable risk that he could be subjected to the death penalty following his trial before the military commission” (paragraph 578). Under Article 46 it required Poland “to seek to remove that risk as soon as possible, by seeking assurances from the US authorities that he will not be subjected to the death penalty” (paragraph 589).

Extraordinary rendition Secret detention Article 3 ECHR Death penalty Flagrant denial of justice Effective investigation Diplomatic assurances

Caution The judgment decides Poland’s responsibility under the Convention; the United States is not a party to the Convention or to the case. The Court’s findings of fact rest on evidence assessed as a whole, and it held that Poland had failed to comply with Article 38. The Committee of Ministers’ supervision of the judgment is set out on the Coalition’s page on Poland.

European Court of Human Rights July 24, 2014 Third country: United States custody. The CIA flew him into Poland on 5 December 2002, and on 22 September 2003 transferred him “to another CIA secret detention facility elsewhere” (paragraph 419). At the date of the judgment he was held at the Internment Facility at the United States Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba (paragraph 41).

Disposition Unanimously: the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion dismissed; Poland “failed to comply with its obligations under Article 38 of the Convention”; the application admissible; violations of Article 3 in its procedural and its substantive aspect, of Article 5 and of Article 8; a violation of Article 13 “on account of the lack of effective remedies in respect of the applicant’s grievances under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention”; and a violation of Article 6 § 1 “on account of the transfer of the applicant from the respondent State’s territory despite the existence of a real risk that he could face a flagrant denial of justice”. EUR 100,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 30,000 for costs and expenses. The judgment became final on 16 February 2015.

The Court found it “established beyond reasonable doubt” that the applicant arrived at Szymany with Mr Al Nashiri on 5 December 2002 on the CIA rendition aircraft N63MU, was held at the CIA facility at Stare Kiejkuty until 22 September 2003 and subjected there to the procedures and treatment applied to the CIA’s High-Value Detainees, and was then flown out on the aircraft N313P (paragraph 419). The treatment “amounted to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 511). As in Al Nashiri, the Court accepted that the torture was “the exclusive responsibility of the CIA”, but held Poland responsible on account of its “acquiescence and connivance” in the programme (paragraph 512), and held that “by enabling the CIA to transfer the applicant to its other secret detention facilities, the Polish authorities exposed him to a foreseeable serious risk of further ill-treatment and conditions of detention in breach of Article 3 of the Convention” (paragraph 513). When he was transferred, “there was a real risk that his trial before the military commission would amount to a flagrant denial of justice” (paragraph 557). He had never been charged, and his detention without charge “by itself amounts to a flagrant denial of justice” (paragraph 559).

Extraordinary rendition Secret detention Article 3 ECHR Flagrant denial of justice Indefinite detention Effective investigation

Caution The judgment decides Poland’s responsibility under the Convention; the United States is not a party to the Convention or to the case. The Article 6 finding concerns the risk created by his transfer and his detention without charge; he had not been listed for trial before a military commission (paragraph 559). The Committee of Ministers’ supervision of the judgment is set out on the Coalition’s page on Poland.

M.D. Pa. June 15, 2007 497 F. Supp. 2d 615; 2007 WL 1746367 Third country: None (removal to country of origin)

The court refused to dismiss the habeas petition and stayed removal pending the outcome of the proceeding. Khouzam had been released in February 2006 under an order of supervision, after eight years in custody, on a finding that there was no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. When he reported to the ICE facility in York, Pennsylvania on 29 May 2007 as that order required, he was retaken into custody and handed a three-line letter from the Assistant Secretary for ICE stating that the Secretary of Homeland Security had terminated his deferral of removal to Egypt, effective four months earlier, on diplomatic assurances the government would not show him. Rejecting the government’s arguments that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction and that the petition raised non-justiciable political questions, the court held that Khouzam had presented justiciable issues falling within its habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a stay should continue: granting one “to assure proper observance of the applicable law serves the public interest.”

Diplomatic assurances CAT deferral Termination without notice Redetention at a reporting appointment Order of supervision Habeas jurisdiction Political question Stay of removal

Caution Interim relief only. This was a ruling on a motion to dismiss and a stay application, not a final judgment. This is the first of two opinions in the same case; the merits were decided on 10 January 2008. Removal here was to the petitioner’s own country, Egypt, not to a third country. The Third Circuit later held that the District Court had no habeas jurisdiction over these claims and vacated the January 2008 order on that ground, while granting the same relief on the petition for review.

E.D. Va. August 28, 2006 446 F. Supp. 2d 604

The petition was premature because the six-month post-removal period had not run, and ICE's active steps to secure a third country defeated the claim that removal was not significantly likely.

Prolonged detention (Zadvydas) CAT deferral Third-country designation

Caution Adverse authority, and the brief carries it as such. Pre-removal custody does not count toward the six months. The petitioner was cooperating with ICE's efforts and consented to removal to a third country, so nothing in the case addresses removal over objection, without notice, or to a state where the person fears harm. The brief describes the grant only as 'CAT relief' without specifying withholding or deferral, and it does not print the decretal disposition.

European Court of Human Rights November 15, 1996 Reports 1996-V

Disposition By twelve votes to seven, that “in the event of the Secretary of State's decision to deport the first applicant to India being implemented, there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention”. By thirteen votes to six, no violation of Article 5 § 1. Unanimously, a violation of Article 5 § 4, and a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3. By seventeen votes to two, not necessary to consider the complaint under Article 8. The findings of violation held to be sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage; £45,000 awarded for costs and expenses, less 21,141 French francs; the remainder of the claim dismissed.

On 14 August 1990 the Home Secretary decided that Karamjit Singh Chahal should be deported to India because his presence in the United Kingdom was “unconducive to the public good for reasons of national security and other reasons of a political nature, namely the international fight against terrorism” (paragraph 25). He said that on a visit to Punjab in 1984 the police had held him for twenty-one days, beaten him to unconsciousness, electrocuted him and subjected him to a mock execution (paragraph 18). The Home Secretary obtained an assurance from the government of India, repeated in December 1995, that he “would enjoy the same legal protection as any other Indian citizen, and that he would have no reason to expect to suffer mistreatment of any kind at the hands of the Indian authorities” (paragraph 37). The Grand Chamber held that the risk could not be weighed against the danger he was said to pose: “The prohibition provided by Article 3 (art. 3) against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases.” … “In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) is thus wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees” (paragraph 80). On the assurance: “Although the Court does not doubt the good faith of the Indian Government in providing the assurances mentioned above (paragraph 92), it would appear that, despite the efforts of that Government, the NHRC and the Indian courts to bring about reform, the violation of human rights by certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India is a recalcitrant and enduring problem (see paragraph 104 above). Against this background, the Court is not persuaded that the above assurances would provide Mr Chahal with an adequate guarantee of safety” (paragraph 105). It concluded that “the order for his deportation to India would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3 (art. 3)” (paragraph 107). The Court also found that “neither the advisory panel nor the courts could review the decision of the Home Secretary to deport Mr Chahal to India with reference solely to the question of risk, leaving aside national security considerations” (paragraph 153), so that he had no effective remedy, and that neither habeas corpus, judicial review nor the advisory panel met the requirements of Article 5 § 4 for the review of his detention (paragraph 132). The detention itself, with a view to deportation, did not breach Article 5 § 1.

Article 3 ECHR Non-refoulement National security Diplomatic assurances Detention pending removal Effective remedy Judicial review

Caution The Article 3 finding was made by twelve votes to seven. The judgment decides whether the deportation order could be carried out on the evidence before the Court in 1996, when Mr Chahal was still detained; it does not record what happened to him afterwards, and the Coalition has not read a source that does. The Court applied the same rule, that the risk of ill-treatment cannot be weighed against the reasons for removal, in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom in 2012 (see that entry), where it accepted the assurances Jordan gave.